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reafon; the foregoing argument concluding ftill more ftrongly against imaginary beings, than against improbable facts: fictions of that nature may amuse by their novelty and fingularity; but they never move the fympathetic paffions, because they cannot impofe on the mind any perception of reality. I appeal to the difcerning reader, whether that observation be not applicable to the machinery of Taffo and of Voltaire: fuch machinery is not only in itself cold and uninterefting, but gives an air of fiction to the whole compofition. A burlefque poem, fuch as the Lutrin or the Difpenfary, may employ machinery with fuccefs; for these poems, though they affume the air of hiftory, give entertainment chiefly by their pleasant and ludicrous pictures, to which machinery contributes: it is not the aim of fuch a poem, to raise our fympathy: and for that reafon a ftrict imitation of nature is not required. A poem profeffedly ludicrous, may employ machinery to great advantage; and the more extravagant the better.

Having affigned the means by which fiction. commands our paffions; what only remains for accomplishing our prefent tafk, is to aflign the final caufe. I have already mentioned, that fiction, by means of language, has the command of our fympathy for the good of others. By the fame means, our sympathy may also be raised for our own good. In the fourth fection of the prefent chapter, it is obferved, that examples both

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of virtue and of vice raife virtuous emotions; which becoming ftronger by exercife, tend to make us virtuous by habit, as well as by principle. I now further obferve, that examples confined to real events are not fo frequent as without other means to produce a habit of virtue if they be, they are not recorded by hiftorians. It therefore shows great wisdom, to form us in fuch a manner, as to be susceptible of the fame improvement from fable that we receive from genuine hiftory. By that contrivance, examples to improve us in virtue may be multiplied without end: no other fort of difcipline contributes more to make virtue habitual, and no other fort is fo agreeable in the application. I add another final caufe with thorough fatisfaction: because it shows, that the Author of our nature is not lefs kindly provident for the happinefs of his creatures, than for the regularity of their conduct: the power that fiction hath over the mind affords an endless variety of refined amufements always at hand to employ a vacant hour: fuch amusements are a fine refource in folitude; and, by chearing and fweetening the mind, contribute mightily to focial happiness.

PART

PART II.

EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS AS PLEASANT AND PAIN

FUL, AGREEABLE AND DISAGREEABLE.

FICATIONS OF THESE QUALITIES.

MODI

T will naturally occur at first, that a discourse

IT

upon the paffions ought to commence with explaining the qualities now mentioned: but upon trial, I found that this explanation could not be made diftinctly, till the difference fhould first be ascertained between an emotion and a paffion, and their caufes unfolded.

Great obfcurity may be observed among writers with regard to the prefent point: particularly no care is taken to diftinguish agreeable from pleasant, difagreeable from painful; or rather these terms are deemed fynonymous. This is an error not at all venial in the fcience of ethics; as inftances can and fhall be given, of painful paffions that are agreeable, and of pleafant paffions that are difagreeable. Thefe terms, it is true, are used indifferently in familiar converfation, and in compofitions for amusement; but more accuracy is required from thofe who profess to explain the paffions. In writing upon the critical art, I would avoid every refinement that may feem more curious than ufeful: but the proper meaning of the terms under confide

ration

ration must be ascertained, in order to underftand the paffions, and fome of their effects that are intimately connected with criticism.

I fhall endeavour to explain these terms by familiar examples. Viewing a fine garden, I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable; and I confider the beauty or agreeableness as belonging to the object, or as one of its qualities. When I turn my attention from the garden to what paffes in my mind, I am confcious of a pleasant emotion, of which the garden is the caufe: the pleasure here is felt, as a quality, not of the garden, but of the emotion produced by it. I give an oppofite example. A rotten carcafe is dif agreeable, and raises in the fpectator a painful emotion: the difagreeablenefs is a quality of the object; the pain is a quality of the emotion produced by it. In a word, agreeable and difagreeable are qualities of the objects we perceive; pleasant and painful are qualities of the emotions we feel: the former qualities are perceived as adhering to objects; the latter are felt as exifting within us.

But a paffion or emotion, befide being felt, is frequently made an object of thought or reflection we examine it; we inquire into its nature, its caufe, and its effects. In that view, like other objects, it is either agreeable or difagreeable. Hence clearly appear the different fignifications of the terms under confideration, as applied to paffion: when a paffion is termed

pleasant

!

pleasant or painful, we refer to the actual feeling; when termed agreeable or difagreeable, we refer to it as an object of thought or reflection; a paffion is pleasant or painful to the perfon in whom it exifts; it is agreeable or disagreeable to the person who makes it a fubject of contemplation.

In the description of emotions and paffions, thefe terms do not always coincide: to make which evident, we must endeavour to ascertain, firft, what paffions and emotions are pleasant, what painful; and next, what are agreeable, what difagreeable. With refpect to both, there are general rules, which, if I can truft to induction, admit not a fingle exception. The nature of an emotion or paffion, as pleasant or painful, depends entirely on its caufe: the emotion produced by an agreeable object is invariably pleafant; and the emotion produced by a difagreeable object is invariably painful*. Thus a lofty oak, a generous action, a valuable discovery in art or science, are agreeable objects that invariably produce pleafant emotions. A ftinking puddle, a treacherous action, an irregular, illcontrived edifice, being difagreeable objects, produce painful emotions. Selfish paffions are pleasant; for they arife from self, an agreeable object or cause. A focial paffion directed upon an agreeable object is always pleasant; directed

upon

* See part 7. of this chapter.

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