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have stumbled upon the question, Whether, and how far, do these rules agree with human nature. It could not furely be his opinion, that these poets, however eminent for genius, were entitled to give law to mankind; and that nothing now remains, but blind obedience to their arbitrary will: if in writing they followed no rule, why should they be imitated? If they ftudied nature, and were obfequious to rational principles, why should these be concealed from us?

With respect to the prefent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to compofe a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true fource of criticifm. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleasant impreffions; and, by that circumftance, are diftinguished from the ufeful arts but, in order to make pleasant impreffions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally disagreeable. That fubject is here attempted, as far as neceffary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and the author affumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diftinctly than hitherto has been done, that these principles, as well as every just rule of criticism, are founded upon the fenfitive part of our nature. What the author hath discovered or collected upon that fub

ject,

ject, he chooses to impart in the gay and agree able form of criticifm; imagining that this form will be more relished, and perhaps be no less instructive, than a regular and laboured difquifition. His plan is, to afcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; inftead of beginning with the former, handled abstractedly, and defcending to the latter. But, though criticism is thus his only declared aim, he will not difown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of Man, confidered as a fenfitive being capable of pleasure and pain: and, though he flatters himself with having made some progress in that important science, he is, however, too fenfible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeffedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the prefent work.

To cenfure works, not men, is the just prerogative of criticifm; and accordingly all perfonal cenfure is here avoided, unless where neceffary to illuftrate fome general propofition. No praife is claimed on that account; becaufe cenfuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any person of humanity. Writers, one should imagine, ought, above all others, to be referved on that article, when they lie fo open to retaliation. The author of this treatise, far from being confident of meriting no cenfure, entertains not even the flighteft hope of fuch perfection. Amusement was at firft the fole aim of

his

his inquiries: proceeding from one particular to another, the subject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ftruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, however, he would not appear in a flovenly drefs; and therefore he pretends not otherwise to apologife for his errors, than by obferving, that in a new fubject, no lefs nice than extenfive, errors are in fome measure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to justify his tafte in every particular: that point must be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in fome matters fufceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchstone of tafte: to that he appeals, and to that he chearfully fubmits.

N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too affuming for this work. A number of thefe elements or principles are here unfolded: but, as the author is far from imagining that he has completed the lift, a more humble title is proper, fuch as may exprefs any number of parts lefs than the whole. This he thinks is fignified by the title he has chofen, viz. ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

ELEMENTS

ELEMENTS

OF

CRITICISM.

A

CHAPTER I.

PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS IN A TRAIN.

MAN, while awake, is conscious of a

continued train of perceptions and ideas paffing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train: nor can he at will add any idea to the train *. At the fame time, we learn from daily experience, that

the

For how fhould this be done? what idea is it that we are to add? If we can specify the idea, that idea is already in the mind, and there is no occafion for any act of the will. If we cannot specify any idea, I next demand, how can a perfon will, or to what purpose, if there be nothing in view? We cannot form a conception of fuch a thing. If this argument need confirmation, I urge experience: whoever makes a trial will find, that ideas are linked together in the mind, forming a connected chain; and that we have not the command of any idea independent of the chain.

VOL. I.

B

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