kindly affections, which, meeting with all encouragement, take poffeffion of the mind, and govern all our actions. In that condition, the progrefs of paffion along related objects, by spreading the kindly affections through a multitude of individuals, hath a glorious effect.

Nothing can be more entertaining to a ration al mind, than the economy of the human paffions, of which I have attempted to give fome faint notion. It must however be acknowledged, that our paffions, when they happen to fwell beyond proper limits, take on a lefs regular appearance: reafon may proclaim our duty, but the will, influenced by paffion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of paffion, which, when in excefs, cannot be refifted but by the utmost fortitude of mind: it is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without diftinction. Thus joy infpired by a fortunate event, is diffused upon every perfon around by acts of benevolence; and refentment for an atrocious injury done by one out of reach, feizes the first object that occurs to vent itself upon. Those who believe in prophecies, even with the accomplishment; and a weak mind is disposed voluntarily to fulfil a prophecy, in order to gratify its wish. Shakespeare, whom no particle of human nature hath escaped, however remote from common obfervation, defcribes that weaknefs :

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K. Henry.

K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong Unto that lodging where I firft did fwoon?

Warwick. 'Tis call'd Jerufalem, my Noble Lord. K. Henry. Laud be to God! ev'n there my life muß end,

It hath been prophefy'd to me many years,

I should not die but in Jerufalem,

Which vainly I fuppos'd the Holy Land.
But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie:
In that Jerufalem shall Henry die.

Second part, Henry IV. A&t xv. Sc. laft.

I could not deny myself the amusement of the foregoing obfervation, though it doth not properly come under my plan. The irregularities of paffion proceeding from peculiar weakneffes and biaffes, I do not undertake to justify; and of these we have had many examples *. It is fufficient that paffions common to all, are made fubfervient to beneficent purposes. I fhall only observe, that, in a polished fociety, inftances of irregular paffions are rare, and that their mifchief doth not extend far.

* Part 5. of the present chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

BEAUTY.

H

AVING difcourfed in general of emotions and paffions, I proceed to a more narrow inspection of fuch of them as ferve to unfold the principles of the fine arts. It is the province of a writer upon ethics, to give a full enumeration of all the paffions; and of each feparately to affign the nature, the cause, the gratification, and the effects. But a treatise of ethics is not my province: I carry my view no farther than to the elements of criticism, in order to fhow, that the fine arts are a fubject of reasoning as well as of tafte. An extenfive work would ill fuit a defign fo limited and to confine this work within moderate bounds, the following plan may contribute. The obfervation made above, that things are the caufes of emotions, by means of their properties and attributes *, furnisheth a hint for diftribution.. Inftead of a painful and tedious examination of the feveral paffions and emotions, I purpose to confine my inquiries to fuch attributes, relations, and circumstances, as in the fine arts are chiefly employed to raise N 2 agreeable

Chap. 2. part 1. fect. 1. first note.

agreeable emotions. Attributes of fingle objects, as the moft fimple, fhall take the lead; to be followed with particulars, which, depending on relations, are not found in single objects. Dispatching next fome coincident matters, I proceed to my chief aim; which is, to establish practical rules for the fine arts, derived from principles previously established. This is a general view of the intended method; referving however a privilege to vary it in particular instances, where a deviation may be more commodious. I begin with Beauty, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to single objects.

The term beauty, in its native fignification, is appropriated to objects of fight: objects of the other fenfes may be agreeable, fuch as the founds of mufical inftruments, the fmoothness and foftnefs of fome furfaces; but the agreeableness denominated beauty belongs to objects of fight.

Of all the objects of external fenfe, an object of fight is the most complex in the very fimpleft, colour is perceived, figure, and length, breadth, and thickness. A tree is compofed of a trunk, branches, and leaves; it has colour, figure, fize, and fometimes motion: by means of each of thefe particulars, feparately confidered, it appears beautiful; how much more fo, when they are all united together? The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a compofition of numberlefs beauties arifing from the parts and qualities

of

of the object, various colours, various motions, figures, fize, &c. all united in one complex object, and ftriking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality fo remarkable in vifible objects, lends its name to exprefs every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of speech, we fay a beautiful found, a beautiful thought or expreffion, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or fcience. But, as figurative expreffion is the fubject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper fignification.

It is natural to fuppofe, that a perception fo various as that of beauty, comprehending fometimes many particulars, fometimes few, fhould occafion emotions equally various and yet all the various emotions of beauty maintain one common character, that of fweetness and gaiety.

Confidering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we difcover two kinds. The firft may be termed intrinfic beauty, because it is discovered in a fingle object viewed apart without relation to any other: the examples above given are of that kind. The other may be termed relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The purpofed diftribution would lead me to handle these beauties feparately; but they are frequently fo intimately connected, that, for the fake of connection, I am forced, in this inftance, to vary from the plan, and to bring them both into the fame chapter. Intrinfic beauty is an object

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