s.v. Zepñvos), and extracts from this epitome have been preserved by the Etymologicum Magnum. (4) Concerning the Acquisition and Selection of Books, 12 books (Suidas, 8.v. Þíàwv Búßatos). The ninth book apparently was entitled Concerning Physicians.' It is cited by Stephen of Byzantium, 8.0. Κύπτος and Δυρράχιον. The treatise Concerning Things worth Knowing (Etym. Mag. 8.v. yepavos) was perhaps part of the same work. (5) Concerning the Language of the Romans (Etym. Mag. 8.v. aλrýp). (6) The Choice of Words (Etym. Mag. 8.v. аßоλnτwp, aιOTOS, άτμNTOS). (7) Epigrams, 4 books (Eudocia, 8.v. Diawr BUBALOS). (8) By far the most important of Philo's works was his Phoenician History, 8 books (Porphyry, de Abstin. ii. 56), or 9 books (Eus. Præp. Evang. 1. ix. 31d). This purported to be a translation of the Phoenician History of Sanchuniathon. Extensive extracts from it are given by Eusebius (Præp. Evang. 1. ix f.). It is cited also by Origen, c. Celsum, i. 16, p. 334 (Ben.), by Johannes Lydus, de Mens., ed. C. B. Hase, Paris, 1823, p. 274, and by Stephen of Byzantium, 8.v. Niσißis (see SANCHUNIATHON) All the fragments of Philo have been collected by C. Müller, FHG iii. 560-576. LITERATURE.-Art. Philon von Byblos,' in J. S. Ersch and J. G. Gruber, Allgemeine Encyclopadie, Leipzig, 1847, pp. 427-435; art. Philo Herennius,' in EBril xxi. 413; C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte, Leipzig, 1895, p. 406; E. Schürer, GJ V3 i. 71 f., iii. 463; and especially the copious literature on SANCHUNIATHON. LEWIS BAYLES PATON. PHILO JUDÆUS.-See ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY. PHILOSOPHY. Primitive (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 844. Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 846. Celtic. See CELTS, DRUIDS. Egyptian (A. H. GARDINER), p. 857. Greek (P. SHOREY), p. 859. Indian.-See MIMAMSA, NYAYA, SAŃKHYA, PHILOSOPHY (Primitive). —Philosophy has many definitions, not a few of which would render such a phrase as 'primitive philosophy' contrary to sense; for they consider philosophy as a product of sophistication, consciously critical in character, the last and ripest fruit of studied experience. Certainly this is a just description of the thought of the great historical schools of Europe; but there is, none the less, a sense in which the word 'philosophy' can be justly applied not only to the stream of sophisticated reflexion which was born with Thales, but also to the more naive, but not less genuine, reflexion with which even the least traditioned of men consider the world about them. As inclusive of this unsophisticated thought, philosophy may be defined as the process and expression of rational reflexion upon experience-a definition which will be found applicable to the speculations of the sophisticated and the primitive man alike. To be sure, 'system,' the very mark of sophistication, is not to be found in primitive thinking, except here and there by implication; but 'system' is by no means synonymous with rationality.' Further, that subdivision into fields or sciences which is the prime token of systemic philosophies is also wanting, though there is a sense in which we may speak of the ethics, psychology, and ontology, and even of the logic and epistemology, of the pre-critical period-viz. from the point of view of an observer who has made and learned the use of these distinctions, and now sees them in embryo in the speculations of men not yet conscious of them. In the present article (which can no more than indicate a point of view) the various leads' of primitive speculation in the directions of the several sciences will be briefly sketched. 1. Method. Consciously developed method is, of course, not found in unconsciously developed thinking, yet the main elements of all rational method-reasoning on the principles of identity and causality, the use of number, and the evaluation of sense-perception-are presented with a kind of elemental perspicuity that makes the study of primitive thinking at once fascinating and instructive. A main and interesting characteristic of this thinking is its suspicion of sensation. Few things are to the primitive man merely what they appear to the senses; the realities of things are their powers, and these powers are rarely measured in physical terms. There is, indeed, a profound VAIŠEṢIKA, Vedānta, YOGA, MATERIALISM Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 865. Scottish.-See SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY. analogy between a savage's conception of natural bodies and that of physical science in each case the reality of the object is defined by the sum of its forces, never by its ostensible form; senseperception is a guide to experience, but not a test of true being. From this first fact follows the search of the savage after causes, which he is ever seeking to divine. His two great formulæ, 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' and similia similibus,' are in substance the same as the laws of causality and of identity; all that is needed to give them logical validity is quantification-the syllogism and the method of trial and error. Of the weaknesses of primitive thinking the most important is the feeble use of number and mathematical relations generally. Nearly all peoples have some conception of number, both ordinal and cardinal, but their applications of this knowledge are most limited. The oldest of the sciences, that of the calendar, is certainly everywhere somewhat developed, and among barbaric peoples leads to important metaphysical theories; but, apart from this, the application of numberconcepts to any body of facts is rare, and without such applications the perspective of science is impossible. A second weakness is paucity of analogies. Human instincts and desires seem to form the primary group of analogies for savage reasoning. in line with the savage's fundamentally activistic interpretation of the life of nature,' as we still call it. Along with this comes the immense group of analogies based upon the body and its functions: This corn is my heart, and it shall be to my people as milk from my breasts,' says the earth-goddess in a Sia myth (M. C. Stevenson, The Sia,' 11 RBEW [1894], p. 39); and in primitive myth and rites generally it will be found that the head, the heart, the tongue, and the nutritive and sexual functions are the great fountains of similitude by which the world about man is brought within the scope of his understanding. This is no deep derogation, for the modern attraction and repulsion hark back to the primitive love and hate, while energy itself gets its common intelligibility from the human will; only the purifications of mathematics sublimate the human metaphor which is at the core of all science. There are, of course, differences in the philosophical gift among primitive races and tribes, and between individuals of savage groups, as among civilized people. The Polynesian and the American Indian are clearly more speculative than are the black tribes of Africa. In N. America it is comparatively easy to single out certain peoples with a marked gift for speculation -the Pawnee, the Navaho, the Bellacoola-and a tendency towards the systematization of thought. James Mooney (14 RBEW [1896], pt. ii. p. 775 f.) gives an interesting contrast of the philosophical and the practical types, from two associated tribes. The Cheyenne and Arapaho, although for generations associated in the most intimate manner, are of very different characters. In religious matters it may be said briefly that the Arapaho are devotees and prophets, continually seeing signs and wonders, while the Cheyenne are more skeptical. In talking with Tall Bull, one of the Cheyenne delegates and then captain of the Indian police, he said that before leaving they had asked Wovoka [the ghost-dance prophet] to give them some proof of his supernatural powers. Accordingly he had ranged them in front of him, seated on the ground, he sitting facing them, with his sombrero between and his eagle feathers in his hand. Then with a quick movement he had put his hand into the empty hat and drawn out from it "something black." Tall Bull would not admit that anything more had happened, and did not seem to be very profoundly impressed by the occurrence, saying that he thought there were medicine-men of equal capacity among the Cheyenne. In talking soon afterward with Black Coyote, one of the Arapaho delegates and also a police officer, the same incident came up, but with a very different sequel. Black Coyote told how they had seated themselves on the ground in front of Wovoka, as described by Tall Bull, and went on to tell how the messiah had waved his feathers over his hat, and then, when he withdrew his hand, Black Coyote looked into the hat and there "saw the whole world."' It is worthy of remark in passing that maps or charts which show the whole world' are not infrequent among the N. Americans, their purpose being, as a rule, to show the way' by which the spirit may descend to the powers of the nether, or ascend to the powers of the upper, realm. Such maps are surely in the method of scientific cosmology. 2. Theory of man. The primitive thinker measures the world about him in terms of his own mind and body: its conduct is actuated by desires and motives such as his, and its physical unities are set by his own bodily dimensions-finger, palm, hand, foot, and pace are all measures still in use, and the decimal system itself is but the mathematical apotheosis of our ten-digited hands. But this homo mensura standardization of experience becomes retroactive: when man measures the world in terms of himself, even unconsciously he is already analyzing his own being; he makes the panorama of nature his mirror and reflexion, and so comes eventually to self-revelation. Further, he expands his own nature in assimilating environment to it, and thus finds his inner self not only reflected in the outer world, but coloured by it. Psychology is a science whose roots run very deep. In reading his motives into nature man has begun already the classification of his powers, and gradually this classification, unconsciously impressed on his mind, becomes assumed as his natural image. Doubtless the first distinction made is that of the 'life' from the body: the life represents feeling and conduct, the body mere form; and, as to savage man forms are always suspect, it is the life that is conceived to be the prime reality. But the life is not incorporeal; it is always associated with some bodily manifestation, of which the most common and elementary is the blood, the blood of life: 'But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat' (Gn 94). Many American aborigines believe that potent or sacred stones, if broken, will bleed, as a broken body bleeds. After the blood, the breath is the most universal symbol of vital reality: And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul' (Gn 27). The belief in a ‘breath-body' or wind' life is nearly universal, attested, of course, by the outstanding fact that so many words for soulnephesh, psyche, pneuma, spiritus, anima-rest their meaning on this metaphor. After blood and breath, the body's heat and its shadow-flammula, umbra, simulacrum-are the commonest images of its separable life. Psychology is begun with this distinction of the active from the passive in man's being, of soul from body. The fact of death is certainly potent in enforcing the distinction; and the antiquity of burial attests the depth of this impression. But deeper even than death is that consciousness of the active and impulsive power which man feels in himself and hence imagines in the raging winds and rushing waters of an unquiet world of nature. With this first distinction made, others become easy. It is no uncommon thing, therefore, to find among primitives theories of man's constitution rivalling the Egyptian in complexity; mummy, genius, bird-soul, heart, form, shadow, soul, strength, and name represent an Egyptian dissection of the personality of the deceased, but the American prophet Keokuk taught his followers to pray for the heart, heart and flesh, life, name, and family souls; the Haida have two names for the embodied and one for the discarnate soul, while mind and ghost are still other entities; and the Iroquois distinguish mind, soul, ghost, life, brain, and strength-a classification which surely constitutes respectable psychology. The further discrimination, not of parts but of faculties, is well begun when bodily organs, especially the heart and the liver, are made seats or symbols of passion and appetite, memory and thought-a symbolism which the speech of civilization still retains (see artt. LIFE AND DEATH, SOUL, SPIRITUALISM). 3. Theory of the world.-Even Xenophon still speaks contemptuously of the thing the Sophists call "the world" (Memorabilia, I. i. 11), and it is hardly to be wondered at that few primitive men attain Sophistic familiarity with the concept. The idea of a cosmos or a universe is a late achievement of reflexion; nevertheless, a conception of what might properly be called a 'world-house,' or perhaps the stage of life,' comes into definition far anterior to sophistication. Cosmology and cosmogony are both very primitive in origin; and in truth it may be fairly affirmed that the most advanced philosophies are as subordinate to cosmology as is the most primitive mythology; cosmology is the parent of ontology, and it is altogether probable that the 'scientific' cosmologies of to-day will appear to some future age as visionary as do the mythic world-views of the past to us. Cosmology is essentially an effort to define the world of space. Its natural and nearly universal first form is of a world-tent or domed house, a circular plane surmounted by a hemispherical roof. But, since the imagination does not stop with the visible, a heaven above the firmament and a hollow beneath the earth are conceived, and may be multiplied into a series of heavens and hells, thus framing a storeyed universe. The plane dimension of the middle earth is itself divided. Man is a foursquare animal; and, corresponding with his structure, the place of the rising sun becomes 'the before,' the south is the right,' the north the left,' the west 'the behind'; and so the four cardinals are established. 'The earliest orientation in space among Indo-Germanic peoples arose from the fact that man turned his face to the rising sun and thereupon designated the East as "the before," the West as "the behind," the South as "the right," the north as "the left"' (O. Schrader, Indogermanische Altertumskunde, Strassburg, 1901, p. 371). Evidence from Semitic tongues indicates the early prevalence of a like system, while in America there is an almost universal cult of the quarters implying the same conception; with the Zuñi, who have this cult highly developed, the east is always the before' (M. C. Stevenson, 'The Zuni Indians,' 23 RBEW [1904], p. 63). Determination of the four quarters necessarily involves the fixation of a middle place, or pou sto; hence the number of sacred cities which form the navel of the world'-Delphi, Delhi, Peking, Cuzco, Zuñi, and doubtless many others. But the conceptual completion of the frame of the world is only a step to its endowment with moral values. The sky, as the source of light and warmth, becomes the giver of life, strength, goodness, and righteousness; personified, it is the Heavenly Father of all things. The earth, as the i bringer forth of life and nourishment, becomes the Great Mother, spouse of the lord of heaven; while within her dark body are concealed the pre-natal and post-mortem powers of the unborn and the buried-the beginnings and the ends of fate. The dark under world, too, is the source of all that is noxious and deadly, and hence the permanent abode of things evil. This is the primitive symbolism, but it still colours our thought and forms the very substance of our expression in the whole realm of moral philosophy. repeating universe, passing through cyclic creations and destructions, whose terms are star-measured. That fate is interbound with this cosmic movement is but the inevitable inference of a being such as man, who cannot (and perhaps ought not to) see the world that contains him except as reflecting his moral nature. But, with such a conception reached, we are far on the way to the nebular hypothesis or the not less histrionic cycles of the Hegelian absolute idea (see artt. AGES OF THE WORLD, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY). 4. Theory of conduct.-Our ideas of conduct are inferred from our conception both of man's nature and of the world's nature. The more primitive folk are, the more instinctive and habitual is their action; but there are probably no men who are utterly without some sense of the wherefore of action, and hence unacquainted with speculative morality. Religion might almost be said to represent man's sense of a world-sanction for his own ideals of conduct; certainly this is in some degree the explanation of the intimate union of religion and ethics, and again of the religious and ethical cast which every philosophy assumes. Customary Two types of human experience stand as the foundations of cosmogony. One is the sexual procreation of life. When the heaven is conceived as a father and the earth as a mother, the procreation of life from this primordial pair is the most natural of myths, its philosophic residuum being represented by the theory of cosmic evolution, and indeed by every vitalistic interpretation of nature. Again-the second type the origins of the world are sought on the analogy of manufacture. A primal being is conceived who finds or gives off a substance from which creation is modelled or constructed. This the rarer form in primitive speculation-is the prototype of mechanistic philo-morality explains the great mass of action in every sophies of nature; it represents, too, the type of theistic and transcendentalist philosophies, just as the image of the procreative pair stands for the philosophic doctrines of pantheism and immanence. Wide-spread, too, is the occurrence of a bi-sexed creator, signifying, perhaps, the earliest compromise between the eternally conflicting conceptions of the one of being and the many of becoming. Of the first type of cosmogony Hesiod's Theogony is the outstanding example; and it is not unfair to assume that the prevalence of this conception accounts in no small measure for the characteristic evolutionism of Greek philosophy. The Hebrew Genesis illustrates the second form; and the third is perhaps best known in the Chinese doctrine of heaven and earth as proceeding from the Tien, the father-mother of the world. An American example, analogous to the Chinese, is presented by the Zuni: Áwonawilona [He-She] conceived within himself and thought outward in space, whereby mists of increase, steams potent of growth, were evolved and uplifted. Thus, by means of his innate knowledge, the All-container made himself in person and form of the Sun whom we hold to be our father and who thus came to exist and appear' (F. H. Cushing, 'Outlines of Zuñi Creation Myths,' 13 KEEW (1896], p. 379). A second version (M. C. Stevenson, 'The Zuni Indians,' 23 RBEW, p. 23) reads: With the breath from his heart Awonawilona created clouds and the great waters of the world.' A Pima myth shows extraordinary powers of conceptualization for a primitive people: In the beginning there was nothing where now are Here Cosmogony gives us the drama of creation; there is but one further step to complete the conception of the world in time. When to theogonic æons legendary and historic periods are annexed, the conception of ages of the world is attained; and, as most men find their present case sorry and dark, a future and golden regeneration is anticipated. Thus the acts of the cosmic drama are complete, though its measures remain to be set. They become set through the science of the stars. "The stars are men's first vision of order, cosmos; and with the discovery of their orderly movements and periodical synchronizations they become, and the whole heaven becomes, the great wheel of destiny which measures out the slow repetitions of the world's recurrent drama. Nearly every people with any astronomy reaches this conception of a self grade of culture; but moral speculation-which to some extent is found everywhere- is the true source of our interest in morals. Moral philosophy, as has been indicated, is outwardly imaged in cosmology and cosmogony; the light of heaven represents knowledge, justice, and goodness; the changeless stars represent remorseless destiny. But this outward image, just because it is beyond the control of man, becomes an object of reverence, a system of religious sanctions, rather than a problem for the will. That problem is set primarily by men's needs, especially by the great need of conforming human desire to its possible satisfactions. The recognition of this, far more than the blindness of custom and tradition, is the real source of that conservatism for which primitive people are noted; their conservative clinging to the ways of the fathers is a product, not of habit, but of intention, whose warrant is the justification which nature gives in giving life itself. 'We observe our old customs,' said an aged Greenlander to Knud Rasmussen (The People of the Polar North, London, 1908, b. 124), in order to hold the world up, for the powers must not be offended. We observe our customs, in order to hold each other up; we are afraid of the great Evil. . . . Men are so helpless in face of illness. The people here do penance, because the dead are strong in their vital sap, and boundless in their might.' The same sentiment was expressed by a Hopi priest to J. W. Fewkes: 'We cling to the rites of our ancestors because they have been pronounced good by those who know. We erect our altars, sing our traditional songs, and celebrate our sacred dances for rain that our corn may germinate and yield abundant harvest" (Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1895, p. 6981.). Garcilasso says of his fellow Peruvians: 'It was an inviolable law among them never to alter the mode or custom of their province, no matter what example should come from elsewhere. . . . Hence the Indians, rigid in the following of their ancient customs, were astonished to see the Spaniards change almost every year their manner of living, and they attributed this inconstancy to an excess of pride and sumption' (Hist. des Incas, Paris, 1830, v. ix.). Here surely we are already in sight of Heraclitus and the beginnings of Greek ethics : pre 'Those who speak with understanding hold fast to what is common to all, as a city holds to its law-aye, and more strongly, for all human laws are fed by one law divine, which prevails where it will, and suffices for all, and surpasses all' (frag. 114, in H. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 1.2, Berlin, 1906, p. 78) See artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY. LITERATURE. See the literature under artt. referred to throughout the article. H. B. ALEXANDER. PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist).—1. Introduction: position of philosophy in Buddhism.-Philosophical inquiry was not a purely scientific matter in India. The knowledge of the nature of things was aimed theory of the composite and momentary character of things. But, notwithstanding the moralism of certain monks and possibly of the Master, the historical circumstances being given, metaphysics could not be avoided. Some metaphysics is an essential feature of Buddhism; for it is admitted by all Buddhists that desire cannot be crushed, that desirable things cannot lose their attractiveness, so long as we admit that there is an 'ego' and a 'mine.' Buddhists denied the Ego and, in consequence, had to exercise themselves to give an explanation of life and transmigration in terms of impermanence and selflessness. Buddhist philosophy was born, and developed a coherent system of 'phenomenalism' (the doctrine of the Abhidharmas). Phenomenalism, by a natural evolution, gave rise to various forms of nihilism or voidness (sūnyatā, so-called nihilism, or Madhyamaka; idealism, or Vijñānavāda). at, not for its own sake, but for a practical purpose. It was regarded as a factor in the great work of deliverance from transmigration. In Vedantism it is the factor of deliverance, for the very fact of knowing the true nature of the individual selfidentical with the universal self-is deliverance. The position of philosophy in Buddhism is different. At the beginning, at least, metaphysical knowledge was not an essential part of the Buddhist discipline. The True Law was a practical training and nothing more. In short, deliverance from suffering belongs to the saints; sanctity is deliverance from desire; deliverance from desire is to be reached by the life of a monk (brahmacharya), by a moderate asceticism coupled with meditations that foster distaste for pleasure; these meditations -on universal impermanence and decay, on death, on loathsomeness (asubha)—are only the realization of the vanitas vanitatum of Solomon, a pessimistic view of life and of the world, but not a philosophical system. Sometimes, when questioned on the doctrine of karma, Sakyamuni answers: My doctrine is: "Do good actions, avoid evil ones -an uncompromisingly ethical standpoint, or, so to speak, a pure moralism.' Śakyamuni is not agnostic. The so-called 'agnostic texts' (see artt. AGNOSTICISM and NIRVANA) emphasize this characteristic of Buddhism, or rather-as there are many Buddhisms -reveal a Buddhism which is freed from any metaphysical surmise, which even strongly forbids any curiosity concerning the nature of soul and the state of a saint after death. According to these 2. Hinayana or Abhidharma philosophy (pudgalatexts, such metaphysical questions, important as nairatmya or phenomenalism).-The first philothey seem to us and undoubtedly seemed to many sophy of Buddhism, the philosophy of the Hinayana Buddhists-to the compilers of the Scripture them-(Little Vehicle'), may be shortly described as selves-have no more to do with sanctity than phenomenalism: non-existence of a substance or purely cosmological problems and mundane science an individual (pudgalanairātmya), absolute exist(lokayata) in general. ence of the dharmas-small and brief realities which, grouped as causes and effects, create the pseudo-individuals. 6 A slightly different attitude is illustrated by some texts which we might style 'pragmatist,' texts according to which Sakyamuni purposely answered the philosophical questions in conflicting terms: he spoke sometimes as a believer in permanence (sāśvata), sometimes in favour of annihilation (uchchheda). The standpoint of the Master is that the training that leads to sanctity does not require truth, but useful statements, statements suited to the various dispositions of the hearers and to the general and conflicting instincts of humanity. In order to crush desire, a man must believe in succession that there is a soul and that there is no soul. Evidence is not lacking that the teaching of Sakyamuni himself was agnosticism coupled with pragmatism; but it would be rash to make any assertion on this point. So far scholars are concerned, not with Sakyamuni's own teaching, but with the leading ideas embodied in the Scriptures. And it is fairly evident that, from the earliest time, most probably from the beginning, Buddhism adopted or worked out a philosophy which may be summarized as negation of the existence of a soul (technically, in Sanskrit Buddhism, pudgalanairatmya) together with the hypothesis of a composite self (skandhavāda). This philosophy is a translation, in terms of metaphysics, of the ideas of impermanence and insubstantiality which, from the point of view of agnosticism, were to remain the topics of moral and emotional meditation. We may state here again that the mana to which many suttas object is self-love, estimation of the self as good, better, best, bad, worse, worst, not the actual notion of self; that the notions of impermanence and insubstantiality which are essential to the religious training are the conviction of the evanescence of beauty, strength, and life, not the 1 We cannot deal here with the indebtedness of Buddhism to Sankhya and Yoga philosophies. See SANKHYA, YOGA. These new doctrines are logically constructed and claim to be justified from the scientific point of view; but their maintainers believe that they are no less useful than true. Their usefulness is perhaps the best proof of their truth. The best reason that a Buddhist has for professing nihilism is that there cannot be real religious life (bhikṣutā), sanctity, or deliverance from desire as long as one admits the reality of phenomena (Bodhicharyavatāra, ix. 40). The schools had not forgotten the Master's lesson of pragmatism. This philosophy was at first far from perfect. It is the result of a long inquiry. From the doctrinal point of view, it would perhaps be convenient to contrast (1) the unsystematic views that are expressed in the sutras (Suttantas) and which may be described as ‘a theory of the skandhas' (skandhavāda, a fictitious name), with (2) the developed system which is embodied in the Abhidharmas of the Sarvastivadins (Sanskrit books, school of the Vaibhaṣikas, Abhidharmakosa) and which is discernible in extra-canonic Pali works (Milínda, Buddhaghosa, Abhidhammasamgaha); this system is properly called Abhidharma. From the historical point of view, there are strong objections to such a division. The fully grown phenomenalism is the legitimate offspring of the principles forcibly expressed in the oldest canonical books. No new idea has been discovered, but philosophers see more clearly what they mean; that is nearly all. Here we shall merely call attention to the chief topics of interest. (a) At first no effort was made to work out a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the ontological or psychological principles; these principles were mere surmises and postulates rather than doctrines; they had not been studied enough to be fully understood; they lacked precision and remained, therefore, to some extent contradictory. There is no self (átman), person (pudgala), living being (sattva), or principle of life (jiva)-a flat negative not only of an unchangeable self as recognized by the Brahmanic philosophies, but also of the substantial principle that the popular philosophy considers as a transmigrating entity, a soul different from the body. Man is a complex, composed of five skandhas- the material element, rupa, or body, and four intellectual elements, samjñā, vedanā, samskāras, vijñāna. The ego, or man,' is described in terms of its constitutive elements, and is compared to a chariot which lacks personality because it is composed. That is a static' point of view. In this compound the position of the intellectual elements is a subordinate one; they are given as a resultant of the material elements, viz. the organs: The colour blue being given and the organ of the eye being also given, there arises a visual cognition (a blue image).' That is sensationalism. The intellectual cognitions (abstract ideas, judgments) are worked out by mind, which is a material organ too. (b) The obvious and necessary conclusion of this psychology would be the negation of survival. But, as a matter of fact, Buddhists flatly deny the heretical theory of annihilation, destruction at death (uchchheda). Individual or personal permanence and responsibility through successive existences in the long journey of transmigration are strongly insisted on (see artt. DEATH [Buddhist], KARMA). (c) A conciliation between the negation of a soul or self, capable of survival, and the negation of annihilation is to be found in a 'dynamic' conception of self. Such a conception was brought about by the study of impermanence (anityatva) and causality (pratityasamutpāda). cerning the successive ideas that present themselves without any reference to the ego as thinking.1 'That only exists which is momentary' (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam). What is permanent-e.g., space, nirvana-does not exist, is a mere name, a mere negation (abhāva). (d) An obvious conclusion to be drawn, and one which was early drawn, from the theory of dependent origination is that the origination of cognition has not been scientifically explained in the sūtras (see above, p. 848). A distinction is to be made between the cause (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya). The flame of a lamp is apparently burning during three watches; but it is only a succession of flames. Each of these momentary flames (to put it otherwise, each moment in the existence of this flame that is burning during three watches) has for conditions the oil, the wick, and so on; but its cause is the preceding flame (or the preceding moment in the existence of the flame). To apply this theory to the causation of a cognition, a visual cognition is conditioned by the eye and the exterior object (the colour blue); but it is caused by the preceding cognition. The series of thoughts (chittasamtana) goes on uninterruptedly through the successive existences; the death. consciousness is continued in a conception-con (1) Impermanence' is, in some texts, almost a synonym of 'suffering' and 'selflessness.' Existence is suffering because joy does not last; body and mind are impermanent, and therefore are not a self, do not depend upon a self. But from the idea of impermanence issues the idea of momentariness, which leads to far-reaching conclusions. Im-sciousness (see art. DEATH [Buddhist]). permanence, when predicated of things in general, does not mean momentariness. There is origination (utpada), duration (sthiti), change or old age (anyathabhava, jarā), and destruction (nirodha) of impermanent things in general. But the momentary character of a flame-the flame of a lamp is only a succession of flames, each of which lasts only an instant-and of thought (chitta) was recognized very soon: That, O monks, which is called mind, thought, cognition, keeps up an incessant round by day and by night, of perishing as one thing and springing up as another' (Majjhima, i. 256); whereas the body may last for a hundred years and more. When once the notion of momentariness was reached, it inevitably made its way and took the place of the notion of impermanence. Now momentariness is quite naturally associated with causality. Momentariness and causality converge in continuity. (2) Causality. - Buddhists first examined the cause of suffering (rebirth and death again) and expressed their views in the second truth: 'Suffering originates from desire.' They later expressed the principle of causality in the formula known as pratityasamutpāda, 'dependent origination,' a formula which seems to have been originally only a commentary on the second Truth (cf. Suttanipata), and which, according to the scholastic interpretation, presents a summary of three successive existences of a man (cf. art. PATICCASAMUPPĀDA). It is given in the Scripture as an ontological and psychological theory. It is said to open a middle way between the two wrong ideas (or heresies) of permanence of the living being through consecutive existences and annihilation at death the man who is reborn is not the dead man, but he is not different from this man; because he originates from this man. Coupled with the dogma of momentariness, the dogma of causality leads to the conclusion that the ego is not a static compound like a chariot, but a series (samtāna)-a living series of causes and effects. Everything, even material lifeless objects, will be understood as the series of its successive moments of existence. The series does not exist in itself; it is made up of small momentary entities, called dharmas. There is no thinker, but only thoughts; no feeler, but only feelings; dhyāna partly consists in dis1 Cf. Visuddhimagga, viii., ap. H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 252, and Mahäniddesa, p. 117. See art. IDENTITY (Buddhist). | Pudgalavada.-A small place must be given to the 'heretical' theory of a self-a theory which is much abused in the sutras as well as in the treatises, both Sanskrit and Pali, but which, nevertheless, was supported by the powerful sects of the Sammitiyas. There is a sutra, the 'sūtra of the bearer of the burden,' which states that the pudgala exists independently of the skandhas; that it 'shoulders' the skandhas, new skandhas at every birth, till it lays down the skandhas, i.e. obtains libera. tion. The explanation of the Sammitiya school is that the pudgala is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas; that it is not to be expressed' (anabkiläpya), that nevertheless it exists and transmigrates. There are in the Scriptures passages where the relations of the feeling with the feeler, and so on, are expressed in the same terms; and the position of the Sammitiyas is not an impossible one. But in the light of other passages which state that there is no feeler, no eater, but only feelings, foods, we must admit that the Scripture, on the whole, favours the opinion of the schools who deny altogether the existence of a pudgala. We know the partisans of the pudgala only from the criticism of the 'orthodox' scholars, both Sanskrit and Päli. 3. Mahāyāna philosophy. − (a) Sunyatāvāda (Madhyamaka system). —(1) The real nature of things (dharmaṭā, bhūtatathatā, or, shortly, tathatā) is their being produced by causes and their being productive of effects (pratītyasamutpannatā). The Abhidharmikas have stated this fact well. But they fail to see that what is produced by causes does not exist in itself, is without own nature' (niḥsvabhāvatā), is insubstantial or void (śūnya). Voidness (sunyatā) is neither a principle immanent in things nor is it nothingness. On the contrary, it is the character of what exists, of the dharmas. Things are void because they are originated; voidness = origination, void originated. Existence (samsāra) is an intricate succession of momentary things, or dharmas, which have not in themselves any raison d'être, and which cannot exist substantially by the power of their causes; for these causes are dharmas of the same nature, which do not exist in themselves. As it is said, 'From dharmas like a magical show (mayopama) arise dharmas like a magical show.' We should say, 'From contingent phenomena arise contingent phenomena.' = (2) Such is the common view of the Madhyamikas. But there are many texts which would lead us much further: (a) the simile of the monk suffering from ophthalmia, who sees in his almsbowl hairs which do not exist, while a healthy monk sees these hairs as they are, i.e. does not see them; in the same way a saint who is free from illusion or nescience (avidyā) does not see the dharmas: 1 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, London, 1914, p. 98. |