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CHAP. II.

EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS.

F all the feelings raised in us by external objects, thofe only of the eye and the ear are honoured with the name of paffion or emotion: the most pleasing feelings of tafte, or touch, or smell, afpire not to that honour. From this obfervation appears the connection of emotions and paffions with the fine arts, which, as obferved in the introduction, are all of them calculated to give pleasure to the eye or the ear; never once condescending to gratify any of the inferior fenfes. The defign accordingly of this chapter is to delineate that connection, with the view chiefly to ascertain what power the fine arts have to raise emotions and paffions. To thofe who would excel in the fine arts, that branch of knowledge is indifpenfable; for without it the critic, as well as the undertaker, ignorant of any rule, have nothing left but to abandon themselves to chance. Deftitute of that branch of knowledge, in vain will either pretend to foretel what effect his work will have upon the heart.

The principles of the fine arts, appear in this view to open a direct avenue to the heart of man. The inquifitive mind beginning with criticism, the most agreeable of all amusements, and findVOL. I.

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ing no obftruction in its progrefs, advances far into the fenfitive part of our nature; and gains imperceptibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its defires, and of every motive to action; a fcience, which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greatest importance.

Upon a fubject fo comprehenfive, all that can be expected in this chapter, is a general or flight furvey and to shorten that furvey, I propofe to handle feparately fome emotions more peculiarly connected with the fine arts. Even after that circumfcription, fo much matter comes under the prefent chapter, that, to avoid confufion, I find it neceffary to divide it into many parts: and though the firft of thefe is confined to fuch causes of emotion or paffion as are the most common and the moft general; yet upon examination I find this fingle part fo extenfive, as to require a fubdivifion into feveral fections. Human nature is a complicate machine, and is unavoidably so in order to answer its various purposes. The public indeed have been entertained with many fyftems of human nature that flatter the mind by their fimplicity according to fome writers, man is entirely a selfish being; according to others, univerfal benevolence is his duty: one founds morality upon fympathy folely, and one upon utility. If any of these fyftems were copied from nature, the present fubject might be foon difcuffed. But the variety of nature is not fo eafily reached. and for confuting fuch Utopian systems without

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the fatigue of reasoning, it appears the best method to take a furvey of human nature, and to fet before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exift.

PART I.

CAUSES UNFOLDED OF THE EMOTIONS AND
PASSIONS.

SECT. I.-Difference between Emotion and Paffion.-Caufes that are the most common and the moft general.-Paffion confidered as productive of Action.

HESE branches are fo interwoven that they

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cannot be handled feparately. It is a fact univerfally admitted, that no emotion or paffion ever starts up in the mind without a cause: if I love a perfon, it is for good qualities or good offices if I have refentment against a man, it must be for fome injury he has done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no diftrefs of body nor of mind.

The circumstances now mentioned, if they raise an emotion or paffion, cannot be entirely indifferent; for if fo, they could not make any impres fion. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent: looking back upon the fore

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going examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable: if an injury did not give uneafiness, it would not occafion refentment against the author: nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in diftress, if that object did not give pain.

What is now faid about the production of emotion or paffion, refolves into a very fimple propofition, That we love what is agreeable, and hate what is difagreeable. And indeed it is evident, that a thing must be agreeable or disagreeable, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

This fhort hint about the causes of paffion and emotion, leads to a more extenfive view of the fubject. Such is our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are inftantaneously conscious of pleasure or pain: a gently-flowing river, a smooth extended plain, a fpreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of fight that raise pleafant emotions: a barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcafe, raife painful emotions. Of the emotions thus produced, we inquire for no other caufe but merely the prefence of the object.

The things now mentioned, raise emotions by means of their properties and qualities to the emotion raised by a large river, its fize, its force, and its fluency, contributes each a fhare: the regularity, propriety, and convenience, of a fine building, contribute each to the emotion raised by the building.

If external properties be agreeable, we have reafon to expect the fame from those which are internal; and, accordingly, power, difcernment, wit, mildness, fympathy, courage, benevolence, are agreeable in a high degree: upon perceiving thefe qualities in others, we inftantaneously feel pleasant emotions, without the flighteft act of reflection, or of attention to confequences. It is almoft unneceffary to add, that certain qualities oppofite to the former, fuch as dulnefs, peevishnefs, inhumanity, cowardice, occafion in the fame manner painful emotions.

Senfible beings affect us remarkably by their actions. Some actions raise pleasant emotions in the fpectator, without the leaft reflection; fuch as graceful motion, and genteel behaviour. But as intention, a capital circumftance in human actions, is not vifible, it requires reflection to difcover their true character: I fee one delivering a purfe of money to another, but I can make nothing of that action, till I learn with what intention the money is given if it be given to discharge a debt, the action pleases me in a flight degree; if it be a grateful return, I feel a stronger emotion; and the pleafant emotion rifes to a great height, when it is the intention of the giver to relieve a virtuous family from want. Thus actions are qualified by intention: but they are not qualified by the event; for an action well intended gives pleasure, whatever the event be. Further,

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