of our own growth to rise up in our defence; and might not have time to draw a fufficient number of troops to our relief from the remote corners of Germany. It is generally said, that if King Charles II. had made war upon France in the beginning of his reign, he might have conquered it by the many veterans which were fcattered up and down this kingdom, and had been inured to fervice in the civil wars. It is to be hoped we shall never have fuch another nursery of foldiers; but if the present war gives a more military turn to all other nations of Europe, than to our own, it is to be feared we may lofe in ftrength, what we gain in number. We may apply the fame confideration nearer home. If all our levies are made in Scotland or Ireland, may not those two parts of the British monar chy, after the difbanding of the present army, be too powerful for the reft, in cafe of a revolt? though, God be thanked, we are not in any danger of one at prefent. However, as thefe confiderations do not concern the more effential . part of our defign, it is fufficient to have mentioned them.

The fparing of ourselves in fo important a conjuncture, when we have but this fingle opportunity left for the preferving every thing that is precious amongst us, is the worst fort of management that we can poffibly fall into. The good husbandry of one age may intail an endless expence upon all pofterity. We must venture the facrificing a part of our lives and fortunes at prefent, if we will effectually fecure both for the future. The British Kingdom is fo well ftocked with people, and fo much abounds in horfe, that we have power enough in our

own

hands,

hands, did we make our utmost use of it, to humble France, and in a campaign or two to put an end to the war.

1

There is not a more difagreeable thought to the people of Great Britain than that of a ftanding army. But if a peace be made before the difunión of France and Spain, there are few, perhaps, that will not think the maintaining a fettled body of numerous forces indifpenfible for the fafety of our country. We have it therefore in our choice to raife fuch a ftrong reinforcement of troops as at prefent may be fufficient, in conjunction with thofe of the allies, for breaking the ftrength of the enemy; or when the peace is concluded, to keep on foot fuch an army as will be neceffary for preventing his attempts upon us.

It is to be hoped that those who would be the moft zealous against keeping up a conftant body of regular troops after a general peace, will the moft diftinguith themfelves for the promoting an augmentation of those which are now on foot; and by that means take care that we shall not ftand in need of fuch an expedient.

We are indeed obliged by the prefent fituation of our affairs to bring more troops into the field than we have yet done. As the French are retired within their lines, and have collected all their ftrength into a narrow compafs, we must have greater numbers to charge them in their intrenchments, and force them to a battle. We faw the laft campaign that an army of fourscore thousand of the beft troops in Europe, with the Duke of Marlborough at the head of them, could do nothing against an enemy that were too nu

merous

merous to be assaulted in their camps, or attacked in their strong holds.

There is another confideration which deferves our utmost attention. We know very well, that there is a Prince at the head of a powerful army, who may give a turn to the war, in which we are engaged, if he thinks fit to fide with either party. I cannot prefume to guess how far our minifters may be informed of his defigns: but unless they have very ftrong affurances of his falling in with the grand alliance, or not oppofing it, they cannot be too circumfpect and fpeedy in taking their precautions against any contrary refolution. We fhall be unpardonable, if after fuch an expence of blood and treasure, we leave it in the power of any fingle Prince to command a peace, and make us accept what conditions he thinks fit. It is certain, according to the posture of our affairs in the last campaign, this Prince could have turned the balance on either fide; but it is to be hoped the liberties of Europe will not depend any more on the determination of one man's will. I do not speak this because I think there is any appearance of that Prince's uniting himself to France. On the contrary, as he hath an extraordinary zeal for the reformed religion, and great sentiments of honour, I think it is not improbable we should draw him over to the confederacy, if we press him to it by proper motives. His love for religion, and his fenfe of glory, will both have their effect on a Prince who hath already diftinguifhed himself by being a patron of proteftants, and guarantee of the Weftphalian treaty, And if his intereft hath any part in his actions, the

allies may make him greater offers than the French King can do in the prefent conjuncture. There are larger extents of dominion in the forfeited principalities of the Empire; doubtful fucceffions, to which the King of Sweden feems to have very just pretenfions; and at the fame time a great title not yet difpofed of, and a feat of war on the Mofelle, where none of our generals have fignalized themfelves. It would be prefumption to be particular in any proposals on fuch an occafion; it is enough to have fhewn in general, that there are fair opportunities, of which the wisdom of the confederates may make use.

Common fenfe will direct us, when we fee fo warlike a Prince at the head of fo great an army hovering on the borders of our Confederates, either to obtain his friendship, or fecure ourselves against the force of his arms. We are fure, whatever number of troops we raife, we fhall have no hands but what will turn to account. Nay, we are certain, that extraordinary funds and augmentations for one or two campaigns may spare us the expence of many years, and put an end to taxes and levies for a whole age; whereas a long parfimonious war will drain us of more men and money, and in the end may prove ineffectual.

There is ftill a great popular objection, which will be made to every thing that can be urged on this fubject. And indeed it is fuch a one as falls fo much in with the prejudices and little paffions of the multitude, that when it is turned and fet off to advantage by ill-defigning men, it throws a damp on the public fpirit of VOL. III. M

the

the nation, and gives a check to all generous refolutions for its honour and fafety. In fhort, we are to be told, that England contributes much more than any other of the Allies, and that therefore it is not reasonable she should make any addition to her prefent efforts. If this were true in fact, I do not fee any tolerable colour for fuch a conclufion. Suppofing among a multitude embarked in the fame veffel, there are several that in the fury of a tempeft will rather perifh than work for their preservation; would it not be madness in the reft to ftand idle, and rather choose to fink together than do more than comes to their fhare? Since we are engaged in a work fo abfolutely neceflary for our welfare, the remiffness of our Allies fhould be an argument for us to redouble our endeavours rather than flacken them. If we must govern ourfelves by example, let us rather imitate the vigilance and activity of the common enemy, than the fupineness and negligence of our friends.

We have indeed a much greater share in the war than any other part of the confederacy. The French King makes at us directly, keeps a King by him to fet over us, and hath very lately augmented the falary of his court, to let us fee how much he hath that design at his heart. Few of the nations in war with him, fhould they ever fall into his hands, would lose their religion or form of government, or interfere at prefent with him in matters of commerce. The Dutch, who are likely to be the greatest lofers after the Britons, have but little trade to the Levat in comparison with ours, have no confiderable plantations or commerce in the Weft

Indies,