connected with pleasure in the emotion, its effect, that an agreeable cause cannot be better defined, than by its power of producing a pleasant emotion and difagreeablenefs in the cause has the fame neceffary connection with pain in the emotion produced by it.

From this preliminary it appears, that in order to know for what end an emotion is made pleafant or painful, we must begin with inquiring for what end its caufe is made agreeable or difagreeable. And, with refpect to inanimate objects, confidered as the causes of emotions, many of them are made agreeable in order to promote our happiness; and it proves invincibly the benignity of the Deity, that we are placed in the midst of objects for the most part agreeable. But that is not all: the bulk of such objects, being of real ufe in life, are made agreeable in order to excite our industry; witness a large tree, a well-dreffed fallow, a rich field of grain, and others that may be named without end. On the other hand, it is not easy to specify a difagreeable object that is not at the fame time hurtful: fome things are made difagreeable, fuch as a rotten carcase, because they are noxious: others, a dirty marsh, for example, or a barren heath, are made disagreeable, in order, as above, to excite our induftry. And, with respect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable, it will be made evident, that their being left indifferent is not a work of chance

but of wisdom: of fuch I fhall have occafion to

give feveral inftances.

Becaufe inanimate objects that are agreeable fix our attention, and draw us to them, they in that refpect are termed attractive: fuch objects inspire pleasant emotions, which are gratified by adhering to the objects, and enjoying them. Because disagreeable objects of the fame kind repel us from them, they in that respect are termed repulfive: and the painful emotions raised by such objects are gratified by flying from them. Thus, in general, with respect to things inanimate, the tendency of every pleasant emotion is to prolong the pleasure; and the tendency of every painful emotion is to end the pain.

Senfible beings confidered as objects of paffion, lead into a more complex theory. A fenfible being that is agreeable by its attributes, infpires us with a pleasant emotion accompanied with defire; and the queftion is, What is naturally the gratification of that defire? Were man altogether selfish, his nature would lead him to indulge the pleasant emotion, without making any acknowledgment to the perfon who gives him pleafure, more than to a pure air or temperate clime: but as man is endued with a principle of benevolence as well as of felfishness, he is prompted by his nature to defire the good of every fenfible being that gives him pleasure; and the happiness of that being is the gratification of his defire. The final cause of defire fo directed is illuftrious:

it contributes to a man's own happiness, by affording him means of gratification beyond what selfishness can afford; and, at the fame time, it tends eminently to advance the happiness of others. This lays open a beautiful theory in the nature of man: a felfish action can only benefit myself: a benevolent action benefits myself as much as it benefits others. In a word, benevolence may not improperly be faid to be the most refined selfishness; which, by the way, ought to filence certain fhallow philofophers, who, ignorant of human nature, teach a disgustful doctrine, That to ferve others, unless with a view to our own happiness, is weakness and folly; as if felflove only, and not benevolence, contributed to our happiness. The hand of God is too vifible in the human frame, to permit us to think feriously, that there ever can be any jarring or inconfiftency among natural principles, thofe efpecially of felf-love and benevolence, which govern the bulk of our actions *.

Next

* With fhallow thinkers the felfifh fyftem naturally prevails in theory, I do not fay in practice. During infancy, our defires center moftly in ourselves: every one perceives intuitively the comfort of food and raiment, of a fnug dwelling, and of every convenience. But that the doing good to others will make us happy, is not fo evident; feeding the hungry, for example, or clothing the naked. This truth is seen but obfcurely

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Next in order come fenfible beings that are in diftrefs. A perfon in diftrefs, being so far a difagreeable object, must raise in a spectator a painful paffion; and, were man purely a selfish being, he would defire to be relieved from that pain, by turning from the object. But the principle of benevolence gives an oppofite direction to his defire: it makes him defire to afford relief; and by relieving the perfon from distress, his paffion is gratified. The painful paffion thus directed, is termed fympathy; which, though painful, is yet in its nature attractive. And, with refpect to its final caufe, we can be at no lofs: it not only tends to relieve a fellow-creature from diftrefs, but in its gratification is greatly more pleasant than if it were repulfive..

We, in the last place, bring under confideration perfons hateful by vice or wickedness. Imagine

by the grofs of mankind, if at all feen: the superior pleasure that accompanies the exercife of benevolence, of friendship, and of every social principle, is not clearly understood till it be frequently felt. To perceive the focial principle in its triumphant ftate, a man must forget himself, and turn his thoughts upon the character and conduct of his fellow-creatures: he will feel a fecret charm in every paffion that tends to the good of others, and a fecret averfion against every unfeeling heart that is indifferent to the happiness and diftrefs of others. In a word, it is but too common for men to indulge selfishness in themselves; but all men abhor it in others.

gine a wretch who has lately perpetrated fome horrid crime he is difagreeable to every spectator; and confequently raiseth in every spectator a painful paffion. What is the natural gratification of that paffion? I muft here again observe, that, fuppofing man to be entirely a selfish being, he would be prompted by his nature to relieve himself from the pain, by averting his eye, and banishing the criminal from his thoughts. But man is not fo conftituted: he is compofed of many principles, which, though feemingly contradictory, are perfectly concordant. His actions are influenced by the principle of benevolence, as well as by that of selfishness: and in order to answer the foregoing question, I must introduce a third principle, no lefs remarkable in its influence than either of these mentioned; it is that principle, common to all, which prompts us to punish those who do wrong. An envious, a malicious, or a cruel action, being difagreeable, raifeth in the fpectator the painful emotion of refentment, which frequently fwells into a paffion; and the natural gratification of the defire included in that paffion, is to punish the guilty perfon: I must chaftife the wretch by indigna, tion at least and hatred, if not more feverely. Here the final caufe is felf-evident.

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An injury done to myfelf, touching me more than when done to others, raises my resentment to a higher degree. The defire, accordingly, included in this paffion, is not fatisfied with fo

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