not a good inference, will appear from confidering, that beauty, in its very conception, refers to a percipient; for an object is faid to be beautiful, for no other reafon but that it appears fo to a spectator: the fame piece of matter that to a man appears beautiful, may poffibly appear ugly to a being of a different species. Beauty, therefore, which for its exiftence depends on the percipient as much as on the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property in either. And hence it is wittily obferved by the poet, that beauty is not in the perfon beloved, but in the lover's eye. This reafoning is folid; and the only cause of doubt or hesitation is, that we are taught a different leffon by fense: a fingular determination of nature makes us perceive both beauty and colour as belonging to the object, and, like figure or extenfion, as inherent pro. perties. This mechanifm is uncommon; and, when nature, to fulfil her intention, prefers any fingular method of operation, we may be certain of fome final caufe that cannot be reached by ordinary means. For the beauty of fome objects we are indebted entirely to nature; but, with refpect to the endless variety of objects that owe their beauty to art and culture, the perception of beauty greatly promotes industry; being to us a strong additional incitement to enrich our fields, and improve our manufactures. These, however, are but flight effects, compared with the connections that are formed among individuals

viduals in fociety by means of this fingular mechanifm: the qualifications of the head and heart form undoubtedly the most folid and moft permanent connections; but external beauty, which lies more in view, has a more extenfive influence in forming these connections: at any rate, it concurs in an eminent degree with mental qualifications to produce focial intercourse, mutual good-will, and confequently mutual aid and support, which are the life of society.

It must not, however, be overlooked, that the perception of beauty doth not, when immoderate, tend to advance the interefts of fociety. Love, in particular, arifing from a perception of beauty, lofes, when exceffive, its fociable character the appetite for gratification prevailing over affection for the beloved object, is ungovernable; and tends violently to its end, regardless of the mifery that muft follow. Love, in that state, is no longer a fweet agreeable paffion it becomes painful, like hunger or thirst ; and produceth no happiness but in the inftant of fruition. This discovery fuggefts a most important leffon, That moderation in our defires and appetites, which fits us for doing our duty, contributes at the fame time the most to happinefs even focial paffions, when moderate, are more pleasant than when they fwell beyond proper bounds.

CHAP. IV.

GRANDEUR AND SUBLIMITY.

NAT

ATURE hath not more remarkably diftinguished us from other animals by an erect pofture, than by a capacious and afpiring mind, attaching us to things great and elevated. The ocean, the fky, feize the attention, and make a deep impreffion*: robes of ftate are made large and full, to draw refpect: we admire an elephant for its magnitude, notwithstanding its unwieldinefs.

The elevation of an object affects us no lefs than its magnitude: a high place is chofen for the flatue of a deity or hero: a tree growing on the brink of a precipice looks charming when viewed from the plain below: a throne is erected for the chief magiftrate; and a chair with a high feat for the prefident of a court. Among all nations, heaven is placed far above us, hell far below us.

In

* Longinus obferves, that nature inclines us to admire, not a small rivulet, however clear and tranfparent, but the Nile, the Ifter, the Rhine, or ftill more the ocean. The fight of a small fire produceth no emotion; but we are ftruck with the boiling furnaces of Ætna, pouring out whole rivers of liquid flame. Treatife of the Sublime, chap. 29.

In fome objects, greatness and elevation concur to make a complicated impreffion: the Alps and the Peak of Teneriff are proper examples; with the following difference, that in the former greatness seems to prevail, elevation in the latter.

The emotions raised by great and by elevated objects, are clearly distinguishable, not only in internal feeling, but even in their external expreffions. A great object makes the fpectator endeavour to enlarge his bulk; which is remarkable in plain people, who give way to nature without referve; in defcribing a great object, they naturally expand themselves by drawing in air with all their force. An elevated object produces a different expreffion: it makes the fpectator ftretch upward, and stand a-tiptoe.

Great and elevated objects confidered with relation to the emotions produced by them, are termed grand and fublime. Grandeur and fublimity have a double fignification: they commonly fignify the quality or circumftance in objects by which the emotions of grandeur and fublimity are produced; fometimes the emotions themselves.

In handling the prefent fubject, it is neceffary that the impreffion made on the mind by the magnitude of an object, abftracting from its other qualities, fhould be afcertained. And because abstraction is a mental operation of fome difficulty, the fafeft method for judging is, to choose a plain object that is neither beautiful

nor deformed, if fuch a one can be found.

The

plaineft that occurs, is a huge mafs of rubbish, the ruins, perhaps, of fome extenfive building, or a large heap of ftones, fuch as are collected together for keeping in memory a battle or other remarkable event. Such an object, which in miniature would be perfectly indifferent, makes an impreffion by its magnitude, and appears agreeable. And fuppofing it fo large, as to fill the eye, and to prevent the attention from wandering upon other objects, the impreffion it makes will be fo much the deeper *.

But, though a plain object of that kind be agreeable, it is not termed grand: it is not entitled to that character, unless, together with its fize, it be poffeffed of other qualities that contribute to beauty, fuch as regularity, proportion, order, or colour and according to the number of fuch qualities combined with magnitude, it is more or lefs grand. Thus, St Peter's church at Rome, the great pyramid of Egypt, the Alps towering above the clouds, a great arm of the fea, and, above all, a clear and ferene fky, are grand, because, befide their fize, they are beautiful in an eminent degree. On the other hand, an overgrown whale, having a difagreeable appearance, is not grand. A large building, agreeable by its regularity and proportions, is grand, and yet a much larger building deftitute

* See Appendix, Terms defined, fect. 33.