intellectual and the abstract. According to his own definition, he certainly is not a virtuous philosopher. He carries every thing to an extreme. And the intellectual extreme in morals is particularly vicious, because it strikes out the corner-stone of virtue. Well might Bacon say: "I find it strange that Atistotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof!" Never were two ethical systems more entirely at variance as to the nature of virtue, than those of Aristotle and President Edwards. Edwards on the Affections would have been quite as effectual a poser to Aristotle, as Edwards on the Will is to certain modern admirers of Plato. With Aristotle, virtue is not love to any thing-least of all, "love to being in general." The great source and sum of being is struck out of his system of morals. Instead of basing his ethics upon theology, as Socrates did, he has built a temple without a god, and without any place for one. And as he acknowledges no all-seeing eye to discern the heart, so he pays no regard to the motives and springs of human action. He recognizes no higher guide of moral conduct than reason, and no deeper foundation of moral character, than habit. The Ethics is therefore false in theory and of little use in practice.

But it abounds in important thoughts, ingenious speculations, and able reasonings. The definition of virtue, as consisting in a mean between two extremes, and the test and measure of virtue as lying in the pleasure with which we practise it—both these, though hasty generalizations, which will not bear so universal an application, are certainly happy thoughts, which are well worthy of our attentive consideration. And his view of habit as constituting the character, becomes a truth of vast importance, if only extended so as to embrace, not merely the habitual conduct, but the habitual motives by which it is prompted. Aristotle's Ethics made a bad standard of theology for the doctors and divines of the middle ages. It would not make a good text-book of moral philosophy for the professors of our day. But no curious and reflecting mind

can read a page of it without finding ample stimulus and food for thought.

In close connection with his Ethics, Aristotle composed his treatise on

Politics.

In his view the community, or the state, is prior, in the intention of nature, to the individual, as every whole is prior in the intention of nature to its parts; and the individual can no more attain to the perfection of his nature, or answer the end of his existence without the state, than the hand or the foot can live and move and have its being without the body. Man is born a gregarious, nay a political animal. He seeks political society instinctively, as flocks herd and bees work together under the guidance of instinct, and his nature demands association and law and government, as much more than theirs, as he is more highly endowed with the gift of communication and the capacity for social improvement. To suppose that he was not made for society, were to impeach nature (who never does any thing without an object) of folly, in endowing him with speech. And to suppose that he was not made for political society, were to suppose that he was meant to be the worst of animals; for such man uncivilized and ungoverned always is, while man perfected by the offices of social and civil life, is by far the best. Thus government, as well as society, is the dictate of nature and the result of necessity.

Political society is defined to be a sort of community or partnership, existing for the benefit of the partners. Its germ is to be found in the family. The family grows into a canton or clan. And the clan increases, till it becomes a nation. Hence the earliest form of government known in history, is the monarchical, which is a modification of the patriarchal.

Aristotle justifies slavery, as founded in nature and sustained by analogy. Some are born to command, others to obey; some to think and others to labor; and as the soul is master of the body, so the intellectual and the wise should be mas

ters of the imbecile and the ignorant. And such subjection is for the good of the slave, just as it is for the good of the body to be subject to the soul. This principle, however, justifies slavery no further than it is for the mutual benefit of both parties, and only where the master is as fit to command, as the slave is to obey. Liberty is the right of the slave just so soon as he is worthy to obtain it and capable of enjoying it. And just so soon it is the duty and the interest of the state to see that he is emancipated.

The principle of this argument, Aristotle contends, will not justify the enslavement of women. For women, as a sex, nature has made different from men rather than inferior to them; and so fitted them to be their partners, but not adapted them to be their slaves. To enslave them is proof of barbarism. Barbarians reduce their women to the level of slaves, because they have not themselves risen to the rank of men.

A community of women and children, (which Plato so earnestly recommends in his Republic,) to say nothing of its tendency to licentiousness, incest, parricide, and every crime against nature, paralyzes exertion, precludes home education, and annihilates natural affection. If it checks self-interest, it does so only by the extinction of all interest; if it represses self-love, it does so only by smothering all love. As a drop of honey is dissipated and lost in a pail of water, so the sweet affection of love perishes by too extensive a diffusion.

Similar objections lie against a community of goods (which is another of Plato's darling day-dreams). It cuts the sinews of industry and blinds the eye of vigilance. It multiplies occasions for dissension in the very effort to procure harmony. It destroys the pleasure of saying This is mine—a pleasure as natural as self-love, and as innocent. It precludes the privilege of giving to others. Destroy marriage, and what room will be left for the virtue of chastity? Destroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality? A false principle deceived Plato. He took for granted, that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate; whereas this union, if it could be carried beyond certain lim

its (as it cannot be), would destroy the commonwealth, and make the community a unity. Symphony is good, and metre is good; but symphony is destroyed when it is changed into sameness of tone, and metre is destroyed when it is changed. into sameness of time. The greater the variety of tones, the richer the music, if the chords are preserved. So the greater the individuality of the citizens, the better the commonwealth, if harmony is maintained.

So of all forced schemes for equalizing property. Shares may be all equal; and yet they will all be too small, if they foster sloth and luxury. Mediocrity ought to be the aim of legislation; but this object will be better attained by moderating passion, than by levelling property.

This whole Book (the second Book in which Aristotle comments with singular good sense on several model Republics, both real and ideal, particularly on the Republic of Plato) we would recommend to the attentive perusal of the Fourierists and other levellers of our day. It concludes with some very sensible remarks on innovation, which might be useful to all our people, and which we would gladly extract for the readers of the Repository; but it would lead us too far from the main purpose of these Sketches.

To return now with our author to a more general view of the nature and end of government. As every partnership is formed for the interest of all the partners, so the end of government is the good of all the citizens, including the rulers. as citizens. Such a government is rightful and useful, whatever be its form. If administered by one man, it is called a monarchy; if by a few, an aristocracy; if by the many, a republic. When the good of the rulers instead of the citiizens becomes the end, then a monarchy is perverted into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an obligarchy, and a republic into a democracy. For a democracy may be selfish and exclusive as well as an oligarchy or a tyranny itself. It may seek the good of a greater number, and so be a less wrong; but if it seeks the good of a class and not of the community-of part and not of the whole-it is still oppressive and unjust.

No government can be truly good which is not administered agreeably to an established constitution and laws. And it matters little as to the result, whether it be an individual tyrant, or a tyrannical few, or a tyrannical majority, that tramples on the constitution and governs without law; in either case it is a despotic and not a free or rightful government. When they rise above law and the constitution, the votes of the majority are as tyrannical as the ordinances of the oligarchy, or the edicts of the autocrat. And as the court-flatterer in the one case, so the popular demagogue in the other, is usually the real despot, carrying every thing in his own way, and making sport and havoc of the true interests of the people. It not unfrequently happens, that the constitution is one thing de jure, and quite another thing de facto. Manners prevail over the laws, and the law remains a dead letter; while they who have effected the change become masters of the commonwealth.

Political institutions are best fitted for promoting human happiness, when they are best adapted to the character and sentiments of the people, and to the circumstances of the age and country. No one political system will suit all countries. Government being an arrangement, the best government is the best arrangement; and the best arrangement is that which the materials to be arranged are best fitted to receive and to preserve. The materials of the statesman are the number and character of the people, and the extent and quality of the country. Pure democracy is suited only to a limited territory and a uniform population. An agricultural people are most likely to possess this social equality, while their habits and pursuits produce also the sound and healthy state of body, mind, and heart, which is essential to the maintenance of a democracy. Aristocracy is suited only to a people where there is a great natural and social inequality between one class and all the others. On the same principle, pure monarchy theoretically requires that one man-if hereditary, one family-possess a like superiority over all others; though the habit of loyalty and veneration may perpetuate