Free Will and IllusionOUP Oxford, 30 במרץ 2000 - 344 עמודים Saul Smilansky presents an original treatment of the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and human self-understanding. He maintains that we have most of the resources we need for a proper understanding of the problem; and the key to it is the role played by illusion. The major traditional philosophical approaches are inadequate, Smilansky argues: their partial insights need to be integrated into a hybrid view, which he calls Fundamental Dualism. Common views about justice, responsibility, human worth, and related notions are radically misguided, and the absurd looms large. We do, however, find some justification for enlightened moral views, and grounding for some of our most cherished views of human nature. The bold and perhaps disturbing claim of Free Will and Illusion is that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom: illusion lies at the centre of the human condition. The necessity of illusion is seen to follow from the basic elements of the free will issue, helping keep our moral and psychological worlds intact. Smilansky offers the challenge of recognizing the centrality of illusion and trying to free ourselves to some extent from it; this is not only a philosophical challenge, but a moral and psychological one as well. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 73
עמוד 2
... idea that control is morally central in such ways the Core Conception . Attempts to dent or reject the Core Conception are shown to be wrong , and it is also shown that the relevant notion of ' control ' can be complex , opening the ...
... idea that control is morally central in such ways the Core Conception . Attempts to dent or reject the Core Conception are shown to be wrong , and it is also shown that the relevant notion of ' control ' can be complex , opening the ...
עמוד 3
... idea that some sort of ' metaphysical ' or ' libertarian ' notion of free will , such as would be negated by a completely deterministic ontology , is necessary in order to have moral responsibility . Hence , the term ' compat- ibilism ...
... idea that some sort of ' metaphysical ' or ' libertarian ' notion of free will , such as would be negated by a completely deterministic ontology , is necessary in order to have moral responsibility . Hence , the term ' compat- ibilism ...
עמוד 5
... ideas such as moral responsibility and desert , even without libertarian free will ( and without recourse to a ... idea that either compatibilism or hard determinism can be adequate on its own is unten- able . In Chapter 6 , we ...
... ideas such as moral responsibility and desert , even without libertarian free will ( and without recourse to a ... idea that either compatibilism or hard determinism can be adequate on its own is unten- able . In Chapter 6 , we ...
עמוד 13
... idea of justice , roughly equivalent to that which is ' due ' to people . It is instructive for the importance of desert to note that desert in the broad sense can stand for all of justice in common speech . Here , however , we will be ...
... idea of justice , roughly equivalent to that which is ' due ' to people . It is instructive for the importance of desert to note that desert in the broad sense can stand for all of justice in common speech . Here , however , we will be ...
עמוד 14
... idea of desert than my central one . While there is room for speak- ing of desert not related to free action , the core notion of desert , which is morally deep , is related to free will and responsibility . Indeed , as we shall see it ...
... idea of desert than my central one . While there is room for speak- ing of desert not related to free action , the core notion of desert , which is morally deep , is related to free will and responsibility . Indeed , as we shall see it ...
תוכן
13 | |
Why Not Compatibilism? | 40 |
Why Not Libertarian Free Will? | 56 |
Why Not Hard Determinism? | 74 |
The Fundamental Dualism | 94 |
THE ROLE OF ILLUSION | 143 |
Why Not ReactiveNaturalism? | 220 |
Some Further Benefits | 234 |
Some Additional Problems | 256 |
Conclusion | 283 |
References | 297 |
Glossary | 311 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
absence of libertarian actions basic beliefs bilist blame blameworthy central Chapter choice claim Community of Responsibility compati compatibilist distinctions compatibilist free compatibilist level compatibilist perspective compatibilist terms Compatibility Question concern conclusions consequentialist considered control compatibilism control compatibilist Core Conception crucial danger Derek Parfit Dissonance Problem distributive justice egalitarian ethical existence free will issue free will problem free will-related freedom Fundamental Dualism Galen Strawson hard deter hard determinism hard determinist perspective hence honesty human idea importance of illusion injustice innocent Insufficiency Problem intuitions Isaiah Berlin lack libertarian free lives luck Martha Klein matters moral responsibility moral worth motivation nature notion one's ourselves Oxford people's philosophical position possible practice punishment reactive attitudes reason relevant respect for persons retributive retributive justice role of illusion self-deception self-respect sense situation social Strawson tarian tion truth ultimate level ultimate perspective ultimate-level unillusioned University Press utilitarianism