Lovers of the world, is not this enough? Ought not this to satisfy you? Ye, whose hearts are set upon wealth-who make gold your god; do you expect to become richer than Solomon? Yet his wealth failed to satisfy him; and shall yours ever satisfy you? Ye who aspire to fame, and dote upon worldly distinctions and honours; do you expect to attain to higher honours than Solomon? Do you expect to surround yourselves with greater splendour and magnificence? Yet his honours proved a bubble, at the last. Will yours (if you reach them) be any more substantial? And ye votaries of sinful, sexual pleasure, who know no other enjoyments than those of appetite and lust; look at Solomon, and learn a lesson of wisdom from him. Do your means of gratification equal his? Do you expect that they ever can equal his? And if his were vanity and vexation of spirit, what have you to hope from yours?

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Lovers of the world of every description, learn a lesson of wisdom from the case of Solomon. Profit by the example which has been set before you. Having tried every thing earthly, and found it all vain, Solomon repaired anew to the unfailing Source of good. He came back to the fountain of living waters. To fear God, and keep his commandments, he found to be the whole duty, and the highest and only happiness of man. Let my world-loving, impenitent readers come with him to the same conclusion, and they shall experience the same result. Their oft-cheated, disappointed hearts shall then be satisfied. Their weary souls shall find a rest. They shall begin to realize, in their own experience, the truth of what our Saviour said to the woman of Samaria: "He that drinketh" at the fountains of earth-drink he ever so much"shall thirst again; but he that drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him, shall be within him a well of water springing up into everlasting life."

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE AFFECTIONS.

By Rev. MILES P. SQUIER, Geneva, N. Y.

THOSE discussions in mental science, which have, of late, enriched the pages of our American quarterlies, have done essential service to this interesting study.

It may fairly be submitted, whether the controversy of the elder Edwards, with his Arminian opponents, has not bequeathed to his disciples a phraseology somewhat liable to misconstruction, on the subject of the Will. This would not be surprising, even though no essential error were entertained by him in respect to this faculty. His object was single: his attitude antagonistical. He wished to place in a strong light, the Calvinistic bearings of his subject, and in doing this, was comparatively unmindful of other points, to which it was more remotely affiliated. This is perhaps a uniform feature of controversial writings. But the progress of a century since, has given opportunity to look at the subject of mental science in attitudes and relations, not distinctly recognized by the giant intellect of Edwards, and which has led many to the conviction that he has used forms of speech, in pointing out the connection between the Will and the predominant motive, which does not the most accurately describe the intimations of consciousness respecting it.

These extant discussions are having the effect to redeem the doctrine of the Will from any tendencies toward fatalism, and relieving it from the impression of a literal analogy be tween cause and effect in physics, and motive and volition in the department of mind. They sustain the full responsibility of our acts of will, as reported by consciousness, and place motives in their true position as the condition of the mind's voluntary action ;-as the intelligent considerations in view of which it originates choice in conscious freedom and accountability; while most readers will doubt whether the advocates THIRD SERIES, VOL. II. NO. III.

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of contingent action have succeeded (if that has been their aim) in effacing the conviction that willing is always in the direction of the greatest motive.

But the difficult point in the science of mind, is not yet reached by the very distinguished writers who have appeared upon the arena of this discussion. After conceding that, even with the broadest construction of the conscious freedom, sovereignty, and responsibleness of the Will, its acts, in fact, are in the direction of the leading consideration present to the mind, the inquiry goes back a step, and asks after the doctrine of motive-influence. It seeks for the law of the subjective motive. What are the elements of which it is composed? What do we mean by propensity, bias, or native inclination? What by the accustomed habitudes of the spirit, whether derived from Adam, or acquired in any other way? What is the true analysis of that discolouring medium, through which the objective motive passes, often, in coming to the Will, and influencing the choice? A psychological solution of this problem would solve also many affiliated difficulties in metaphysics and theology, and go far toward making plain our pathway in the researches of mental science. If the generic classification of the powers of the mind be into the understanding, sensibility, and will, the inquiry would relate to the second item in the enumeration, and its actual states and affections; the law of their rise and inhabitation in the soul, and of their correllation with objective truth, and the determinate acts of the will.

This subject would also seem to be next in order, and may be fruitful of good results in the department of religious instruction, of morals, and of common life.

With the view of calling attention to it, we throw out the following suggestions, without pretending to exhaust the subject, or to speak with much authority among the savans, who are in arbitration upon the true lineaments of the mental economy.

1. Affections are not substantive properties of the mind..

They are distinguishable from its essence. They are accretions in its history,-matters of its experience,-feelings, emotions, states; attitudes of the mind in view of other objects, and not its created, substantive being.

Practical error may have arisen on this point, from that classification of the powers of the mind which makes the affections one of them; a misnomer avoided by most modern writers.

There is in the mind a constitutional susceptibility of emotions, an inherent provision and adaptedness to be affected by objects from without, by all truth, and by all the relations appropriate to our moral being. This we know from the fact, that we have emotions, and are affected in view of the various objects of our knowledge. This, doubtless, is a quality of all mind, infinite and finite-angelic or humanfallen or unfallen-intelligent, brute or insect. But every where too, the distinction between the mind and its affections is that between the container and the thing contained-between reason and reasoning-will and willing-agent and action. Thus Dr. Woods (Bib. Repos., Jan., 1842, p. 168): "I maintain that the mind acts as really and powerfully, in loving, and hating, and desiring, as in willing and choosing. It is indeed the subject of an influence from without, but it is an intelligent, active subject. It is not properly a recipient of its affections, but an agent in them."

2. Affections arise in view of objects made known to the mind. We here refer to the great law of mind, that feeling, as well as thought, implies the presence or recollection of an object on which that feeling terminates; that knowledge is the prerequisite of emotion, and that we have no affections concerning an object of which we know nothing. Some report of the senses, some reminiscence of memory, or some combination of the intellect, must awaken emotion, or we shall have none. This matter is as well understood in the nursery, as in the cabinet; in the pastimes of childhood, as in

the laws of evidence, and the instructions of philosophy. The true position for emotions, is on the report of the understanding; on the decision of the intellect; on the apprehension of the mind as to the state of facts in given premises. So is it on the arena of human life. So, it would seem, it must every where and always be. The man who knows nothing of China takes no interest in the destinies deciding there. Your child may have died, but until you know it, you do not feel your loss. Revenge is consequent on the apprehension of wrong;-envy sees a successful rival;-hatred is in view of conflicting claims, or defeat, in respect to cherished objects. Faith apprehends the grounds of confidence, and love the characteristics of loveliness. On this principle are arranged the intercourse, and courtesies, and friendships of life. The commerce of the mind with objects presented to it, is in the order of this process,-its perception of them-its judgment on them-its emotions in view of them, and its determinate acts of Will respecting them. I perceive the house I am in to be on fire; I judge the fire will reach me; I feel the emotion of fear, and will the requisite means of escape. The mind, in a given case, may pass to conclusions with the rapidity of light, but this must be the order of the process, or it is devoid of intelligence.

Habit and the principle of association vastly facilitate the classification of objects; but the mind stands affected toward them, according to their apprehended qualities and relations. It may be mistaken, but its affections in any given instance, are the result of its mental notices; and hence they change with these notices. A friend approaches in the dress of an enemy; I feel aversion. He comes nearer; I see it is my friend, and my feelings change. So a familiar illustration. I hear a noise like that of thunder; I deem it to be thunder, and enjoy its sublimity. I learn it to be but a rumbling of a cart upon the pavement, and all sense of its sublimity passes from my mind. We here ask, Does not this law of intelligent action obtain in respect to all our moral and religious affections?