phlegmatic temperament, having a fluggish train of perceptions are indifpofed to action; and that activity conftantly accompanies a brifk flow of perceptions. To afcertain that fact, a man need not go abroad for experiments: reflecting on things paffing in his own mind, he will find, that a brifk circulation of thought conftantly prompts him to action; and that he is averse to action when his perceptions languish in their courfe. But as man by nature is formed for action, and must be active in order to be happy, nature hath kindly provided against indolence, by annexing pleasure to a moderate courfe of perceptions, and by making any remarkable retardation painful. A flow courfe of perceptions is attended with another bad effect: man, in a few capital cafes, is governed by propenfity or inftinct; but in matters that admit deliberation and choice, reason is affigned him for a guide: now, as reasoning requires often a great compafs of ideas, their fucceffion ought to be fo quick as readily to furnifh every motive that may be neceffary for mature deliberation; in a languid fucceffion, motives will often occur after action is commenced, when it is too late to retreat.

Nature hath guarded man, her favourite, against a fucceffion too rapid, no lefs carefully than against one too flow: both are equally painful, though the pain is not the fame in both. Many are the good effects of that contrivance. In the firft place, as the exertion of bodily faculties is

by

by certain painful fenfations confined within proper limits. Nature is equally provident with respect to the nobler faculties of the mind: the pain of an accelerated course of perceptions, is Nature's admonition to relax our pace, and to admit a more gentle exertion of thought. Another valuable purpofe is difcovered upon reflecting in what manner objects are imprinted on the mind to give the memory firm hold of an external object, time is required, even where attention is the greateft; and a moderate degree of attention, which is the common cafe, muft be continued ftill longer to produce the fame effect: a rapid fucceffion, accordingly, muft prevent objects from making an impreffion fo deep as to be of real service in life; and Nature, for the fake of memory, has, by a painful feeling, guarded against a rapid fucceffion. But a ftill more valuable purpose is answered by the contrivance; as, on the one hand, a sluggish course of perceptions indifpofeth to action; fo, on the other, a courfe too rapid impels to rafh and precipitant action: prudent conduct is the child of deliberation and clear conception, for which there is no place in a rapid courfe of thought. Nature therefore, taking measures for prudent conduct, has guarded us effectually from precipitancy of thought, by making it painful.

Nature not only provides against a fucceffion too flow or too quick, but makes the middle courfe extremely pleasant. Nor is that courfe

confined

confined within narrow bounds: every man can naturally, without pain, accelerate or retard in fome degree the rate of his perceptions. And he can do it in a ftill greater degree by the force of habit a habit of contemplation annihilates the pain of a retarded courfe of perceptions; and a busy life, after long practice, makes acceleration pleasant.

Concerning the final cause of our taste for variety, it will be confidered, that human affairs, complex by variety as well as number, require the diftributing our attention and activity in measure and proportion. Nature therefore, to fecure a juft diftribution correfponding to the variety of human affairs, has made too great uniformity or too great variety in the courfe of perceptions, equally unpleafant and indeed, were we addicted to either extreme, our internal conftitution would be ill fuited to our external circumftances. At the fame time, where great uniformity of operation is required, as in feveral manufactures, or great variety, as in law or phyfic, Nature, attentive to all our wants, hath alfo provided for these cafes, by implanting in the breaft of every perfon, an efficacious principle that leads to habit: an obftinate perfeverance in the fame occupation, relieves from the pain of exceffive uniformity; and the like perfeverance in a quick circulation of different occupations, relieves from the pain of exceffive variety. And thus we come to take delight in feveral occupations,

pations, that by nature, without habit, are not a little difguftful.

A middle rate alfo in the train of perceptions between uniformity and variety, is no lefs pleafant than between quicknefs and flownefs. The mind of man, fo framed, is wonderfully adapted to the course of human affairs, which are continually changing, but not without connection: it is equally adapted to the acquifition of knowledge, which refults chiefly from difcovering refemblances among differing objects, and differences among resembling objects: fuch occupation, even abstracting from the knowledge we acquire, is in itself delightful, by preferving a middle rate between too great uniformity and too great variety.

We are now arrived at the chief purpose of the prefent chapter; which is to confider uniformity and variety with relation to the fine arts, in order to difcover if we can, when it is that the one ought to prevail, and when the other. And the knowledge we have obtained, will even at first view fuggeft a general observation, That in every work of art, it must be agreeable, to find that degree of variety which corresponds to the natural courfe of our perceptions; and that an excess in variety or in uniformity must be dif agreeable, by varying that natural course. For that reason, works of art admit more or lefs variety according to the nature of the fubject: in a picture of an interefting event that ftrongly atVOL. I. taches

X

taches the fpectator to a fingle object, the mind relisheth not a multiplicity of figures nor of ornaments a picture reprefenting a gay fubject, admits great variety of figures and ornaments; because these are agreeable to the mind in a chearful tone. The fame obfervation is applicable to poetry and to mufic.

It muft at the fame time be remarked, that one can bear a greater variety of natural objects, than of objects in a picture; and a greater variety in a picture, than in a defcription. A real object prefented to view, makes an impreffion more readily than when reprefented in colours, and much more readily than when represented in words. Hence it is, that the profufe variety of objects in fome natural landscapes, neither breed confufion nor fatigue; and for the fame reafon, there is place for greater variety of ornament in a picture than in a poem. A picture, however, like a building, ought to be fo fimple as to be comprehended in one view. Whether every one of Le Brun's pictures of Alexander's hiftory will stand this teft, is fubmitted to judges.

From thefe general obfervations, I proceed to particulars. In works expofed continually to public view, variety ought to be ftudied. It is a rule accordingly in fculpture, to contraft the different limbs of a statue, in order to give it all the variety poffible. Though the cone, in a fingle view, be more beautiful than the pyramid; yet a pyramidal fteeple, because of its variety, is justly preferred.