of themselves, an emotion of felf-esteem. Here then are many different emotions, derived from the fame action confidered in different views by different perfons; a machine provided with many fprings, and not a little complicated. Propriety of action, it would feem, is a favourite of Nature, or of the Author of Nature, when fuch care and folicitude is bestowed on it. It is not left to our own choice; but, like juftice, is required at our hands; and, like juftice, is enforced by natural rewards and punishments: a man cannot, with impunity, do any thing unbecoming or improper; he fuffers the chastisement of contempt inflicted by others, and of fhame inflicted by himself. An apparatus fo complicated, and fo fingular, ought to roufe our attention: for nature doth nothing in vain; and we may conclude with certainty, that this curious branch of the human conftitution is intended for fome valuable purpose. To the discovery of that purpofe or final cause I fhall with ardour apply my thoughts, after difcourfing a little more at large upon the punishment, as it may now be called, that nature hath provided for indecent and unbecoming behaviour. This, at any rate, is neceffary, in order to give a full view of the fubject; and who knows whether it may not, over and above, open fome track that will lead us to the final cause we are in queft of?

A grofs impropriety is punished with contempt and indignation, which are vented against the offender

Y 4

offender by external expreffions: nor is even the flightest impropriety fuffered to pass without fome degree of contempt. But there are improprieties of the flighter kind, that provoke laughter; of which we have examples without end in the blunders and abfurdities of our own fpecies: fuch improprieties receive a different punishment, as will appear by what follows. The emotions of contempt and of laughter occafioned by an impropriety of that kind, uniting intimately in the mind of the fpectator, are expreffed externally by a peculiar fort of laugh, termed a laugh of derifion or fcorn*. An impropriety that thus moves not only contempt but laughter, is diftinguished by the epithet of ridiculous; and a laugh of derifion or fcorn is the punishment provided for it by nature. Nor ought it to escape obfervation, that we are fo fond of inflicting that punishment, as fometimes to exert it even against creatures of an inferior species; witness a turkycock fwelling with pride, and ftrutting with difplayed feathers, which in a gay mood is apt to provoke a laugh of derifion.

We must not expect, that these different improprieties are separated by diftinct boundaries; for of improprieties, from the flightest to the moft grofs, from the most rifible to the most ferious, there are degrees without end. Hence it is, that in viewing fome unbecoming actions,

* See Chap. 7.

too

too rifible for anger, and too ferious for derifion; the spectator feels a fort of mixt emotion, partaking both of derifion and of anger; which accounts for an expreffion, common with refpect to the impropriety of fome actions, That we know not whether to laugh or be angry.

It cannot fail to be obferved, that in the cafe of a rifible impropriety, which is always flight, the contempt we have for the offender is extremely faint, though derifion, its gratification, is extremely pleasant. This difproportion between a paffion and its gratification, may feem not conformable to the analogy of nature. In looking about for a folution, I reflect upon what is laid down above, that an improper action not only moves our contempt for the author, but also, by means of contraft, fwells the good opinion we have of ourselves. This contributes, more than any other particular, to the pleasure we have in ridiculing follies and abfurdities; and accordingly, it is well known, that those who have the greatest share of vanity are the most prone to laugh at others. Vanity, which is a vivid paffion, pleasant in itself, and not lefs fo in its gratification, would fingly be fufficient to account for the pleasure of ridicule, without borrowing any aid from contempt. Hence appears the reafon of a noted obfervation, That we are the most disposed to ridicule the blunders and abfurdities of others, when we are in

high

high fpirits; for in high fpirits, felf-conceit difplays itself with more than ordinary vigour.

Having with wary fteps traced an intricate road, not without danger of wandering; what remains to complete our journey, is to account for the final caufe of congruity and propriety, which make fo great a figure in the human conftitution. One final caufe, regarding congruity, is pretty obvious, that the fenfe of congruity, as one principle of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment; which is the final caufe affigned above for our fenfe of proportion*, and need not be enlarged upon here. Congruity, indeed, with refpect to quantity, coincides with proportion: when the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be faid indifferently, that it is agreeable by the congruity of its parts, or by the proportion of its parts. But propriety, which regards voluntary agents only, can never be the fame with proportion: a very long nofe is difproportioned, but cannot be termed improper. In fome instances, it is true, impropriety coincides with difproportion in the fame subject, but never in the same respect. I give for an example a very little man buckled to a long toledo: confidering the man and the fword with refpect to fize, we perceive a disproportion: confidering the fword

as

See Chap. 3.

as the choice of the man, we percive an impropriety.

The sense of impropriety with respect to mis, takes, blunders, and abfurdities, is evidently calculated for the good of mankind. In the fpectators it is productive of mirth and laughter, excellent recreation in an interval from business. But this is a trifle compared to what follows. It is painful to be the fubject of ridicule; and to punish with ridicule the man who is guilty of an abfurdity, tends to put him more on his guard in time coming. It is well ordered, that even the moft innocent blunder is not committed with impunity; becaufe, were errors licenfed where they do no hurt, inattention would grow into habit, and be the occafion of much hurt.

The final cause of propriety, as to moral duties, is of all the moft illuftrious. To have a juft notion of it, the moral duties that respect others must be diftinguished from thofe that refpect ourselves. Fidelity, gratitude, and abftinence from injury, are examples of the first fort; temperance, modefty, firmness of mind, are examples of the other: the former are made duties by the sense of justice; the latter, by the sense of propriety. Here is a final cause of the fenfe of propriety that will roufe our attention. It is undoubtedly the intereft of every man to fuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the ftation allotted him by Providence; for

fuch