successfully defended against desperate attempts of the Moh Wang to recapture them. In, the fighting here, as elsewhere, the steamer Hyson did good service. In one engagement no less than 1300 prisoners were taken, and as many more of the Tai-pings were drowned in their efforts to escape. The taking of Wulungchiao and Patachiao rendered any sortie from Soochow to the south impossible, and also enabled Gordon's force to operate to the north, and thus form a junction with other Imperialist troops, under the Futai's brother, who had advanced from Kongyin. The force which Gordon had under his own immediate command was insufficient to enable him to invest Soochow, yet he was enabled steadily to advance in the work of doing so, because the positions which he took could be left in charge of the Futai's other troops, as those of General Ching, or of the disciplined Chinese under Macartney and Bonnefoi. Thus the Ever-Victorious Army gradually fought its way round Soochow, and left a fortified circle held by its allies encompassing that city.

Among the engagements by which this operation was performed was one on the 1st of November at Leeku, a strong Rebel position five miles to the north of Soochow. This position was carried by storm by the 4th and 2d Regiments, aided by some Franco-Chinese. In almost all these engagements Colonel Gordon was very much exposed, for he found it necessary, or at least expedient, to be constantly in the front, and often to lead in person. Though brave men, the officers of his force would sometimes hang back, and their commander had occasionally to take one by the arm and lead him into the thick of the fire. He himself seemed to bear a charmed life, and never carried any arms, even when foremost in the breach. His only weapon on these occa

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sions was a small cane with which he used to direct his troops, and in the Chinese imagination this cane soon became magnified into Gordon's "magic wand of victory." His Celestial followers, finding him almost invariably victorious and escaping unhurt, though more exposed than any other man in the force, naturally concluded, in accordance with their usual ideas, that the little wand he carried insured protection and success to its owner. Every one who knows the Chinese character will be aware that such an idea must have given great encouragement to the Ever-Victorious Army, and was of more service to its commander than could have been any amount of arms which he himself could possibly have carried. In this engagement at Leeku Colonel Gordon had a narrow escape; for one of his captains, Mr George Perry, was shot dead at his side under rather peculiar circumstances. Some days previously, Gordon found lying on the ground a letter in the handwriting of this officer to a Tai-ping sympathiser in Shanghai, giving information as to the intended movements of the force. On being shown this letter, Perry confessed that he had written it, but declared he thought the information of no importance, and had only intended to send it to Shanghai as a piece of gossip which might be interesting. On this his commander said to him, "Very good, Perry. I shall pass your fault over this time, on condition that, in order to show your loyalty, you undertake to lead the next forlorn-hope." This agreement had been forgotten by Colonel Gordon when, a few days after, they stood together on the edge of the ditch in front of the stockades at Leeku. They were both, in fact, leading a forlornhope; and while standing together, a ball struck Perry in the mouth, and he fell into Gordon's arms, where he almost immediately expired.

Shortly after, on the 10th November, another engagement occurred at Wanti, a place which was so well defended by massive mud-works that the shelling of all the artillery available scarcely made any impression upon it. When the place was surrounded by the disciplined Chinese, the Tai-pings inside rushed out and tried to escape, which led to much hand-to-hand fighting. The capture of Wanti nearly completed the investure of Soochow. The Taiho Lake was held by the steamers Hyson and Tsatlee, on board of which a force of 200 Imperialists was placed, and which cruised off Moodow, cutting off the communication between the lake and the Siaou Mun, or small West Gate of Soochow. The next great water outlet was closed to the Rebels by 1000 Imperialist soldiers stationed at Wulungchiao, off the Pan Mun, or South Gate. The main water and road communication with the south was also closed by 1500 Imperialists stockaded on the Grand Canal at Patachiao. A small creek leading from the South-East Gate was stopped by a fleet of Imperialist gunboats. General Ching's force, of about 4000 men, was encamped on the road to Quinsan, about two miles outside of the Loh Mun, or East Gate of Soochow. At Leeku and Wanti Colonel Gordon himself was stationed with a portion of his force, guarding the canal to Chanzu. The remainder of his army, together with 2500 Imperialist troops under Ching, and 400 of the Franco-Chinese, were moved about, and employed as occasion required. Altogether, 13,500 men were employed in November 1863 in the investment of Soochow, being arranged as follows:—

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25,000 additional Imperialists under the Futai's brother, whose centre was at Fushan. The Tai-pings had 40,000 men in Soochow and its suburbs; the city of Wusieh held some 20,000 more; and the Faithful King had 18,000 men stationed at Mahtanchiao, a place situated between Wusieh and Soochow, and from which he could assist either city, and also could attack on the flank any advance made by the Imperialists on the Grand Canal, the only great water and road line of communication left to the Tai-pings.

This able Tai-ping leader seems to have fully understood the perilous position of his cause, but was distracted between the danger to which Nanking was exposed, and the risk of losing Hangchow and Soochow. The following despatches from him, dated near Soochow, the 10th of November 1863, were intercepted by the Imperialists, and show how alive he was to the dangerous state of the Tai-ping cause at this period :

To the Chow Wang.

The other day, on the return [from Nanking?] of the President Lí, I wrote you particulars of all he had to say, but have received no answer, and feel very anxious on this account. News arrived yesterday from Nanking that all the works in the neighbourhood of the Kao-chiao Gate and the Shang Fang Gate had been abandoned, and that the city is hard pressed in the extreme. I am disturbed beyond measure by this intelligence; and, in view of all the President Lí has said, I earnestly hope that you will act in unison with the brethren, and give speedy thought to the general cause. What is most earnestly to be wished is, that Nanking may be preserved from harm. Only so long as the capital is held are our lives our own.

I look to you to act with the brethren, and not again to allow suspicions to arise. If this is once cherished, the matter is at an end.

To the Hu Wang, commanding at Chanchu fu.

I write again, because on the 28th October I despatched

two letters by express messenger, with orders to deliver them within a certain time, in which I requested that, with the exception of those at Chanchu, all the forces might with all speed be brought together for a combined attack, in order that we might derive the benefit of conjoint action; but a length of time has elapsed, to my great anxiety, without the receipt of an answer. The news yesterday received from Nanking, to the effect that the works around the Kao-chiao Gate have been evacuated, has probably already reached you, as you are nearer to the spot. I was disturbed and grieved beyond measure by this intelligence, and at the same time I have no troops whom I can dispose. If you, together with the Wusieh troops, can come and make a combined effort, there will be reason to hope that the siege both of Nanking and of Soochow may be broken up. The beleaguerment of Nanking is, as you are doubtless fully aware, far different now from what it has been heretofore; and I am most anxious that you should consent to join with your forces, and also combine with the troops under She Wang. If all unite in sweeping away one division of the Imps., security will accrue on all sides; and the sooner we clear away this brood the sooner we shall be able to make a combined effort to relieve Nanking. If, however, Soochow and Hangchow are endangered, not only is it useless to talk of raising the siege of Nanking, but Chanchu and Wusieh will also be as good as lost, and it will be too late for repentance then. To yourself, who know this so well, it is not necessary that I should say more.

Gordon's aim now was to cut the Rebel line of communication, so that the Faithful King might be prevented from going to the aid of the Soochow garrison. The Imperialist officers co-operating with him were afraid of thus cutting the Rebels off from any possibility of retreat; but, with better knowledge of his enemy, he calculated that when completely surrounded, the Taipings at Soochow would be likely to surrender. One great reason for this conclusion was information he had received about dissensions among the Rebel Princes in Soochow. Of these, the Moh Wang, the most energetic