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Having diftinguished paffion from emotion, we proceed to confider paffion more at large, with respect especially to its power of producing action.

We have daily and conftant experience for our authority, that no man ever proceeds to action but by means of an antecedent defire or impulse. So well established is this obfervation, and fo deeply rooted in the mind, that we can scarce imagine a different fyftem of action: even a child will fay familiarly, What should make me do this or that, when I have no defire to do it? Taking it then for granted, that the exiftence of action depends on antecedent defire ; it follows, that where there is no defire, there can be no action. This opens another fhining diftinction between emotions and paffions. The former, being without defire, are in their nature quiefcent: the defire included in the latter, prompts one to act in order to fulfil that defire, or, in other words, to gratify the paffion.

The cause of a paffion is fufficiently explained above it is that being or thing, which, by raifing defire, converts an emotion into a paffion. When we confider a paffion with respect to its power of prompting action, that fame being or thing is termed its object: a fine woman, for example, raises the paffion of love, which is directed to her as its object: a man, by injuring me, raises my refentment, and becomes thereby the object of my refentment. Thus the cause of a paflion, and its object, are the fame in different

refpects.

respects. An emotion, on the other hand, being in its nature quiefcent, and merely a paffive feeling, must have a cause; but cannot be faid, properly speaking, to have an object.

The objects of our paffions may be diftinguished into two kinds, general and particular. A man, a house, a garden, is a particular object : fame, esteem, opulence, honour, are general objects, because each of them comprehends many particulars. The paffions directed to general objects are commonly termed appetites, in contradiftinction to paffions directed to particular objects, which retain their proper name: thus we fay an appetite for fame, for glory, for conqueft, for riches; but we fay the paffion of friendship, of love, of gratitude, of envy, of refentment. And there is a material difference between appetites and paffions, which makes it proper to distinguish them by different names: the latter have no exiftence till a proper object be prefented; whereas the former exift firft, and then are directed to an object: a paffion comes after its object; an appetite goes before it, which is obvious in the appetites of hunger, thirft, and animal love, and is the fame in the other appetites above mentioned.

By an object fo powerful as to make a deep impreffion, the mind is inflamed, and hurried to action with a strong impulfe. Where the object is lefs powerful, fo as not to inflame the mind, nothing is felt but defire without any fenfible perturbation. The principle of duty affords one instance:

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inftance: the defire generated by an object of duty, being commonly moderate, moves us to act calmly, without any violent impulse; but if the mind happen to be inflamed with the importance of the object, in that cafe defire of doing our duty becomes a warm paffion.

The actions of brute creatures are generally directed by instinct, meaning blind impulfe or defire, without any view to confequences. Man is framed to be governed by reafon : he commonly acts with deliberation, in order to bring about fome defirable end; and in that cafe his actions are ineans employed to bring about the end defired thus I give charity in order to relieve a perfon from want: I perform a grateful action as a duty incumbent on me and I fight for my country in order to repel its enemies. At the same time, there are human actions that are not governed by reason, nor are done with any view to confequences. Infants, like brutes, are moftly governed by inftinct, without the leaft view to any end, good or ill. And even adult perfons act sometimes instinctively: thus one in extreme hunger fnatches at food, without the flighteft confideration whether it be falutary: avarice prompts to accumulate wealth, without the least view of. ufe; and thereby abfurdly converts means into an end and animal love often hurries to fruition, without a thought even of gratification.

A paffion when it flames fo high as to impel ust to act blindly without any view to confequences,

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good or ill, may in that state be termed inftinctive; and when it is fo moderate as to admit reason, and to prompt actions with a view to an end, it may in that state be termed deliberative.

With respect to actions exerted as means to an end, defire to bring about the end is what determines one to exert the action; and defire confidered in that view is termed a motive: thus the same mental act that is termed defire with respect to an end in view, is termed a motive with respect to its power of determining one to act. Inftinctive actions have a caufe, namely, the impulse of the paffion; but they cannot be faid to have a motive, because they are not done with any view to confequences.

We learn from experience, that the gratification of defire is pleasant; and the forefight of that pleasure becomes often an additional motive for acting. Thus a child eats by the mere impulfe of hunger: a young man thinks of the pleafure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulse and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health*.

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*One exception there is, and that is remorfe, when it is fo violent as to make a man defire to punish himself. The gratification here is far from being pleafant. See p. 188. of this volume. But a fingle exception, instead of overturning a general rule, is rather a confirmation of it.

From these premises, it is easy to determine with accuracy, what paffions and actions are felfish, what social. It is the end in view that afcertains the clafs to which they belong: where the end in view is my own good, they are felfish; where the end in view is the good of another, they are focial. Hence it follows, that inftinctive actions, where we act blindly and merely by impulfe, cannot be reckoned either focial or selfish: thus eating, when prompted by an impulfe merely of nature, is neither focial nor felfish; but add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleasure or my health, and it becomes in a measure selfish. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert an action to the end folely of advancing my friend's happiness, without regard to my own gratification, the action is juftly denominated focial; and fo is also the affection that is its caufe: if another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will also contribute to my own happiness, the action becomes partly felfish. If charity be given with the fingle view of relieving a perfon from diftrefs, the action is purely focial; but if it be partly in view to enjoy the pleasure of a virtuous act, the action is fo far felfifh*. Animal love when carried into action by natural impulfe fingly, is neither focial

* A selfish motive proceeding from a focial principle, fuch as that mentioned, is the most respectable of all sel

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