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CHAP. X.

CONGRUITY AND PROPRIETY.

AN is fuperior to the brute, not more by his rational faculties, than by his fenfes. With respect to external fenfes, brutes probably yield not to men ; and they may also have fome obfcure perception of beauty: but the more delicate fenfes of regularity, order, uniformity, and congruity, being connected with morality and religion, are reserved to dignify the chief of the terreftrial creation. Upon that account, no difcipline is more fuitable to man, nor more congruous to the dignity of his nature, and that which refines his tafte, and leads him to diftinguish, in every fubject, what is regular, what is orderly, what is fuitable, and what is fit and proper *

It is clear from the very conception of the terms congruity and propriety, that they are not applicable

Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ eft rationisque, quod unum hoc animal fentit quid fit ordo, quid fit quod deceat in factis dictisque, qui modus. Itaque eorum ipfo. rum, quæ afpectu fentiuntur, nullum aliud animal, pulchritudinem, venuftatem, convenientiam partium fentit. Quam fimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem,

conftantiam,

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applicable to any fingle object: they imply a plurality, and obviously fignify a particular relation between different objects. Thus we say currently, that a decent garb is fuitable or proper for a judge, modeft behaviour for a young. woman, and a lofty ftyle for an epic poem: and, on the other hand, that it is unfuitable or incongruous to fee a little woman funk in an overgrown farthingale, a coat richly embroidered covering coarse and dirty linen, a mean subject in an, elevated ftyle, an elevated fubject in a mean ftyle, a firft minifter darning his wife's stocking, or a reverend prelate in lawn fleeves dancing a hornpipe.

The perception we have of this relation, which feems peculiar to man, cannot proceed from any other caufe, but from a fenfe of congruity or propriety; for, fuppofing us deftitute of that sense, the terms would be to us unintelligible *.

It is matter of experience, that congruity or propriety, wherever perceived, is agreeable; and that

conftantiam, ordinem, in confiliis factisque confervandum putat, cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat; tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quærimus, honeftum. Cicero de Officiis, l. 1.

From many things that pafs current in the world without being generally condemned, one at firft view would imagine, that the fenfe of congruity or propriety hath scarce any foundation in nature; and that it is ra

ther

that incongruity or impropriety, wherever perceived, is disagreeable. The only difficulty is, to afcertain what are the particular objects that in conjunction suggest these relations; for there are many objects that do not: the fea, for example, viewed in conjunction with a picture, or a man viewed in conjunction with a mountain, fuggeft not either congruity or incongruity. It feems natural to infer, what will be found true by induction, that we never perceive congruity nor incongruity but among things that are connected by fome relation; fuch as a man and his actions, a principal and its acceffories, a fub

ject

ther an artificial refinement of those who affect to diftinguish themselves from others. The fulfome panegyrics bestowed upon the great and opulent, in epiftles dedicatory and other fuch compofitions, would incline us to think fo. Did there prevail in the world, it will be said, or did nature fuggeft, a taste of what is fuitable, decent, or proper, would any good writer deal in fuch compofitions, or any man of fenfe receive them without difguft? Can it be supposed that Lewis XIV. of France was endued by nature with any fenfe of propriety, when, in a dramatic performance purposely compofed for his entertainment, he suffered himself, publicly and in his prefence, to be ftyled the greatest king ever the earth produced? Thefe, it is true, are strong facts; but luckily they do not prove the fenfe of propriety to be artificial: they only prove, that the fenfe of propriety is at times overpowered by pride and vanity; which is no fingular cafe, for that fometimes is the fate even of the fenfe of juftice.

ject and its ornaments. We are indeed fo framed by nature, as, among things so connected, to require a certain fuitableness or correfpondence, termed congruity or propriety; and to be difpleased when we find the oppofite relation of incongruity or impropriety*.

If things connected be the fubject of congruity, it is reasonable beforehand to expect a degree of congruity proportioned to the degree of the connection. find our expectation to be well founded: where the relation is intimate, as between a caufe and its effect, a whole and its parts, we require

And, upon examination we

the

* In the chapter of beauty, qualities are distinguished into primary and secondary: and to clear fome obscurity that may appear in the text, it is proper to be observed, that the fame diftinction is applicable to relations. Refemblance, equality, uniformity, proximity, are relations that depend not on us, but exift equally whether perceived or not; and upon that account may justly be termed primary relations. But there are other relations, that only appear fuch to us, and that have not any external existence like primary relations; which is the cafe of congruity, incongruity, propriety, impropriety: thefe may be properly termed Secondary relations. Thus it appears from what is said in the text, that the fecondary relations mentioned arife from objects connected by some primary relation. Property is an example of a secondary relation, as it exifts no where but in the mind, I purchase a field or a horse: the covenant makes the primary relation; and the fecondary relation built on it, is property.

the strictest congruity; but where the relation is flight, or accidental, as among things jumbled together, we require little or no congruity: the strictest propriety is required in behaviour and manner of living; because a man is con→ nected with these by the relation of cause and effect the relation between an edifice and the ground it ftands upon is of the most intimate kind, and therefore the fituation of a great house ought to be lofty: its relation to neighbouring hills, rivers, plains, being that of propinquity only, demands but a fmall fhare of congruity: among members of the fame club, the congruity ought to be confiderable, as well as among things placed for fhow in the fame niche: among paffengers in a stage-coach we require very little congruity; and lefs ftill at a public spectacle,

Congruity is fo nearly allied to beauty, as commonly to be held a fpecies of it; and yet they differ fo effentially, as never to coincide: beauty, like colour, is placed upon a fingle subject; congruity upon a plurality: further, a thing beautiful in itself, may, with relation to other things, produce the ftrongeft fenfe of incongruity.

Congruity and propriety are commonly reckoned fynonymous terms; and hitherto in opening the fubject they have been used indifferently but they are diftinguishable; and the precife meaning of each must be ascertained. ConVOL. I. Y gruity

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