chances a hundred to one against any man's having planted it there, I should at once reckon this last as the more unlikely supposition.

So also, in the instance above given, any unmeaning form into which a number of letters might fall, would not be called improbable, countless as the chances are against that particular order, because there are just as many against each one of all other unmeaning forms; so that no one would be comparatively improbable; but if the letters formed a coherent poem, it would then be called incalculably improbable that this form should have been fortuitous, though the chances against it remain the very same; because there must be much fewer chances against the supposition of its having been the work of design. The probability in short, of any supposition, is estimated from a comparison with each of its alternatives. The inclination of the balance cannot be ascertained from knowing the weights in one scale, unless we know what is in the opposite scale. So also the pressure of the atmosphere (equivalent to about 30,000 pounds on the body of an ordinary man) is unfelt while it is equable on all parts, and balanced by the air within the body; but is at once perceived, when the pressure is removed from any part, by the air-pump or cupping-glass.

The foregoing observations however, as was above remarked, are not confined to Arguments from Testimony, but apply to all cases in which the degree of probability is estimated from a calculation of chances.

Disbeliev

For some further remarks on this subject ing is Be- the reader is referred to § 17 of the Treatise lieving on Fallacies,* where the "Fallacy of Objections" is discussed. It is most important to keep in mind the self-evident, but often forgotten maxim that disbelief is belief; only, they have reference to opposite conclusions. E. G. To disbelieve the real existence of the city of Troy, is to believe that it was feigned: and *Logic, B. iii.

which conclusion implies the greater credulity, is the question to be decided. To some it may appear more, to others, less, probable, that a Greek poet should have celebrated (with whatever exaggerations) some of the feats of arms in which his countrymen had actually been engaged, than that he should have passed by all these, and resorted to such as were wholly imaginary The proper opposite to belief is either Ignorance, conscious ignorance, or doubt. And even or doubt op Doubt may sometimes amount to a kind posed to Be of Belief; since deliberate and confirmed Doubt, on a question that one has attended to, implies a" verdict of not proven ;”—a belief that there is not sufficient evidence to determine either one way or the other. And in some cases this conclusion would be accounted a mark of excessive credulity. A man who should doubt whether there is such a city as Rome, would imply his belief in (what most would account a moral impossibility) the possibility of such multitudes of independent witnesses having concurred ia a fabri

cation.

lief.

§ 6. Before I dismiss the consideration of Progressive Signs, it may be worth while to notice ano- approach. ther case of combined Argument different from the one lately mentioned, yet in some degree resembling it. The combination just spoken of, is where several Testimonies or other Signs, singly perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by their coincidence, a degree of probability far exceeding the sum of their several forces, taken separately in the case I am now about to notice, the combined force of the series of arguments results from the order in which they are considered, and from their progressive tendency to establish a certain conclusion. E. G. one part of the law of nature called the “vis inertiæ,” is established by the argument alluded to; viz. that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion with uniform velocity in a right line, so far as it is not acted upon by any causes which re

tard or stop, accelerate, or divert, its course. Now, as in every cause which can come under our observation, some such causes do intervene, the assumed supposition is practically impossible; and we have no opportunity of verifying the law by direct experiment: but we may gradually approach indefinitely near to the case supposed; and on the result of such experiments our conclusion is founded. We find that when a body is projected along a rough surface, its motion is speedily retarded, and soon stopped; if along a smoother surface, it continues longer in motion; if upon ice, longer still; and the like with regard to wheels, &c. in proportion as we gradually lessen the friction of the machinery: and if we remove the resistance of the air by setting a wheel or pendulum in motion under an exhausted receiver, the motion is still longer continued. Finding then that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted, in proportion as we more and more remove the impediments to motion from friction and resistance of the air, we reasonably conclude that if this could be completely done, (which is out of our power,) the motion would never cease, since what appear to be the only causes of its cessation would be absent.*

Again, in arguing for the existence and moral attributes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, great use may be made of a like progressive course of Argument, though it has been often overlooked. Some have argued for the being of a God from the universal, or at least, general, consent of mankind; and some have appealed to the opinions of the wisest and most cultivated portion, respecting both the existence and the moral excellence of the Deity. It cannot be denied that there is a presumptive force in each of these arguments; but it may be answered, that it is conceivable an opinion common to almost all the species, may pos sibly be an error resulting from a constitutional infir

See the argument in Butler's Analogy to prove the advan bage which Virtue, if perfect, might be expected to obtain.

mity of the human intellect;-that if we are to acquiesce in the belief of the majority, we shall be led to Polytheism; such being the creed of the greater part : -and that though more weight may reasonably be attached to the opinions of the wisest and best-instructed, still, as we know such men are not exempt from error, we cannot be perfectly safe in adopting the belief they hold, unless we are convinced that they hold it in consequence of their being the wisest and best-instructed; -so far forth as they are such. Now this is precisely the point which may be established by the above-mentioned progressive Argument. Nations of Atheists, if there are any such, are confessedly among the rudes' and most ignorant savages: those who represent their God or Gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to be found (in the present day at least) among those who are brutal and uncivilized; and among the most civilized nations of the ancients, who professed a similar creed, the more enlightened members of society seem either to have rejected altogether, or to have explained away, the popular belief. The Mahometan nations, again, of the present day, who are certainly more advanced in civilization than their Pagan neighbours, maintain the unity and the moral excellence of the Deity; but the nations of Christendom, whose notions of the divine goodness are more exalted, are undeniably the most civilized part of the world, and possess, generally speaking, the most cultivated and improved intellectual powers. Now if we would ascertain, and appeal to, the sentiments of man as a rational being, we must surely look to those which not only prevail most among the most rational and cultivated, but towards which also a progressive tendency is found in men in proportion to their degrees of rationality and cultivation. It would be most extravagant to suppose that man's advance towards a more improved and exalted state of existence should tend to obliterate true and instil false notions. On the contrary we are

authorized to conclude, that those notions would be the most correct, which men would entertain, whose know. ledge, intelligence, and intellectual cultivation should have reached comparatively the highest pitch of perfection; and that those consequently will approach the nearest to the truth, which are entertained, more or less, by various nations, in proportion as they have advanced towards this civilized state.

Many other instances might be adduced, in which truths of the highest importance may be elicited by this process of argumentation; which will enable us to decide with sufficient probability what consequence would follow from an hypothesis which we have never experienced. It might, not improperly, be termed the Argument from Progressive Approach.

§ 7. The third kind of Arguments to be Example. considered, (being the other branch of the second of the two classes originally laid down, see § 3,) may be treated of under the general name of EXAMPLE; taking that term in its widest acceptation, so as to comprehend the Arguments designated by the various names of Induction, Experience, Analogy, Parity of Reasoning, &c., all of which are essentially the same, as far as regards the fundamental principles I am here treating of. For in all the Arguments designated by these names, it will be found, that we consider one or more, known, individual objects or instances, of a certain class, as a fair sample, in respect of some point or other, of that class; and consequently draw an inference from them respecting either the whole class, or other, less known, individuals of it.

In Arguments of this kind* then it will be found, that, universally, we assume as a major premiss, that what is true (in regard to the point in question) of the individual or individuals which we bring forward and appeal to, is true of the whole class to which they belong; the minor premiss next asserts something of * See Logic, B. iv. ch. i. § 1.