תמונות בעמוד
PDF
ePub

gines that the time of meeting comes on very flow, or rather that it will never come: every minute is thought of an intolerable length. Here is a fair, and, I hope, fatisfactory reason, why time is thought to be tedious when we long for a future event, and not lefs fleet when we dread the event. The reafon is confirmed by other inftances. Bodily pain, fixt to one part, produceth a flow train of perceptions, which, according to the common measure of time, ought to make it appear fhort: yet we know, that, in fuch a ftate, time has the oppofite appearance; and the reafon is, that bodily pain is always attended with a degree of impatience, which makes us think every minute to be an hour. The fame holds where the pain fhifts from place to place; but not fo remarkably, because such a pain is not attended with the fame degree of impatience. The impatience a man hath in travelling through a barren country, or in a bad road, makes him think, during the journey, that time goes on with a very flow pace. We fhall fee afterward, that a very different computation is made when the journey is over.

How ought it to ftand with a person who apprehends bad news? It will probably be thought that the cafe of this perfon resembles that of a criminal, who, terrified at his approaching execution, believes every hour to be but a minute: yet the computation is directly oppofite. Reflecting upon the difficulty, there appears one capital diftinguishing

tinguishing circumftance: the fate of the criminal is determined; in the cafe under confideration, the perfon is ftill in fufpenfe. Every one has felt the diftrefs that accompanies fufpense we wish to get rid of it at any rate, even at the expence of bad news. This cafe, therefore, upon a more narrow infpection, refembles that of bodily pain: the prefent diftrefs, in both cafes, makes the time appear extremely tedious.

The reader probably will not be difpleafed, to have this branch of the fubject illustrated, by an author who is acquainted with every maze of the human heart, and who bestows ineffable grace and ornament upon every subject he handles:

Rofalinda. I pray you, what is't a-clock?

Orlando. You should ask me, what time o'day; there's no clock in the foreft.

Rof. Then there is no true lover in the foreft; else, fighing every minute, and groaning every hour, would detect the lazy foot of Time, as well as a clock.

Orla. Why not the fwift foot of Time? Had not that been as proper?

Rof. By no means, Sir. Time travels in diverse paces with diverse perfons. I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he ftands ftill withal.

Orla. I pr'ythee whom doth he trot withal?

Rof. Marry, he trots hard with a young maid between the contract of her marriage and the day it is folemnized:

folemnized if the interim be but a fe'ennight, Time's pace is so hard, that it seems the length of seven years. Orla. Who ambles Time withal?

Rof. With a prieft that lacks Latin, and a rich man. that hath not the gout: for the one fleeps easily, because he cannot study; and the other lives merrily, because he feels no pain: the one lacking the burthen of lean and wafteful learning: the other knowing no burthen of heavy tedious penury. Thefe Times ambles withal.

Orla. Whom doth he gallop withal?

Rof. With a thief to the gallows: for, tho' he go as foftly as foot can fall, he thinks himself too foon there. Orla. Whom ftays it ftill withal?

Rof. With lawyers in the vacation for they fleep between term and term, and then they perceive not how Time moves.

As you like it, Act 111. Sc. 8.

The natural method of computing present time, fhows how far from truth we may be led by the irregular influence of paffion: nor are our eyes immediately opened when the scene is pat; for the deception continues while there remain any traces of the paffion. But looking back upon paft time when the joy or diftrefs is no longer remembered, the computation is very different in that condition, we coolly and deliberately make ufe of the ordinary measure, namely, the courfe of our perceptions. And I fhall now proceed to the errors that this meafure is fubjected to. Here we must distinguish between a train of perceptions, and a train of

ideas:

ideas real objects make a ftrong impreffion, and are faithfully remembered: ideas, on the contrary, however entertaining at the time, are apt to escape a fubfequent recollection. Hence it is, that in retrospection, the time that was employed upon real objects, appears longer than that employed upon ideas: the former are more accurately recollected than the latter; and we measure the time by the number that is recollected. This doctrine fhall be illuftrated by examples. After finishing a journey through a populous country, the frequency of agreeable objects diftinctly recollected by the traveller, makes the time spent in the journey appear to him longer than it was in reality; which is chiefly remarkable in the firft journey, when every object is new, and makes a strong impreffion. On the other hand, after finishing a journey through a barren country thinly peopled, the time appears fhort, being measured by the number of objects, which were few, and far from interefting. Here in both inftances a computation is made, directly oppofite to that made during the journey. And this, by the way, ferves to account for what may appear fingular, that, in a barren country, a computed mile is always longer, than near the capital, where the country is rich and populous: the traveller has no natural measure of the miles he has travelled, other than the time beftowed upon the journey; nor any natural measure of the

time,

time, other than the number of his perceptions: now these, being few from the paucity of objects in a waste country, lead him to compute that the time has been short, and confequently that the miles have been few: by the fame method of computation, the great number of perceptions, from the quantity of objects in a populous country, make the traveller conjecture that the time has been long, and the miles many. The laft step of the computation is obvious: in eftimating the distance of one place from another, if the miles be reckoned few in number, each mile muft of courfe be long; if many in number, each must be short.

Again, the travelling with an agreeable companion, produceth a fhort computation both of the road and of time; efpecially if there be few objects that demand attention, or if the objects be familiar and the cafe is the fame of young people at a ball, or of a joyous company over a bottle the ideas with which they have been entertained, being tranfitory, efcape the memory: after the journey and the entertainment are over, they reflect that they have been much diverted, but scarce can fay about what.

When one is totally occupied with any agreeable work that admits not many objects, time runs on without obfervation and upon a fubfequent recollection, must appear short, in proportion to the paucity of objects. This is ftill more remarkable in clofe contemplation and in deep thinking,

« הקודםהמשך »