focial nor felfifh: when exerted with a view to gratification, it is felfifh: when the motive of giving pleasure to its object is fuperadded, it is party focial, partly selfish. A just action, when prompted by the principle of duty folely, is neither focial nor selfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is felfish: I pay debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But fuppofe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereft, purely to oblige me: in that cafe, together with the motive of gratification, there arifes a motive of gratitude, which refpects the creditor folely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action is partly focial, partly felfish. Suppofe again I meet with a furprifing and unexpected act of generofity, that infpires me with love to my benefactor, and the utmost gratitude: I burn to do him good: he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure în gratifying the defire, vanisheth out of fight: in this cafe, the action I perform is purely focial.

fish motives. To enjoy the pleasure of a virtuous action, one must be virtuous; and to enjoy the pleasure of a charitable action, one must think charity laudable at least, if not a duty. It is otherwise where a man gives charity merely for the fake of oftentation; for this he may do without having any pity or benevolence in his temper.

focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes ftrong, the action is exerted with a view fingly to the object of the paffion, and felf never comes in view. The fame effect of stifling selfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial. An action, for example, done to gratify my ambitious views, is selfish; but if my ambition become headstrong, and blindly impel me to action, the action is neither felfish nor focial. flight degree of refentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arifing to myself from gratifying the paffion, is justly denominated selfish: where revenge flames fo high as to have no other aim but the deftruction of its object, it is no longer felfish; but, in oppofition to a focial paffion, may be termed diffocial*.

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When this analyfis of human nature is confidered, not one article of which can with truth be controverted, there is reafon to be surprised at the blindness of fome philofophers, who, by dark and confused notions, are led to deny all motives

* This word, hitherto not in use, seems to fulfil all that is required by Demetrius Phalereus (Of Elocution, fect. 96.) in coining a new word: first, that it be perfpicuous; and next, that it be in the tone of the language; that we may not, says our author, introduce among the Grecian vocables, words that found like those of Phrygia or Scythia.

motives to action but what arife from felf-love. Man, for aught appears, might poffibly have been fo framed, as to be fufceptible of no paffions but what have felf for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety: his constitution, partly felfish, partly focial, fits him much better for his present fituation *.

Of felf, every one hath a direct perception; of other things we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes: and hence it is, that of felf the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and for the reason now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is this fufficient to account for the prevalence of felf-love?

In the foregoing part of this chapter it is fuggefted, that fome circumstances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint ought to be purfued. It is a truth afcertained

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* As the benevolence of many human actions is beyond the poffibility of doubt, the argument commonly infifted on for reconciling such actions to the selfish system, is, that the only motive I can have to perform a benevolent action, or an action of any kind, is the pleasure that it affords me. So much then is yielded, that. we are pleased when we do good to others: which is a fair admiffion of the principle of benevolence; for without that principle, what pleasure could one have in doing good to others? And admitting a principle of benevolence, why may it not be a motive to action, as well as selfishnefs is, or any other principle?

by univerfal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenfion is beyond reach, never is the object of defire; no man, in his right fenfes, defires to walk on the clouds, or to defcend to the centre of the earth we may amufe ourselves in a reverie, with building castles in the air, and wishing for what can never happen; but fuch things never move defire. And indeed a defire to do what we are fenfible is beyond our power, would be altogether abfurd. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with respect to things within reach, often inflames defire; yet, where the profpect of attainment is faint, and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, feldom raifeth any ftrong defire thus beauty, or any other good quality, in a woman of rank, feldom raifes love in a man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raise emotions in different degrees; and when defire accompanies any of these emotions, its strength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its cause. Hence the remarkable difference among defires directed to beings inanimate, animate, and rational: the emotion caused by a rational being, is out of measure ftronger than any caufed by an animal without reafon; and an emotion raifed by fuch an animal, is ftronger that what is caused by any thing inanimate. There is a feparate reason why defire of which a rational being is the object, fhould be the strongest: our D 2 defires

defires fwell by partial gratification; and the means we have of gratifying defire, by benefiting or harming a rational being, are-without end: defire directed to an inanimate being, fufceptible neither of pleasure nor pain, is not capable of a higher gratification than that of acquiring the property. Hence it is, that though every emotion accompanied with defire, is ftrictly speaking a paffion; yet commonly none of these are demoninated paffions, but where a senfible being, capable of pleasure and pain, is the object.

SECT. II.-Power of Sounds to raise Emotions and Paffions.

UPON

PON a review, I find the foregoing fection almoft wholly employed upon emotions and paffions raised by objects of fight, though they are alfo raised by objects of hearing. As this happened without intention, merely because fuch objects are familiar above others, I find it proper to add a fhort fection upon the power of founds to raise emotions and paffions.

I begin with comparing founds and visible objects with refpect to their influence upon the mind. It has already been observed, that of all external objects, rational beings, especially of our own species, have the most powerful influence in raifing emotions and paffions; and, as

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