as established, they will often, according to the maxim omne ignotum pro mirifico," take for granted that he has advanced valid arguments, and will be loth to seem behind-hand in comprehending them. It usually requires that a man should have some confidence in his own understanding, to venture to say, "what has been spoken is unintelligible to me." Furnishing a pretext clined. Occupy. ing time. Another purpose sometimes answered by a discourse of this kind is, that it serves to furnish an excuse, flimsy indeed, but not un- for voting frequently sufficient, for men to vote or act ac- as one is in cording to their own inclinations; which they would perhaps have been ashamed to do, if strong argu ments had been urged on the other side, and had remained confessedly unanswered; but they satisfy themselves, if something has been said in favour of the course they wish to adopt; though that something be only fairsounding sentences that convey no distinct meaning. They are content that an answer has been made, without troubling themselves to consider what it is. § 5. Another end, which in speaking is sometimes proposed, and which is, if possible, still more remote from the legitimate province of Rhetoric, is to occupy time. When an unfavourable decision is apprehended, and the protraction of the debate may afford time for fresh voters to be summoned, or may lead to an adjournment, which will afford scope for some other manœuvre ;-when there is a chance of so wearying out the attention of the hearers, that they will listen with languor and impatience to what shall be urged on the other side;-when an advocate is called upon to plead a cause in the absence of those whose opinion it is of the utmost importance to influence, and wishes to reserve all his Arguments till they arrive, but till then, must apparently proceed in his pleading; in these and many similar cases, which it is needless to particularize, it is a valuable talent to be able to pour forth with fluency an unlimited quantity of well-sounding language which has little or no meaning, yet which shall not strike the hearers as unintelligible or nonsensical, though it convey to their minds no distinct idea. Perspicuity of Style-real, not apparent, perspicuity -is in this case never necessary, and sometimes, studiously avoided. If any distinct meaning were conveyed, then, if that which was said were irrelevant, it would be perceived to be so, and would produce impatience in the hearers, or afford an advantage to the opponents; if, on the other hand, the speech were relevant, and there were no arguments of any force to be urged, except such as either had been already dwelt on, or were required to be reserved (as in the case last alluded to) for a fuller audience, the speaker would not further his cause by bringing them forward. So that the usual resource on these occasions, of such orators as thoroughly under. stand the tricks of their art, and do not disdain to employ them, is to amuse their audience with specious empti ness. It is most unfortunate, that in Sermons there should be so much temptation to fall into the first two (to say nothing of the third) of these kinds of spurious oratory. When it is appointed that a Sermon shall be preached, and custom requires that it shall be of a certain length, there cannot but be more danger that the preacher should chiefly consider himself as bound to say something, and to оссиру the time prescribed, without keeping in mind the object of leaving his hearers the wiser or the better, than if he were to preach solely in consequence of his having such a specific object to accomplish.* Display of § 6. Another kind of spurious Oratory, and the last that will be noticed, is that which has for its object to gain the hearer's admiration of the Eloquence displayed. This, indeed, constitutes one of the three kinus of Oratory enumerated See part iii. chap. iii. § 2. py Aristotle,* and is regularly treated of by him, along with the deliberative and Judicial branches; though it hardly deserves the place he has bestowed on it. When this is the end pursued, perspicuity is not in deed to be avoided, but it may often without detriment be disregarded.† Men frequently admire as eloquent, and sometimes admire the most, what they do not at all, or do not fully, comprehend, if elevated and high-sounding words be arranged in graceful and sonorous periods. Those of uncultivated minds, especially, are apt to think meanly of any thing that is brought down perfectly to the low level of their capacity; though to do this with respect to valuable truths which are not trite, is one of the most admirable feats of genius. They admire the profundity of one who is mystical and obscure; mistaking the muddiness of the water for depth; and magnifying in their imaginations what is viewed through a fog; and they conclude that brilliant language must represent some brilliant ideas, without troubling themselves to enquire what those ideas are. Many an enthusiastic admirer of a "fine discourse, or a piece of " fine writing," would be found on examination to retain only a few sonorous, but empty phra ses; and not only to have no notion of the general drift of the Argument, but not even to have ever considered whether the author had any such drift or not. It is not meant to be insinuated that in every such case the composition is in itself unmeaning, or that the author had no other object than the credit of eloquence; he may have had a higher end in view; and he may have expressed himself very clearly to some hearers, though not to all; but it is most important to be fully aware of the fact, that it is possible to obtair the high *For he says, that in each of the two other kinds, the hearer is a "judge;" in the first of the "expedient," in the other, of the just; but in the third kind he is only Ocwpòs, literally, a Specta tor; and is a judge merely (Tis duváμεws) of the ability of the Orator. † See Appendix, [L.] est applause from those who not only receive no edifi. cation from what they hear, but absolutely do not un derstand it. So far is popularity from being a safe criterion of the usefulness of a preacher. CHAP. II.-Of Energy § 1. The next quality of Style to be noticed is what may be called Energy; the term being used in a wider sense than the 'Evépyeta of Aristotle, and nearly correspond ing with what Dr. Campbell calls Vivacity; so as to comprehend every thing that may conduce to stimulate attention to impress strongly on the mind the Arguments adduced-to excite the Imagination, and to arouse the Feelings. This Energy then, or Vivacity of Style, must depend (as is likewise the case in respect of Perspicuity) on three things; 1st, the Choice of words, 2nd, their Ňumber, and 3rd, their Arrangement. Choice of With respect to the choice of words, it will words with be most convenient to consider them under those two classes which Aristotle has de a view to energy. scribed under the titles of Kuria and Xena, for which our language does not afford precisely corresponding names: "Proper," " Appropriate," or " Ordinary," terms, will the most nearly designate the former; the latter class (literally the "Strange,") including all others; all that are in any way removed from common use; whether uncommon terms, or ordinary terms, either transferred to a different meaning from that which strictly belongs to them, or employed in a different marner from that of common discourse. All the Tropes and Figures, enumerated by Grammatical and Rhetorical Writers, will of course fall under this head Caution With respect then to "Proper" terms, the against ge principal rule for guiding our choice with a neral terms. view to Energy, is to prefer, ever, those words which are the least abstract and general. Indi viduals alone having a real existence, the terms denoting them (called by Logicians "Singular terms ") will of course make the most vivid impression on the mind, and exercise most the power of Conception; and the less remote any term is from these, i. e. the more specific or individual, the more energy it will possess, in comparison of such as are more general. The impression produced on the mind by a "Singular term," may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye of any object (suppose some particular man) near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distinguish the features of the individual; in a fainter light or rather further off, we merely perceive that the object is a man; this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the name of the Species; yet further off, or in a still feebler light, we can distinguish merely some living object; and at length, merely some object; these views corresponding respectively with the terms denoting the genera, less or more remote. And as each of these views conveys, as far as it goes, an equally correct impression to the mind, (for we are equally certain that the object at a distance is something, as that the one close to us is such and such an individual,) though each, successively, is less vivid; so, in language, a general term may be as clearly understood, as a Specific, or a Singular term, but will convey a much less forcible impression to the hearer's mind. "The more General * Thence called by Aristotle, (Categ. sec. 3.) "primary substances" (pwrαι obciat,) Genus and Species, being denominated "secondary," as not properly denoting a "really-existing thing," (rode Ti,) but rather an attribute. He has, indeed, been considered Es the great advocate of the opposite doctrine; i. e. the system of "Realism" which was certainly embraced by many of his professed followers; but his own language is sufficiently explicit Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει· άτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενον ἐστιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ, μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ζῶον. ΟΥ ΜΗΝ ΓΕ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Kołóν ri onpalvε K. T. X. Aristotle, Categ. 3. See Logic, Dissert. c. v |