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refined beauties, are quick-fighted in improprieties; and these they eagerly grafp, in order to gratify their favourite propenfity. Perfons galled are provoked to maintain, that ridicule is improper for grave fubjects. Subjects really grave are by no means fit for ridicule but then it is urged against them, that when it is called in question whether a certain fubject be really grave, ridicule is the only means of determining the controverfy. Hence a celebrated question, Whether ridicule be or be not a test of truth? I give this question a place here, because it tends to illuftrate the nature of ridicule.

The question ftated in accurate terms is, Whether the sense of ridicule be the proper teft for diftinguishing ridiculous objects, from what are not fo. Taking it for granted, that ridicule is not a fubject of reasoning, but of sense or taste*, I proceed thus. No perfon doubts but that our fense of beauty is the true teft of what is beautiful; and our sense of grandeur, of what is great or fublime. Is it more doubtful whether our fense of ridicule be the true teft of what is ridiculous? It is not only the true teft, but indeed the only test; for this fubject comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reafon. If any fubject, by the influence of fafhion or custom, have acquired a degree of veneration to which naturally it is not entitled,

*See Chap. 10. compared with Chap. 7.

what

what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial colouring, and difplaying the fubject in its true light? A man of true tafte fees the fubject without disguise: but if he hesitate, let him apply the test of ridicule, which feparates it from its artificial connections, and expofes it naked with all its native improprieties.

But it is urged, that the gravest and most serious matters may be set in a ridiculous light. Hardly fo; for where an object is neither rifible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But fuppofing the fact, I foresee not any harmful confequence. By the fame fort of reasoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to burlesque a great or lofty fubject. Such irregular ufe made of a talent for wit or ridicule, cannot long impofe upon mankind: it cannot ftand the teft of correct and delicate tafte; and truth will at last prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule because it may be perverted to wrong purpofes, is not a little ridiculous could one forbear to smile, if a talent for reafoning were condemned because it also may be perverted? and yet the conclufion in the latter cafe, would be not lefs just than in the former perhaps more juft; for no talent is more frequently perverted than that of reafon.

We had beft leave nature to her own operations the most valuable talents may be abufed,

and

and fo may that of ridicule: let us bring it under proper culture if we can, without endeavouring to pluck it up by the root. Were we deftitute of this teit of truth, I know not what might be the confequences: I fee not what rule would be left us to prevent fplendid trifles paffing for matters of importance, fhow and form for fubftance, and fuperftition or enthusiasm for pure religion.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

WIT.

W

IT is a quality of certain thoughts and expreffions: the term is never applied to an action nor a paffion, and as little to an external object.

However difficult it may be, in many inftances, to diftinguish a witty thought or expreffion from one that is not fo, yet, in general, it may be laid down, that the term wit is appropriated to fuch thoughts and expreffions as are ludicrous, and alfo occafion fome degree of furprise by their fingularity. Wit alfo, in a figurative fenfe, expreffes a talent for inventing ludicrous thoughts or expreffions we fay commonly a witty man, or a man of wit.

Wit in its proper fenfe, as explained above, is diftinguishable into two kinds; wit in the thought, and wit in the words or expreffion. Again, wit in the thought is of two kinds; ludicrous images, and ludicrous combinations of things that have little or no natural relation.

Ludicrous images that occafion furprise by their fingularity, as having little or no foundation in nature, are fabricated by the imagina

tion:

tion and the imagination is well qualified for the office; being of all our faculties the most active, and the least under restraint. Take the following example;

Shylock. You knew (none fo well, none fo well as you) of my daughter's flight.

Salino. That's certain; I for my part knew the tailor that made the wings fhe flew withal.

Merchant of Venice, A&t 111. Sc. 1.

The image here is undoubtedly witty. It is ludicrous and it muft occafion furprise; for having no natural foundation, it is altogether unexpected.

The other branch of wit in the thought, is that only which is taken notice of by Addifon, following Locke, who defines it "to lie in the

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46

affemblage of ideas; and putting those together, with quickness and variety, wherein "can be found any refemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleafant pictures and "agreeable vifions in the fancy *." It may be defined more concifely, and perhaps more accurately, "A junction of things by diftant and "fanciful relations, which surprise because they "are unexpected t." The following is a pro

per example.

We grant although he had much wit,
He was very shy of ufing it,

As

*B. ii. Ch. 11. § 2.

+ See Chap. 1.

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