תמונות בעמוד
PDF
ePub

CHAP. VI.

NOVELTY, AND THE UNEXPECTED APPEARANCE OF OBJECTS.

F all the circumftances that raise emotions,

OF

not excepting beauty, nor even greatness, novelty hath the most powerful influence. A new object produceth inftantaneously an emotion termed wonder, which totally occupies the mind, and for a time excludes all other objects. Converfation among the vulgar never is more interefting than when it turns upon ftrange objects and extraordinary events. Men tear themfelves from their native country in fearch of things rare and new; and novelty converts into a pleasure, the fatigues and even perils of travelling. To what caufe fhall we afcribe these fingular appearances? To curiofity undoubtedly, a principle implanted in human nature for a purpose extremely beneficial, that of acquiring knowledge; and the emotion of wonder, raised by new and ftrange objects, inflames our curiofity to know more of them. This emotion is different from admiration: novelty wherever found, whether in a quality or action, is the caufe of wonder; admiration is directed to the person who performs any thing wonderful.

During

During infancy, every new object is probably the occafion of wonder, in fome degree; because, during infancy, every object at first fight is ftrange as well as new: but as objects are rendered familiar by custom, we cease by degrees to wonder at new appearances, if they have any resemblance to what we are acquainted with; for a thing must be fingular as well as new, to raise our wonder. To fave multiplying words, I would be understood to comprehend both circumftances when I hereafter talk of novelty.

In an ordinary train of perceptions where one thing introduces another, not a fingle object makes its appearance unexpectedly *: the mind thus prepared for the reception of its objects, admits them one after another without perturbation. But when a thing breaks in unexpectedly, and without the preparation of any connection, it raifes an emotion, known by the name of furprife. That emotion. may be produced by the most familiar object, as when one unexpectedly meets a friend who was reported to be dead; or a man in high life lately a beggar.. On the other hand, a new object, however ftrange, will not produce the emotion, if the fpectator be prepared for the fight: an elephant in India will not furprise a traveller who goes to fee one; and yet its novelty will raise his wonder: an Indian

R 2

* See Chap. 1.

Indian in Britain would be much furprised to ftumble upon an elephant feeding at large in the open fields: but the creature itself, to which he was accustomed, would not raise his wonder.

Surprise thus in feveral refpects differs from wonder: unexpectedness is the cause of the former emotion; novelty is the cause of the latter. Nor differ they lefs in their nature and circumftances, as will be explained by and by. With relation to one circumftance they perfectly agree; which is, the shortnefs of their duration: the inftantaneous production of thefe emotions in perfection, may contribute to that effect, in conformity to a general law, That things foon decay which foon come to perfection: the violence of the emotions may alfo contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increase, cannot have a long courfe. But their fhort duration is occafioned chiefly by that of their causes: we are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether thefe emotions be pleasant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities, fhould afford any matter for a doubt: but when we are engroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calm. for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recall the emotion with accuracy. New objects are fometimes terrible,

terrible, fometimes delightful: The terror which a tyger infpires is greatest at first, and wears off gradually by familiarity: on the other hand, even women will acknowledge that it is novelty which pleases the moft in a new fashion. It would be rafh however to conclude, that wonder is in itself neither pleasant nor painful, but that it affumes either quality according to circumftances. An object, it is true, that hath a threatening appearance, adds to our terror by its novelty but from that experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itself difagreeable; for it is perfectly confiftent, that we be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another a river in flood fwelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object; and yet it may produce no fmall degree of fear when we attempt to cross it: courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet, when we view these qualities in an enemy, they ferve to increase our terror. In the fame manner, novelty may produce two effects clearly diftinguishable from each other it may, directly and in itself, be agreeable; and it may have an oppofite effect indirectly, which is, to infpire terror; for when a new object appears in any degree dangerous, our ignorance of its powers and qualities, affords ample scope for the imagination to drefs it in the moft frightful colours *. The first fight of a lion,

R 3

*Effays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, part 2. eff. 6,

lion, for example, may at the fame inftant produce two oppofite feelings, the pleafant emotion of wonder, and the painful paffion of terror: the novelty of the object produces the former directly, and contributes to the latter indirectly. Thus, when the fubject is analyfed, we find, that the power which novelty hath indirectly to inflame terror, is perfectly confiftent with its being in every circumstance agreeable. The matter may be put in the clearest light, by adding the following circumstances. If a lion be firft seen from a place of fafety, the fpectacle is altogether agreeable without the leaft mixture of terror. If, again, the first fight puts us within reach of that dangerous animal, our terror may be fo great as quite to exclude any fenfe of novelty. But this fact proves not that wonder is painful: it proves only, that wonder may be excluded by a more powerful paffion. Every man may be made certain from his own experience, that wonder raised by a new object which is inoffenfive, is always pleafant; and with refpect to offenfive objects, it appears from the foregoing deduction, that the fame muft hold as long as the fpectator can attend to the novelty.

Whether surprise be in itself pleasant or painful, is a queftion no lefs intricate than the former. It is certain that furprife inflames our joy when unexpectedly we meet with an old friend, and our terror when we ftumble upon any thing noxious. To clear that queftion, the first thing

to

« הקודםהמשך »