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Further, human actions are perceived to be right or wrong; and that perception qualifies the pleafure or pain that refults from them*.

Emotions

* In tracing our emotions and passions to their origin, my first thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary causes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterwards expanded upon the being to which these qualities and actions belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, feparable from the being to which it belongs; and, for that rea on, cannot of itself be the caufe of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or fubftance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwise than by their means. But ftill, when an emotion is raifed, it is the being itfelf, as we apprehend the matter, that raises the emotion; and it raises it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we can in idea abstract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be answered, That such abstraction may ferve the purposes of reasoning, but is too faint to produce any fort of emotion. But it is fufficient for the prefent purpose to anfwer, That the eye never abstracts: by that organ we perceive things as they really exist, and never perceive a quality as feparated from the subject. Hence it must be evident, that motions are raised, not by qualities abftractly confidered, but by the substance or body fo and to qualified. Thus, a spreading oak raifes a pleasant emotion, by means of its colour, figure, umbrage, &c.: it is not the colour, ftrictly speaking,

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Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions of others, but also by their feelings I cannot behold a man in diftrefs, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure.

The beings or things above defcribed, occafion emotions in us, not only in the original furvey, but also when recalled to the memory in idea; a field laid out with tafte, is pleasant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye: a generous action defcribed in words or colours, occafions a fenfible emotion, as well as when we see it performed; and when we reflect upon the distress of any perfon, our pain is of the fame kind with what we felt when eye-witneffes. In a word, an agreeable or disagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occafion of a pleasant or painful emotion, of the fame kind with that produced when the object was prefent the only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleasure or pain produced by the former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter. Having

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that produces the emotion, but the tree coloured: it is not the figure abstractly confidered that produces the emotion, but the tree of a certain figure. And hence, by the way, it appears, that the beauty of fuch an ob ject is complex, refolvable into several beauties more fimple.

Having explained the nature of an emotion, and mentioned feveral caufes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obfervation of confiderable importance in the science of human nature, which is, That defire follows fome emotions, and not others. The emotions raised by a beautiful garden, a magnificent building, or a number of fine faces in a crowded affembly, is feldom accompanied with defire. Other emotions are accompanied with defire; emotions, for example, raised by human actions and qualities: a virtuous action raifeth in every fpectator a pleafant emotion, which is commonly attended with defire to reward the author of the action: a vicious action, on the contrary, produceth a painful emotion, attended with defire to punish the delinquent. Even things inanimate often raise emotions accompanied with defire: witnefs the goods of fortune, which are objects of defire almost universally; and the defire, when immoderate, obtains the name of avarice. The pleasant emotion produced in a fpectator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, is feldom accompanied with defire; but if fuch a picture be expofed to fale, defire of having or poffeffing is the natural confequence of a strong emotion.

It is a truth verified by induction, that every paffion is accompanied with defire; and if an emotion be fometimes accompanied with defire, fometimes not, it comes to be a material inqui

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ry, in what refpect a paffion differs from an emotion. Is paffion in its nature or feeling diftinguishable from emotion? I have been apt to think that there must be such a diftinction; but, after the ftricteft examination, I cannot perceive any: what is love, for example, but a pleasant emotion raifed by a fight or idea of the beloved female, joined with defire of enjoyment? in what elfe confifts the paffion of refentment, but in a painful emotion occafioned by the injury, accompanied with defire to chaftife the guilty perfon? In general, as to paffion of every kind, we find no more in its compofition, but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with defire. What then fhall we say? Are passion and emotion fynonymous terms? That cannot be averred; because no feeling nor agitation of the mind void of defire, is termed a paffion; and we have discovered, that there are many emotions which pafs away without raifing defire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be folved? There appears to me

but one folution, which I relish the more, as it renders the doctrine of the paffions and emotions fimple and perfpicuous. The folution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it paffeth away without defire, is denominated an emotion: when defire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated a paffion. A fine face, for example, raifeth in me a plea

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fant feeling if that feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion; but if the feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently strong to occafion defire, it lofes its name of emotion, and acquires that of paffion. The fame holds in all

the other paffions: the painful feeling raised in a fpectator by a flight injury done to a stranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion; but that injury raiseth in the stranger a stronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion : external expreffions of diftrefs produce in the fpectator a painful feeling, which being fometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, is an emotion; but if the feeling be fo ftrong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity: envy is emulation in excefs; if the exaltation of a competitor be barely difagreeable, the painful feeling is an emotion; if it produce defire to depress him, it is a paffion.

To prevent mistakes, it must be observed, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, namely, that internal act, which, by influencing the will, makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax sense refpects also actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to represent him, or that my country may flourish in arts and sciences: but fuch internal act is more properly termed a wish than a desire,

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