though Maimonides evidently stretches the virtue of the atonement beyond the limits of the law, (presumptuous sins not admitting of expiation,) yet he seems to have reasoned on a right principle, in attributing to the sincere and pious sentiments of the offerer, the power of extending the efficacy of the atonement to those moral offences, which the legal sin-offering by itself could never

reach.

NO. XXXVIII.

ON THE VICARIOUS IMPORT OF

THE MOSAIC SACRIFICES.

PAGE 34. (I have, in the page here referred to, used the expression vicarious import, rather than vicarious, to avoid furnishing any colour to the idle charge, made against the doctrine of atonement, of supposing a real substitution in the room of the offender, and a literal translation of his guilt and punishment to the immolated victim; a thing utterly incomprehensible, as neither guilt nor punishment can be conceived, but with reference to consciousness, which cannot be transferred. But to be exposed to suffering, in consequence of another's guilt; and thereby, at the same time to represent to the offender, and to release him from, the punishment due to his transgression, involves no contradiction whatever. In this sense, the suffering of the animal may be

1

conceived a substitute for the punishment of the offender inasmuch as it is in virtue of that suffering, the sinner is released. If it be asked, what connexion can subsist between the death of the animal and the acquittal of the sinner, I answer without hesitation, I know not. To unfold divine truths by human philosophy, belongs to those who hold opinions widely different from mine on the subject of atonement. To the Christian it should be sufficient, that Scripture has clearly pronounced this connexion to subsist. That the death of the animal could possess no such intrinsic virtue is manifest; but that divine appointment could bestow upon it this expiatory power, will not surely be denied and as to the fact of such appointment, as well as its reference to that great event from which this virtue was derived, the word of revelation furnishes abundant evidence, as I trust appears from the second of the Discourses contained in this volume.

Now, that the offering of the animal slain in sacrifice, may be considered vicarious in the sense here assigned, that is, vicarious in symbol, (or as representing the penal effects of the offerer's demerits, and his release from the deserved punishment in consequence of the death of the victim) seems to require little proof, beyond the passages of Scripture referred to in the text. If farther evidence should however be required, we shall find it in a more particular examination of that most

solemn service of the yearly atonement, described in pp. 61, 62, of this volume. Mean time, it may be worth while to enquire, how far the arguments urged in opposition to the vicarious nature of the Mosaic sacrifices, will operate against this acceptation. And for this purpose, it will be sufficient to examine the objections, as stated by Sykes, and H. Taylor; inasmuch as the industry of the former, and the subtilty of the latter, have left none of the arguments of Socinus, Crellius, or the other learned antagonists of the doctrine of atonement, unnoticed or unimproved; and the skirmishing writers of the present day, have done nothing more than retail, with diminished force, the same objections.

They are all reduced by Sykes and Taylor under the following heads, 1. It is no where said in the Old Testament, that the life of the victim was given as a vicarious substitute for the life of him who offered it. 2. The atonement was not made by the death of the animal, but by the sprinkling of the blood at the altar. 3. No atonement could be made, where life was forfeited. 4. Atonements were made by the sacrifice of animals in some cases where no guilt was involved. And 5. Atonements were sometimes made without the death of an animal, or any blood-shedding whatever.*This is the sum total of the arguments, collected

*See Sykes's Essay on Sacr. p. 121-141. Ben. Mord, p. 797–799. und Crell, contra Grot. cap. x.

by the industry of these writers, against the notion of the vicarious nature of sacrifice and it must be remembered, that Sykes applies these to the idea, that "the taking away the life of the animal was designed to put the offerer in mind of his demerits," no less than to the idea, that "the life of the animal was given in lieu of the life of the sinner" (pp. 120, 121.) so that they may fairly be replied to, on the principle of atonement here contended for.

Now, to the first of these objections it may be answered, that it is again and again asserted in the Old Testament, that in cases where punishment had been incurred, and even where (as we shall see hereafter) life itself was forfeited, the due oblation of an animal in sacrifice was effectual to procure, the reversal of the forfeiture, and the pardon of the offender; that is, the death of the animal was so far represented as standing in place of the offender's punishment, and in some cases even of his death, that through it, no matter how operating, the offerer was enabled to escape. This however is not deemed sufficient. Some precise and appropriate phrase, unequivocally marking a strict vicarious substitution, is still required. But as a strict vicarious substitution, or literal equivalent, is not contended for, no such notion belong+ ing to the doctrine of atonement, it is not neces→ · sary that any such phrase should be produced. The words,

and wɔ, in their sacrificial appli

cation, sufficiently admit the vicarious import; and the description of the sacrificial ceremony and its consequences, especially in the instance of the scape-goat, positively prove it; and beyond this nothing farther can be required.

But it is curious to remark, that both Sykes and Taylor, in their eagerness to demonstrate, that the sacrificial terms conveyed nothing whatever of a vicarious import, have urged an objection, which rebounds with decisive force against their own opinion. "The life of the animal," say they," is never called, in the Old Testament, a ransom; nor is there any such expression, as λυτρον, αντίλυτρον, αντιψυχον, equivalent, exchange, substitute, &c." Essay on Sacr. p. 134. B. Mord. p. 197.—Now, not to speak of their criticisms on the expressions in the original, (particularly on the word,) which merely go to prove, that these words do not necessarily convey such ideas, inasmuch as being of a more extended signification, they are not in all cases applied exactly in this sense-an argument, which will easily strip most Hebrew terms of their true and definite meaning, being, as they are denominated by Grotius, (De Satis. Chr. cap. viii. § 2, 3.) woλvonuar -not to speak, I say, of such criticisms, nor to urge the unfairness of concluding against the meaning of the original, from the language used in the Greek translation; have not these writers, by admitting, that the words Aurgo, artiλUTgov, &C.