that Mr. Peache did not receive the summons to attend the defendants' jury in sufficient time; and, on the other hand, that from his ill state of health he was in the habit of neglecting similar calls, and had actually neglected to attend upon another jury at the same assizes, to which second jury he had been duly summoned. The lord-chief-justice disposed of the various points in the following manner :-First, as to the unindifferency of the master of the Crown-office, the custom was, to select the special jurors by name; and as each party had the right of striking off twelve, the panel was likely to be as favourable to himself as though it had been chosen by the chance of the die: the nomination of esquires only was also a proceeding according to custom, the object being, to put upon special juries persons of a higher rank than, under ordinary circumstances, would try the cause; there was no reason to suppose, that persons in the commission of the peace would act under any undue influence, nor was it fair or reasonable that such persons should be excluded from special juries; and the selection of gentlemen who had served upon the grand jury-though made, no doubt, by the master, under a conscientious conviction that he was acting legally-had afterwards been set aside, and could not therefore, in any way, have prejudiced the defendants. With respect to the second ground of complaint, the non-summoning of Mr. Peache, it did not appear that the neglect of summons had proceeded from partiality on the part of the sheriff: on the contrary, it seemed probable, that

Mr. Peache, even if his summons had been delivered in time, would have pleaded his ill health, and avoided serving upon the jury. The last ground of objection was, the point which went to the challenge of the poll. Now, there was no proof offered at the trial of any expressions hostile to the defendants having been used by the jury; but it was proposed, without any proof, to put questions to them as to their opinions. Such a course could not be taken: in refusing to permit such challenge to the special jurymen, the lord-chief-baron had done right; and, in permitting it even to the talesmen, that learned judge had done wrong. It stood upon the most indisputable authorities, that opinions expressed by a juryman arising from his knowledge or belief, as to the facts of a cause, formed no sufficient ground for challenge; the only tenable ground of such challenge was a declaration of favour or preference between the parties.—Rule discharged.

MAY 1.-In Banco. Brunton and others v. Hawkes.

This was an action upon the case. The plaintiffs are patentees of certain improvements, alleged to be of their invention, in the construction of ships' anchors, windlasses, and cables, and they charged the defendant with invasion of their right. The action was tried, in the sittings after Trinity term last, before the lord chief-justice, at Westminster, when the matter as to the windlasses was put aside by consent, and a verdict, establishing their rights as to the anchor and cable, was taken for the plaintiffs.

In Michaelmas term last, a rule Nisi for a new trial was obtained upon the following grounds:First, with respect to the chain cable, it was denied that in the form of link used by the plaintiffs (an elliptical link, the sides prevented from collapsing by a broadended stay placed crosswise), there was any novelty: upon the cable, therefore, no patent could be maintained: 2dly, as to the anchor, the difference between the plaintiffs' improvement and the old machine was stated to be this: in the old anchor, the flukes were made in distinct pieces, and united, by welding, to the shank; whereas the plaintiffs' formed the flukes in one piece, and united them to the shank by passing the conical end of the shank through a corresponding aperture in the centre of the flukes. Now, in this arrangement it was contended no novelty appeared; the principle, as regarded the construction of the flukes, having been applied in the mushroom anchor, and in the adze anchor, and being, as to the union of the flukes with the shank, used in the mushroom anchor and in the kedge anchor, and being also of daily occur rence in the pick-axe, and in the common hammer. The third point maintained in argument for the new trial was, that failure upon either branch of the patent, the anchor or the cable, vitiated and made void the patent altogether.

Cause was shown upon different days, and at considerable length, by Mr. Scarlett, Mr. Marryat, and Mr. Chitty.

The points chiefly insisted upon were three-that the employment of the elliptical link with the broad-ended stay in the chain

cable was, at least, a new combination; that the adze and mushroom anchors, set up by the other side, were mere mooring posts, totally distinct, in use and construction, from the ship's anchor; for improvement upon which the plaintiffs' claimed, and that failure of one branch of the patent would not void the other branch, any more than a grant of three estates would be made wholly inoperative by a defect as regarded any one of those estates in the title of the granter.

The Court this morning delivered its opinion.

The Lord Chief Justice regretted, extremely, that the author of a highly beneficial invention should from any cause be deprived of his personal advantage in it. That the plaintiffs' chain cable involved novelty of combination, he had no doubt; and he thought that, upon that part, taken distinctly, of the improvements in question, a patent might have been sustained. In the construction of the plaintiffs' anchor, however, there was, according to his lordship's view, no originality; and he thought it evident, both upon the principles of patents, and upon the decided case of " Hill v. Thomson," which had gone through very elaborate discussion in the court of Common-pleas, that the failure of any part of a patent, of necessity, rendered void the whole.

Mr. Justice Bayley concurred in opinion with the lord-chiefjustice, and felt the less regret at being compelled to do so, as the plaintiffs, if they went to a new trial, might take, by means of a special verdict, the opinion of a court of error. The learned judge had no doubt that a patent, bad as

to part, must be bad as to the whole, because patents were not matters of right, but grants dependant merely upon the pleasure of the crown, The consideration of the instrument was to be looked at the crown might be induced to grant a patent to a man for three inventions, which it would have refused to him for any one of those inventions singly.

Mr. Justice Best doubted very much, whether, upon the plaintiffs' improvement in the chain cable, a patent could be sustained: as to the anchor, clearly it could not; and the patent being void as to the one part, certainly became invalid as to the other.

Mr. Scarlett said, that the demand for the plaintiffs' anchors was so great, that it was impossible to manufacture them with rapidity to meet it.

The Lord Chief Justice was convinced, that the invention, as far as it could be so called, was highly beneficial.

Rule absolute for a new trial.

KING'S BENCH, GUILDHALL,
JUNE 21.

(Before the Lord Chief Justice

and a Special Jury.)

Wakely v. Barron and others. This was an action against the Hope Insurance Company upon a policy of insurance for 1,2001.

Mr. Adolphus opened the pleadings.

A gentleman of the special jury felt himself bound to state that he was a director of the Royal Exchange Assurance Company; perhaps that circumstance might be an objection to his serving on the jury.

The Lord Chief Justice, after
VOL. LXIII.

consulting the counsel for the plaintiff, said, that there could be no objection.

Mr. Denman stated, that in opening a case of extraordinary interest, he would occupy very briefly the time of the court. Mr. Wakely, the plaintiff, a surgeon of great respectability, and the son of a landholder in the county of Kent, went, in December, 1819, to live at No. 5, in Argyle-street. He married in February, 1820; and, on that occasion, deemed it fit to increase his insurance from 600l. to 1,200/.: the accession of property, which would naturally accompany such change in a man's situation, would sufficiently account for that proceeding. On the night of the 26th of August, or rather on the morning of the 27th (for it was between one and two o'clock), a fire was discovered in his dwelling. The flames were seen bursting from the windows; the servants rushed naked from the house; the neighbourhood was in confusion and dismay; but Mr. Wakely himself was no where to be found; great anxiety was, as the jury would suppose, felt on his account; for him; and, after much unsucsearch in all quarters was made cessful toil, he was discovered, drenched in blood, covered with dirt, with a heavy bruise upon his head, and stabs upon different parts of his body, in the house of his next door neighbour, Mr. Thomson. The friends who found the plaintiff in that situation, agitated, trembling, and almost unconscious of what he did, thought it best to put him to bed, and endeavour to restore him to his senses. In bed he remained during the remainder of the night; his house in the mean 2 F

time was burned to the ground, and his property in it destroyed. Now, claiming in a court of justice to recover his loss by that fire of the 27th August, the plaintiff might fairly expect to be called upon for some account of himself-for some account of what had been his situation previous to his being found in the house of Mr. Thomson. The narrative of Mr. Wakely as to that point, it was now his (Mr. Denman's) duty to lay before the Court; he confessed it was most extraordinary; but he doubted not that it was entitled to, and that it would obtain belief. On the night of the 26th of August, about eleven o'clock, Mr. Wakely, being troubled with an affection of the eyes, ordered leeches to be brought that he might apply them to his temples: at half past eleven his servant placed the leeches before him, and went to bed-at that time Mrs. Wakely was on a visit at the house of her father, and there was no one in Argyle-street but the plaintiff and two servants. After the servants were gone to bed, Mr. Wakely applied the leeches to his face, and continued for some time to encourage the bleeding; at length he heard a knock at the street door, and, on opening it, a stranger appeared, who desired he would immediately go to Mr. Ivatt's (a patient living in the city), who was extremely ill. Mr. Wakely said, that he could not then leave the house, but that he would see Mr. Ivatt early in the morning; the stranger said, that he had walked fast, that it was hot weather, and that he wished Mr. Wakely would give him some beer. The plaintiff then admitted the man into his hall,

and went down into the cellar in order to draw him some cider; as he returned up the kitchen stairs he received a violent blow, from what hand he knew not; but it stunned him, and he fell senseless to the ground. Awaking from his stupor (how long after he could not tell), Mr. Wakely saw flame and smoke surrounding him. He found that the house was on fire; and going into the back kitchen, he contrived, by standing upon a meat screen, to force his way through a skylight to some leads; thence he climbed over a wall, and eventually made his way into the yard of his neighbour, Mr. Thomson. This was Mr. Wakely's statement. From 12 o'clock, which was the time, as near as he could guess, when the stranger came, until two o'clock, when he was found in the house of Mr. Thomson, he could give no account of himself: he supposed he must have lain, during that time, in a state of insensibility. If he was asked, however, to what cause he could ascribe the mysterious visit of his secret enemy, he could, upon that point, perhaps, furnish some clue to explanation. The jury would remember the execution of Thistlewood and his companions for treason. Owing to some infatuation, which it was impossible to account for, a report had been spread, and generally credited, that Mr. Wakely was the individual who, under a mask, had beheaded those persons; and some of the crowd, while witnessing the conflagration, had been heard to rejoice, that punishment had overtaken the masked executioner. At all events, if the plaintiff was unable to give a full account of all that had befallen him