The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War: An Analysis

כריכה קדמית
McFarland, 12 בספט׳ 2009 - 286 עמודים
This volume examines the military strategy and issues that Egyptian war planners faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Of major interest is the relationship between the political and military leaders and how that affected the buildup and course of the conflict. Taking this as a starting place, the author concentrates on how Soviet military doctrinal changes presented themselves between the conclusion of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.
 

מה אומרים אנשים - כתיבת ביקורת

לא מצאנו ביקורות במקומות הרגילים

תוכן

1 The Egyptian Army
13
2 Israels Defense System on the Sinai Front
35
3 Egypt Prior to the Yom Kippur War
56
4 Potential Problems in the Campaign
72
5 The Soviet Warfare Doctrine and Its Application by the Egyptians
98
Conclusion
178
Appendix A
187
Appendix B
202
Appendix C
205
Appendix D
226
Appendix E
228
Appendix F
233
Chapter Notes
241
Bibliography
267
Index
273
זכויות יוצרים

מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל

מונחים וביטויים נפוצים

מידע על המחבר (2009)

Dani Asher served in the Israel Defense Forces intelligence service for more than 40 years, mainly dealing with the southern front with Egypt, and took part in all the IDF wars since 1962. He has written many classified books and articles about wars in the Middle East. He teaches in the IDF war colleges and is a member of the Israeli and the International Commission for Military History.

מידע ביבליוגרפי