CHAP. III.-Of the favourable or unfavourable dispo sition of the hearers towards the Speaker or his opponent.

§ 1. In raising a favourable impression of Indirect the speaker, or an unfavourable one of his self-comopponent, a peculiar tact will of course be mendation. necessary; especially in the former, since direct selfcommendation will usually be disgusting, to a greater degree, even than a direct personal attack on another; though, if the Orator is pleading his own cause, or one in which he is personally concerned, (as was the case in the speech of Demosthenes concerning the Crown,) a greater allowance will be made for him on this point; especially if he be a very eminent person, and one who mav safely appeal to public actions performed by him. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as claiming, directly, when speaking in his own vindication, exactly the qualities (good Sense, good Principle, and Goodwill) which Aristotle lays down as constituting the character which we must seek to appear in. But then it is to be observed, that the historian represents him as accustomed to address the people with more authority than others for the most part ventured to assume. is by the expression of wise, amiable, and generous Sentiments, that Aristotle recommends the speaker to manifest his own character;* but even this must generally be done in an obliquet and seemingly incidental manner, lest the hearers be disgusted with a

It

*When (as of course will often happen) the hearers are thus induced, on insufficient grounds, to give the speaker full credit for moral excellence, from his merely uttering the language of it, the fallacy which in this case misleads them may be regarded as that of undistributed middle: "a good man would speak so and so; the speaker does this; therefore he must be a good man."

t E. G. "It would be needless to impress upon you the maxim," &c. "You cannot be ignorant," &c. &c. "I am not advancing any high pretensions in expressing the sentiments which such an Dccasion must call forth in every honest heart," &c,

pompous and studied display of fine sentiments; and care must also be taken not to affront them by seeming to inculcate, as something likely to be new to them, maxims which they regard as almost truisms. Of course the application of this last caution must vary according to the character of the persons addressed; that might excite admiration and gratitude in one audience, which another would receive with indignation and ridicule. Most men, however, are disposed rather to overrate than to extenuate their own moral judgment; or at least to be jealous of any one's appearing to underrate it.

Eloquence Universally indeed, in the Arguments used, relative. as well as in the appeals made to the feelings, a consideration must be had of the hearers, whether they are learned or ignorant of this or that profession -nation-character, &c. and the address must be adapted to each; so that there can be no excellence of writing or speaking, in the abstract; nor can we any more pronounce on the Eloquence of any Composition, than upon the wholesomeness of a medicine, without knowing for whom it is intended. The less enlightened the hearers, the harder, of course, it is to make them comprehend a long and complex train of Reasoning; so that sometimes the arguments, in themselves the most cogent, cannot be employed at all with effect; and the rest will need an expansion and copious illustration which would be needless, and therefore tiresome, (as has been above remarked,) before a different kind of audience. On the other hand, their feelings may be excited by much bolder and coarser expedients; such as those are the most ready to employ, and the most likely to succeed in, who are themselves a little removed above the vulgar; as may be seen in the effects produced by fanatical preachers. But there are none whose feelings do not occasionally need and admit of excitement by the powers of eloquence; only there is a more exquisite skill required in thus affecting the educated classes, than the populace. "The less improved in

knowledge and discernment the hearers are, the easier it is for the speaker to work upon their passions, and by working on their passions, to obtain his end. This, it must be owned, appears on the other hand to give a considerable advantage to the preacher; as in no congregation can the bulk of the people be regarded as on a footing, in point of improvement, with either House of Parliament, or with the Judges in a Court of Judicature. It is certain, that the more gross the hearers are, the more avowedly may you address yourself to their passions, and the less occasion there is for argument; whereas, the more intelligent they are, the more covertly must you operate on their passions, and the more attentive must you be in regard to the justness, or at least the speciousness, of your reasoning. Hence some have strangely concluded, that the only scope for eloquence is in haranguing the multitude; that in gaining over to your purpose men of knowledge and breeding, the exertion of oratorical talents hath no influence. This is precisely as if one should argue, because a mob is much more easily subdued than regular troops, there is no occasion for the art of war, nor is there a proper field for the exertion of military skill, unless when you are quelling an undisciplined rabble. Every body sees, in this case, not only how absurd such a way of arguing would be, but that the very reverse ought to be the conclusion. The reason why people do not so quickly perceive the absurdity in the other case, is, that they affix no distinct meaning to the word eloquence, often denoting no more by that term than simply the power of moving the passions. But even in this improper acceptation, their notion is far from being just; for wherever there are men, learned or ignorant, civilized or barbarous, there are passions; and the greater the difficulty is in affecting these, the more art is requisite. It may be added to what Dr. C. has here remarked, that the title of eloquent may have come to be often • Campbell's Rhetoric, b. i. ch. x. sec. 2, pp. 224, 22.5

limited to such compositions as he is speaking of, from the circumstance that their eloquence is (to readers of cultivated mind) more conspicuous. That which affects our own feelings is not, by us, at the time at least, per ceived to be eloquence. See note to the next section.

On the other hand, it is, as has been said, in the same degree more difficult to bring the uneducated to a comFrehension of the arguments employed; and this, not only from their reasoning-powers having less general cultivation, but also, in many instances, from their ignorance of the subject;-their needing to be informed of the facts, and to have the principles explained to them, on which the argument proceeds. And I cannot but think that the generality of sermons seem to pre-suppose a degree of religious knowledge in the hearers greater than many of them would be found on examination to possess. When this is the case, the most angelic eloquence must be unavailing to any practical purpose.

In no point more than in that now under consideration, viz. the Conciliation (to adopt the term of the Latin writers) of the hearers, is it requisite to consider who and what the hearers are; for when it is said that good Sense, good Principle, and Good-will, constitute the character which the speaker ought to establish of himself, it is to be remembered that every one of these is to be considered in reference to the opinions and habits of the audience. To think very differently from his hearers, may often be a sign of the Orator's wisdom and worth; but they are not likely to consider it so. A witty satirist has observed, that "it is a short way to obtain the reputation of a wise and reasonable man, whenever any one tells you his opinion, to agree with him." Without going the full length of completely acting on this maxim, it is absolutely necessary to remem. ber, that in proportion as the speaker manifests his dissent from the opinions and principles of his audience

* Swift.

so far, he runs the risk at least of impairing their esti. mation of his judgment. But this it is often necessary to do when any serious object is proposed; because it will commonly happen that the very End aimed at shall be one which implies a change of sentiments, or even of principles and character, in the hearers.

ness."

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This must be very much the case with any preacher of the Gospel; but must have been much more so with its first promulgators. Christ crucified" was "to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks, foolishThe total change required in all the notions, habits, and systems of conduct in the first converts, constituted an obstacle to the reception of the new religion, which other that has prevailed ever had to contend with. Tue striking contrast which Mahommedism presents, in this respect, to Christianity, constitutes the rapid diffusion of the two, by no means parallel cases.

Those indeed who aim only at popularity, are right in conforming their sentiments to those of the hearers, rather than the contrary; but it is plain that though in this way they obtain the greatest reputation for Eloquence, they deserve it the less; it being much easier according to the tale related of Mahomet, to go to the mountain, than to bring the mountain to us. "Little force is necessary to push down heavy bodies placed on the verge of a declivity; but much force is requisite to stop them in their progress, and push them up. If a man should say, that because the first is more frequently effected than the last, it is the best trial of strength, and the only suitable use to which it can be applied, we should at least not think him remarkable for distinctness in his ideas. Popularity alone, therefore, is no test at all of the eloquence of the speaker, no more than velocity alone would be, of the force of the external impulse originally given to the body moving. As in this the direction of the body, and other circumstances, must be taken into the account; so, in that, you must consider the tendency of the teaching, whether it fa