And it is infinitely against

consentiremus ad malum." reason it should; for in infants the very actions and desire of concupiscence are no sins, therefore much less is the principle; if the little emanations of it in them be innocent, although there are some images of consent, much more is that principle innocent, before any thing of consent at all is applied to it.

By the way, I cannot but wonder at this, that the Roman schools, affirming the first motions of concupiscence to be no sin, because they are involuntary, and not consented to by us, but come upon us whether we list or no, yet that they should think original sin to be a sin in us really and truly, which, it is certain, is altogether as involuntary and unchosen as concupiscence. But I add this also, that concupiscence is not wholly an effect of Adam's sin; if it were, then it would follow, that if Adam had not sinned we should have no concupiscence, that is, no contrary appetites; which is infinitely confuted by the experience of Adam's fall: for by the rebellion and prevailing of his concupiscence it was that he fell, and that which was the cause, could not be the effect of the same thing: as no child can beget his own father, nor any thing, which it leads and draws in after itself. Indeed, it is true that by Adam's sin this became much worse, and by the evils of the body, and its infirmities, and the nakedness of the soul as well as the body, and new necessities and new emergencies, Πάντη ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κρυπτοῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰς ἡμᾶς κατήντησεν, as Macarius said, An entire contrariety, both manifest and secret, came in upon us from the transgressions of Adam f;" this, I say, became much worse, and more inordinate and tempted and vexed, and we were more under the devil's power, because we had the loss of our own.

66

12. The result is this, that neither the one nor the other is our sin formally, but by imputation only, that is, we are not sinners, but we are afflicted for his sin, and he is punished in us, and that it cannot be our sin properly, but metonymically, that is, our misery only; appears to me demonstratively certain upon this account: for how can that in another be our sin, when it is in us involuntary, when our own acts, if involuntary, are not sins?

If it be asked, how can we have the punishment unless we also have the fault? I return this answer, that St. Austin and some others, who make this objection, have already given answers themselves, and Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi",' is an answer enough; as Saul sinned and his seven sons were hanged: and all that evil which is upon us, being not by any positive infliction, but by privative, or the taking away gifts and blessings and graces from us, which God, not having promised to give, was neither naturally nor by covenant obliged to give, it is certain, he could not be obliged to continue that to the sons of a sinning father, which to an innocent father he was not obliged to give.

But these things, which are only evils and miseries to us upon Adam's account, become direct punishments upon our own account, that is, if we sin. But then as to the argument itself: certainly it were more probable to say, we had not the fault, we did not do the sin which another did: therefore, the evil that we feel is our miséry, but not our punish'ment; rather than to say, we are punished, therefore we are guilty. For let what will happen to us, it is not true that we are guilty of what we never did: and whatever comes upon us by the way of empire and dominion, nothing can descend upon us by the way of justice, as relating to our own fault.

But thus it was, that in him we are all sinners;' that is, his sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us; because we were born of him, and consequently put into the same natural state where he was left after his sin; no otherwise than as children, born of a bankrupt father, are also miserable; not that they are guilty of their fathers' sin, or that it is imputed so as to involve them in the guilt, but it is derived upon them and reckoned to evil events; the very nature of birth and derivation from him infers it.

13. And this it is that St. Austin once said; "Nascimur non propriè, sed originaliter peccatores," that is, Adam's sin is imputed to us, but we have none of our own born with us: and this expression of 'having Adam's sin imputed to us,' is followed by divers of the modern doctors: by St. Bernard, serm. 11. 'de Dominicâ prima post 8. Epiph.:' by Lyra b Hor. ep. 1. 2. 14.

* Lib. 4. contra duas epist. Pelag. e. 4.

i De Civ. Dei, lib. 18.

in 5. cap. Rom.: by Cajetan ibidem:' by Bellarmine, tom. 3. de Amiss. Gratiæ,' lib. 5. cap. 17.: by Dr. Whitaker, lib. 1. de Peccato Originali,' cap. 7. et 9.: by Paræus in his Animadversions upon Bellarmine, lib. 5. ‘de Amiss. Gratiæ,' cap. 16.: by Dr. George Charleton, lib. de Consensu Ecclesiæ Catholicæ contra Tridentinos,' controvers. 4.: which is the fifth chapter of Grace in these words: "Either we must, with Pelagius, wholly deny original sin, or it must be by the imputation of the injustice that was in Adam, that we are made sinners, because original sin is an imputed sin.”—The effect of this is, that therefore it is not formally ours, and it is no sin inherent in us; and then the imputation means no thing but that it brought evils upon us; our dying, our sorrow, and the affections of mortality and concupiscence, are the consequents of Adam's sin, and the occasion of ours, and 'so we are in him and by him made sinners:' and in this there can be no injustice, for this imputation brings nothing upon us as in relation to Adam's sin, but what by his power and justice he might have done without such relation; and what is just, if done absolutely, must needs be just if done relatively; and because there is no other way to reconcile this with God's justice, it follows, that there is no other sense of imputation than what is now explicated.

SECTION III.

The Doctrine of the ancient Fathers was, that Free-will
remained in us after the Fall.

14. ADAM'S sin did not destroy the liberty of our election, but left it naturally as great as before the fall.

And here I observe, that the fathers before St. Austin, generally maintained the doctrine of man's liberty remaining after the fall; the consequents of which are incompossible and inconsistent with the present doctrines of original 'sin.

That the doctrine of man's liberty remaining was general and catholic, appears by these few testimonies instead of very many. Justin Martyr, in his second apology for the Christians, hath these words; Καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὸν καὶ δυνά

ευ

66

μενον αἱρεῖσθαι τἀληθῆ καὶ εὖ πράττειν, τὸ γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πεποίηκεν, ὥστ ̓ ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρὰ τῷ θεῷ· λογικοὶ γὰρ καὶ θεωρητικοὶ γεγένηνται. " Christ hath kai declared, that the devil and his angels, and men that follow him, shall be tormented in hell for ever; which thing is not yet done for the sake of mankind, because God foresees that some by repentance shall obtain salvation, even some that are not yet born: and from the beginning he created mankind, so that he should be endued with understanding, and by the power of his free-will should obtain choice to follow truth, and to do well : wherefore, all men are wholly left without excuse and defence before God; for they are created by him reasonable and fit for contemplation."

St. Cyrillus, lib. 4. in Johan. 1. 7.: "Non possumus, secundum Ecclesiæ veritatisque dogmata, liberam potestatem hominis, quod liberum arbitrium appellatur, ullo modo negare."

St. Hieronymus epist. ad Ctesiphontem' extrem.: "Frustra blasphemas et ignorantiam auribus ingeris, nos liberum arbitrium condemnare, Damnetur ille qui damnat."

Autor Hypognosticon, lib. 3.: "Ipsum liberum arbitrium in hominibus esse certâ fide credimus et prædicamus indubitanter : [et infra] est igitur liberum arbitrium: quod quisquis negaverit, catholicus non est.

Gregory Nyssenus, the great divine, saith, lib. 7. ' de Philosoph.' c. 2.: "Concupiscere et non concupiscere, mentiri et non mentiri, et quæcunque talia in quibus consistunt virtutis et vitii opera, hæc sunt in nostro libero arbitrio."

B. Macarius Ægyptius, hom. 15.: "Cæterumve semel et omnino resonet, et permaneat delectus et arbitrii libertas, quam primitus homini dedit Deus, ea propter dispensatione suâ res administrantur, et corporum solutio sit, ut in voluntate hominis situm sit, ad bonum, vel malum converti."

Marcus Heremita, lib. de Baptismo,' ultra medium, speaks more home to the particular question; "Hæc et similia, cum sciat scriptura in nostrâ potestate positum esse, ut hæc agamus nec ne, propterea non Satanam, neque peccatum Adæ, sed nos increpat. [et infra.] Primam conceptionem habemus ex dispensatione quemadmodum et ille, et perinde ac ille pro arbitrio possumus obtemperare vel non obtemperare."

Julius Firmicus de Erroribus Profanarum Religionum,' cap. 29.: "Liberum te Deus fecit: in tuâ manu est, ut aut vivas aut pereas, quia te per abrupta præcipitas."

St. Ambrose, in exposit. Psalm. 40.: "Homini dedit eligendi arbitrium quod sequatur; ante hominem vita et mors; si deliqueris, non natura in culpa est, sed eligentis affectus."

Gaudentius Brixianus tertio tractat. super Exod.: "Horum concessa semel voluntatis libertas non aufertur, ne nihil de eo judicare possit, qui liber non fuerit in agendo."

Boetius libro de Consolatione Philosophiæ:"" Quæ cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus libertas arbitrii."

Though it were easy to bring very many more testimonies to this purpose, yet I have omitted them because the matter is known to all learned persons, and have chosen these, because they testify that our liberty of choice remains after the fall: that if we sin, the fault is not in our nature, but in our persons and election: that still it is in our own powers to do good or evil; that this is the sentence of the church: that he who denies this, is not a catholic believer.'

15. And this is so agreeable to nature, to experience, to the sentence of all wise men, to the nature of laws, to the effect of reward and punishments, that I am persuaded no man would deny it, if it were not upon this mistake; for many wise and learned men dispute against it, because they find it affirmed in Holy Scripture every where, that grace is necessary; that we are servants of sin; that we cannot come to God unless we be drawn;' and very many more excellent things, to the same purpose. Upon the account of which they conclude, that therefore our free-will is impaired by Adam's fall, since without the grace of God we cannot convert ourselves to godliness,-and being converted, without it we cannot stand,-and if we stand, without it we cannot go on, and going on, without it we cannot persevere. Now though all this be very true, yet there is a mistake in the whole question, For when it is affirmed, that Adam's sin did not, could not, impair our liberty, but all that freedom of election which was concreated with his reason, and is essential to an understanding creature, did remain inviolate, there is no more said: but that after Adam's fall, all that which was natural, remained, and that what Adam could na