The essence of ordeals is the oath, though the fact is obscured by the unfair incidence of the physical result. Hindu theory recognized the essential connexion; the word sapatha connotes both oath' and 'ordeal.' Oaths were used for lesser offences, ordeals for heavy crimes. The mediæval wager of battle was a mutual ordeal, each party taking an oath (see ORDEAL).

The covenant and the treaty have been largely based on the mutual oath, until signatures replaced the spoken word.

The Greeks and Romans ratified their treaties by oaths, the text of which was inscribed in the official inscriptions.

In primitive ritual the mutual oath was strengthened by various imitative and magical methods. The blood-covenant is 'regularly accompanied by curses or self-imprecations. Similarly with other forms of compact. Tylor notes the differentia, which also applies to the vow, in the following typical cases:

Grasping hands, putting one hand between the hands of another, are compacts, not oaths. The hand under the thigh is a rite of covenant. Mixing blood or drinking one another's blood is not an oath unless there is a mutual self-imprecation, such as dipping weapons in the blood.7

8. Prohibition of oath.-Certain sacred persons are prohibited from incurring the dangerous risks

of an oath.

Such was the flamen of Juppiter, and Plutarch suggests that the reason was that otherwise the peril of perjury would reach in common to the whole commonwealth, if a wicked, godless, and forsworn person should have the charge and superinten dence of the prayers, vows, and sacrifices made in the behalf of the city.'8 Nor might the Vestal Virgins take an oath.9 The sect of the Essenes were averse from the oath; they prided themselves on their truthfulness; they argued that those who could not be believed without swearing were selfcondemned.10 Christ taught, 'Swear not at all.'11 His expounders have explained the precept to refer to profane and frivolous oaths alone. But the teaching, 'Let your yea be yea and your nay nay,' is clearly inclusive, and of the same character as the Essene doctrine. The Anabaptists and, later, the Quakers refused oath-taking. The latter have argued that, if on any particular occasion a man swear in addition to his yea or no, in order to make it more obligatory or convincing, its force becomes comparatively weak at other tinies when it

receives no such confirmation.' 12

But this argument neglects the power (apart from that of superstition or religious feeling) of ceremony, which is practically the imperious gesture of the social body. Charles Bradlaugh initiated the right of affirmation in place of the oath. LITERATURE. This is quoted throughout the article. See also E. von Lasaulx, Der Eid bei den Römern, Würzburg, A. E. CRAWLEY.

1844.

OATH (NT and Christian).—1. NT times.-The true starting-point of our investigation of the place of the oath in the new régime initiated by Christ must of necessity be found in the ipsissima verba of the Master Himself. Here, at the outset, we are met by a difficulty; for, on the face of things, the almost universal practice of Christendom appears to be in flagrant disregard of an explicit injunction of Christ, whose words on this subject, taken by themselves, seem to amount to nothing less than an absolute prohibition of the oath under any circumstances or in any form (Mt 534-37; cf. also Ja 52). But a final conclusion upon this matter is not so simple as appears on the surface. 1 Du Cange, 8.vv. 'Sacramentum,' 'Juramentum'; Tyler,

p. 266.

2 MI i. 505 f.

3 SBE xxxiii. 97, 99 ff.

4 MI i. 504 ff., ii. 687.

5 See GB3, pt. i., The Magic Art, i. 289; Gn 159., Jer 3418, 6 MI ii. 208, 624, 686.

7 Tylor, loc. cit. p. 940ab; cf.

8 Quæst. Rom. 44.

10 Jos. BJ II. viii. 6.

Gn 242 4729; Herod. iv. 70.

9 Aul. Gell. x. xv. 31. 11 Mt 534.

It is evident that, if Christ's admonition be interpreted as an absolute prohibition, some of His early followers, who had the best opportunities for knowing His mind and what the modern logician would describe as His 'universe of discourse,' were in serious error as to the meaning of His words. St. Paul, e.g., again and again expresses himself in terms that are indistinguishable from the oath (cf. 1 Th 25, 2 Co 13, Gal 120, Ro 19); the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews makes use of language which bears unmistakable witness that he also was unaware that the practice of swearing had ceased to be legitimate (616f. 720.); and the seer of the Apocalypse does not hesitate to put an oath into the mouth of the angel-representative of the Eternal (10.). Christ Himself, moreover, to all intents and purposes submitted to be sworn (Mt 26631.); and His ȧun, áμýv, is almost, if not quite, an oath. In view of these facts, our Lord's apparent prohibition should not be regarded as being too explicit to be discussed; it rather demands careful consideration in relation to NT

teaching as a whole, if haply superficial contradictions may be resolved.

The classic passage-a very interesting section of the Sermon on the Mount-that constitutes the inevitable starting-point of any discussion of the lawfulness or otherwise of the Christian oath forms one of a series of illustrations of the contrast between the new life in Christ and the old Hebrew ideal of religious living. That the Christian man should always abide by his word is the real burden of Christ's injunction, which was in truth greatly needed. For the Jews held that only oaths, as distinguished from the mere promise, and only some of these, need be kept. An elaborate system of moved the admiration of a medieval casuist, had distinctions between oaths, which would have been gradually evolved; a lie was not held to be sinful unless sworn to, and even perjury itself was at worst venial, unless the broken oath had been taken in a particular form. Such a system necessarily cut at the root of that good faith apart from which a well-ordered social organism becomes impossible, and in foreign relations could not fail to bring upon a people who practised it a very bad name. This is what actually came to pass; and it was the fate of the Jews to be generally regarded with suspicion and dislike not only in the time of Christ, but also for many centuries to follow. Herein also may be found an explanation, at any rate in part, of the oppression to which the Jew was normally subject throughout the Middle Ages, and from which he is not entirely free even to-day. So great, indeed, did this anti-social trifling with the plighted word become that the Talmud laid down that, if repeated (as in Mt 537), a simple Yes' or 'No' ought to be regarded as being as binding as an oath. It should also not be overlooked that Christ did not exactly say that anything beyond a simple statement is absolutely evil, but that it springs from evil-a delicate distinction, perhaps, but a real one none the less. In an ideal condition of society absolute truthfulness and perfect sincerity would prevail in all personal relations. The oath would naturally disappear, inasmuch as a simple 'Yes' or 'No' would afford adequate assurance of good faith. That more than this is required in practice is entirely due to the imperfection of all human society; evil or not, certainly springs out of evil, i.e. out of whence it follows that the oath, whether absolutely

that ill condition of social relations which demands more than a simple affirmation or denial as a guarantee of truth in statement or honest performance of promise (cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 8). Though, on the face of it, Christ's statement

hibition, it is difficult, in view of the practice of

His immediate followers and His own apparent recognition of the legal oath, not to suppose that it was meant, and was at the time understood, to be limited in its reference. The fact that the oaths mentioned in this prohibition, in which there is no specific citation of the Divine Name, are typical examples of just the kind of oath that many Jews of that day lightly took, and broke without scruple, renders it not improbable that what our Lord had in mind was not so much the oath seriously taken and honourably observed as the light swearing and the casuistical distinctions (cf. Mt 2316-22) that all too frequently degraded the oath into a form as useless as it was profane.

These considerations should at least warn us against hastily accepting a theory based upon a single passage regarded in isolation from the teaching of the NT as a whole. We may, however, conclude with assurance that Christ sought to impress upon the minds of His hearers not merely that playing fast and loose with the oath was an offence in the sight of God, but that the absence of an oath in no way lessened man's obligation at all times to speak the truth.

2. Early Church. However unnecessary it might be in an ideal society, this has ever been so far from realization in practice that the carrying over of the oath into the newly-established Christian system will commend itself to the reason of most men. The age was an illiterate one, and illiteracy remained the rule for many centuries after Christ. In a community among the members of which writing was a rare accomplishment the oath contributed to fill the place occupied in a society such as our own by the written as compared with the merely verbal agreement. It is not, however, altogether a matter for surprise that, custom, convenience, and the practice of the Apostolic Church being on the one side, and the apparently express prohibition of Christ on the other, there was much difference of opinion, in the early Church, as to the lawfulness or otherwise of the oath. This is apparent to any one who has even a nodding acquaintance with Patristic literature. A few illus. trative examples, culled almost at random from the writings of the Fathers, are all that can be given here. Conspicuons among the advocates of prohibition was Chrysostom, for whom the oath was nothing less than a snare of Satan,' and by all means to be avoided (Serm. ad pop. Ant. hom. xv., in Acta Apost. hom. viii.f.; cf. also hom. x. ; on the same side see also Clem. Hom. iii. 55, xix. 2; Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 16; Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 14; cf. also vii. 8). Augustine also disliked the oath, not so much on the ground of divine prohibition as through fear of perjury (Enarr. in Ps. lxxxviii. (lxxxix.) 4, de Mend. 28; cf. also Ep. xlvii. 2). As against these views, while trifling or profane swearing was universally condemned, it was argued by others, on the ground of NT usage in general and the example of St. Paul in particular, that Christ could not have intended to put completely under the ban the serious use of the oath. conspicuous exponent of this view of the case, we may mention Athanasius, whose practice_certainly squared with his theory (cf. Apol. ad Imp. Const. 3).

As a

3. Middle Ages.-By the time that Christianity had established itself as the religion of the empire, there was really little to differentiate Christian and pagan circles in the matter of the oath. Christian imperial legal procedure required that witnesses should be sworn (Cod. Theod. xi. 39; Cod. Just. iv. 20, 59)—a practice that has been maintained until our day. As time went on, the oath, in ever growing measure, became a factor in almost every social relationship; e.g., in addition to the judicial oath, guaranteeing truth, may be mentioned

those pledges of fidelity, the oath of fealty, the coronation oath, and the oath of office generally. This was the case in ecclesiastical no less than in civil life, as witness ordination oaths, monastic and crusaders' vows. Not only did the oath prevail beyond all precedent in medieval religious circles, but the Church was at pains to take the oath generally into her keeping and control (Decret. Grat. can. xxii.), and claimed as her peculiar prerogative the right of absolving from performance of an oath duly sworn. The Christian oath rested ultimately upon a religious basis; this the Church held to justify her claim, as the earthly representative of Him to whom the actual or implied appeal of the swearer had been addressed, and who, as she at any rate believed (cf. Eus. HE vi. 9), did not on occasion disdain to visit with material penalty abusers of the oath.

For an oath to be valid the Church required (1) veritas in mente―the words used must be a straightforward expression of what the swearer means to do or to assert; (2) judicium_in_jurante-clear understanding of what is involved in taking an oath, for lack of which idiots, children, atheists, and convicted perjurers were held incapable of being sworn; and (3) justitia in objecto-the object of the oath must be legitimate, for even an oath cannot bind a man to do the forbidden or to commit sin, a classic example being found in Herod's oath, which is quoted again and again in Patristic and early Christian literature. It was under the last head that the Church especially claimed her right to determine in respect of the oath, as being in most cases the only competent judge of justitia in objecto, whence it followed as a matter of course that to her appertained the right of annulment.

In spite of the prevalence of the oath in Christian circles generally, communities have existed from early times which, whether attributing an absolute prohibition to Christ, or shrinking from the responsibility of the act, have made it a matter of conscience to avoid the oath in any shape or form. As these communities have often been small, both in numbers and in historical importance, it will suffice to name the Waldenses, Hussites, Mennonites, Anabaptists, Moravians, and Friends (qq.v.).

4. Modern.-Though the Reformation changed many things, it retained the oath as a recognized and serviceable social institution. Art. xxxix. of the Church of England, e.g., embodies a formula which may be accepted as a fair statement of Protestant opinion with reference to the use of the oath as conformable to religion and common sense. For, while the assertion of untruth is always a sin, it is manifestly impracticable that it should always be treated as a legal crime. But the well-being of the community, the maintenance of an ordered state of society, demands that, under certain circumstances, it should be treated as such. The legal oath secures this; perjury is a crime, for which due penalty may be exacted. That the oath is not the only means of securing this end is, of course, true; this has been publicly recognized in the Oaths Act, 1888, in which provision was made for those who, like the Quakers, on conscientious grounds decline to swear or, as non-Christians, decline to take the Christian oath. But, allowing this, the oath generally meets the case; it has, moreover, acquired associations and a religious sanction which add to its effectiveness; it has on historic grounds become an integral part of the apparatus of social life; there appears, therefore, to be no sufficient warrant for discontinuing its use, though, of course, its abuse cannot be deprecated too strongly. Yet, in the last resort, it must be admitted that the very existence of a need for the oath or some equivalent for it is due solely to

the imperfect Christianity of Christian people at the present day as throughout the past. If the ideal of living set up by Christ were actually realized in practice, the oath would forthwith become superfluous; for lying and ill faith would be unknown, a simple affirmation or denial would meet all needs, and a promise would require no further guarantee. Unhappily this is far from being the case; and, society being what it is, the retention of the Christian oath appears to be entirely justified, alike on the grounds of religion, ethics, common sense, and practical convenience.

LITERATURE.-Among the not over-numerous works dealing with the oath in general the following may be named: E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, ed. F. Hargrave and C. Butler, London, 1789; The Book of Oaths (anonymous), do. 1649; C. F. Stäudlin, Gesch. der Vorstellungen und Lehren vom Eide, Göttingen, 1824; J. E. Tyler, Oaths: their Origin, Nature, and History, London, 1835; K. F. Göschel, Der Eid, Berlin, 1837; F. A. Stringer, Oaths and Affirmations3, London, 1910; C. Ford, On Oaths, do. 1903. There is much matter bearing on the subject in commentaries on Holy Scripture, readily available; in the writings of the Fathers, and later ecclesiastical literature, partial reference to which has been given in the text; and in more official documents, such as certain of the Papal Decretals, and so forth. For the practical study of the institution in detail, reference may be made to the Histories, primary and secondary, which are too numerous to W. ERNEST BEET.

mention here.

OATH (Semitic).-Oaths are very common in Semitic speech, particularly in Arabic. This need not imply that the ordinary assertions of a Semite could not or cannot be trusted, though the Arabs have a bad reputation in this respect. It may point rather to a fondness for emphatic speech. In the case of the Hebrews much of this particular kind of emphasis may have been lost in editorial refinements and manipulations; but the use in Hebrew of such syntactical constructions as those with the infinitive absolute and with the perfect of certitude may be taken to indicate that emphatic utterance was characteristic of the people and the language. When, therefore, the oath as a solemn asseveration came into use, its growth on such soil would be rapid and luxuriant. But in its more original form the oath was more an action than an utterance. It was part of the ceremony of a compact or agreement. Such ceremonies, more or less elaborate at first, gradually become modified and simplified until only a gesture may remain. In the judicial oath, which is usually for the most part a form of words, we have the later or latest development. It implies considerable progress both in law and in religion.2 The oath is still of the nature of a compact or agreement. Hebrew and Arabic philology may be said clearly to indicate the ceremonial origin of the oath among the Semites. Some of the words for oath-Heb. shěbhu'ah; Arab. yamin and qasam-imply ceremonies. The Heb. shebhu'ah is connected with the word for 'seven' (shebha); and to swear' (nishba') is literally to do things by sevens' or 'to come under the influence of seven things.' 4 Seven was a sacred number among the Semites (cf. Gn 333, Lv 46, Nu 231, Jos 64, etc.; Qur'an, ii. 27, xxiii. 17, xv. 44, 87, xxxi. 26,

1 Cf. C. M. Doughty, Wanderings in Arabia, i. 110: 'To speak of the Arabs at the worst, in one word, the mouth of the Arabs is full of cursing and lies and prayers; their heart is a deceitful labyrinth.'

2 This stage of development was reached, of course, at different times among different sections of the Semitic race. The Hammurabi Code shows that the judicial oath was employed by the Babylonians as early as 2000 B.C.

3 It always implies as its full form a conditional sentence. Indeed, the simplest oath, judicial or otherwise, may be said to do this. Perjury is a repudiation of sacred things, a violation of religion. When a modern Arab swears by God, Wellahi or Wellahi-Billahi or Wullah-Ballah (Doughty, i. 110), the original implication is: If I perjure myself, I am false to my belief that God is the living God, and I call down upon myself the punishment due to such infidelity.

♦ Wellhausen (Reste, p. 186) thinks that the word may imply a sevenfold repetition. But the repetition of a formula is probably a later idea.

etc.). It probably had magical significance.1 In any case, certain narratives confirm the view that some action by sevens was the primary idea. Thus seven ewe lambs figure in the oath regarding a well made between Abraham and Abimelech (Gn 2131), and on this account the place is said to have been called Beer-sheba, 'Well of Seven.'? Again, Herodotus describes an Arabian oath of covenant (iii. 8) in which seven stones are smeared with blood (cf. Hom. Il. xix. 243 ff.; Paus. III. XX. 9). The Arab. word qasam, used of the judicial oath, is derived from a root which in its simple form means 'to divide into parts' (qasama; iv. aqsama, to swear'). Here again some magical ceremony may be implied; and we are again helped by an OT narrative. In Gn 1510. 17 we have a story of the making of a compact in which certain animals are cut up and the pieces arranged in a particular way. At sunset a smoking oven and a flaming torch pass between the pieces (cf. Jer 3418.). In this narrative, which is composite and confused, there is a hint of some ancient and rather elaborate ceremony (probably magical). We need not think of a sacrifice; and originally no doubt it was the contracting parties who passed between the pieces.* The significance of the pieces or parts is doubtful.' But, in any case, just as the Heb. word has some such primary idea as 'to do a thing by sevens,' the Arab. word would seem to denote primarily 'to do a thing by parts.' The Arab. word yamin really means the right hand.' Since the right hand was much used in contract or oath ceremonies, the same word came to denote an oath. The Arabs give the hand in swearing. There is reference to the same action among the Hebrews as well. In 2 K 1015 the giving of the hand is an indication of loyalty (cf. La 56, 2 Ch 30°). In Ezr 1019 the expression is equivalent to 'promise' or almost to 'swear." In 1 Ch 2924, where RV has 'submitted themselves unto Solomon the king,' the Heb. text has 'gave the hand under Solomon.' This was perhaps the more original form of the expression. The person who swore put the hand or hands under the person to whom the oath was sworn. In the Qur'an (xlviii. 10) we find the words:

'In truth, they who plighted fealty to thee, really plighted that fealty to God: the hand of God was over their hands.'

The original ceremony may have been something like that described in Gn 2429. When Abraham makes his servant swear, he directs him at the same time to put his hand under his (Abraham's)

etc.; W. W. Skeat, Malay Magic, do. 1900, p. 225 f.; also GBS, 1 Of. R. C. Thompson, Semitic Magic, London, 1908, p. 164 ff., pt. ii., Taboo and the Perils of the Soul, do. 1911, p. 805 f.

2 This is no doubt the meaning, though the name might be explained well of the oath,' or even 'well of Sheba.' C. F. Burney (JThSt xii. [1910] 118 f.) explains Sheba as the god Seven; but, since in Assyrian mamitu, oath,' occurs as the name of a goddess (Mercer, The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature, p. 27), Sheba here may be the oath personified (cf. the personification of Gr. öpkos). Mamitu is never mentioned in oath formula; but we find reference to the mistress (goddess) of the oath' as witness to a treaty (Mercer, p. 28). Of course the story in Genesis may be only a popular etymology invented light on the primary idea in the Heb. word 'to swear.' to explain an already existing name; but in any case it throws

8 Especially as other forms of the same Arab. root are used of practising divination (see F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, A Heb. and Eng. Lexicon of the OT, Oxford, 1891 ff., s.v. DDP, and Wellhausen, p. 133 f.).

4 Not as a symbol that they were taken within the mystical life of the victim' (W. Robertson Smith, Rel. Sem.2, p. 480 f.). This idea is hardly primitive enough.

5 Mercer (p. 40 f.) finds an interesting analogy in an Assyrian inscription of the time of Ašur-nirâri II. (754-745 B.C. [Mercer]) in which a treaty between Ašur-nirâri, king of Assyria, and Mati'ilu, ruler of a district west of Hana, occurs. A ram was taken from the herd and beheaded. According to Mercer, this was done, not as an offering or sacrifice, but to typify what would be the fate of the perjurer.

6 Possibly the same word in Hebrew should sometimes be translated oath.' In Ps 1448, e.g., we might translate 'their oath is a false oath.'

7 The same thing is expressed by the 'striking of hands' in Job 173, Pr 61 1115 1718 2226.

may clear himself by taking a solemn oath. This is the oath of purgation (cf. 1 K 831). The same provision is made in the Hammurabi Code (cf. S. R. Driver, Exodus, Cambridge, 1911, p. 423). Among the Arabs it is still possible for a person suspected of theft to clear himself by taking a solemn oath (see Burckhardt, i. 126-129; Doughty, i. 267; and ef. E. W. Lane, Modern Egyptians, London, 1871, i. 384). According to Dt 211, when a man was found slain, the elders of the place had to swear that their people were guiltless of the murder. Robertson Smith (p. 64) thinks that exactly the same custom prevailed in Arabia (cf., however, Wellhausen, p. 189, n. 1).

1

Several oath formulæ are mentioned in the OT -e.g., God do so to so and so and more also (1 S 144 2522, 2 S 39. 35, 1 K 223); As Jahweh liveth!' (1 S 1439 196); As Jahweh liveth and as thou thyself (thy soul) livest' (1 S 203); 'As Jahweh liveth and as my lord the king liveth (2 S 1521); Jahweh is a witness between me and thee for ever' (1 S 2023, inserting 'edh after Jahweh; or Jahweh is an everlasting witness,' reading simply 'edh 'ōlām); 'By myself have I sworn (Gn 2216, Jahweh being the speaker). Among Arabic examples are the following: By what this (copy of the Qur'an) contains of the word of God'; 'I impose upon myself divorcement'; I impose upon myself a triple divorcement' I impose upon myself interdiction'; 'By God the Great'; As the Lord liveth' (Wa hyât Ullah); As I live' (Aly lahyaty). The Jews swore by the Temple (Jer 7') as well as by persons. They are said to have sworn also by heaven (cf. G. H. Dalman, Worte Jesu, Leipzig, 1898, i. 168 f.), by the earth, by the sun, by Jerusalem (see Shebu oth, iv. 2; Mt 534 231; Berakhoth, 55; Qiddushin, 71a; Maimonides, Yad Ha-Hazākā, Hilkoth Shebu'oth, 12). The modern Arabs swear by the life of persons or parts of a person (e.g., the head, the beard; see Lane, Modern Egyptians, i. 349), and even of things (e.g., fire, coffee, etc.; see Doughty, Arabia Deserta, Cambridge, 1888, i. 269). According to S. I. Curtiss (Primitive Semitic Religion To-day, London, 1902, p. 113f.), Muhammadans at Hamath, in N. Syria, swear by God's phallus.

'In the village of Bludan, about twenty-five miles west from Damascus, which is composed of Greek Christians of a very low type, the same oath is heard on the lips of women... Another form of oath of a similar sort may be heard in Nebk, in the Syrian desert, and at Zebedani.'2

Muhammadans are said also to swear by the sacred pilgrimage route to Mecca. If the text of Am 814 is correct, the Israelites used the same kind of oath: As the way of Beersheba liveth.' But the oath is peculiar and without parallel in Heb., and the text is perhaps corrupt.3 The pilgrimage 1 The word translated as liveth' has been less correctly rendered by the life of. It is an adjective, and is pointed differently by the Massoretes (e.g., in 2 8 1521) to distinguish

oaths sworn by Jahweh from oaths sworn by false gods and other non-enduring persons and things. If Hos 415 has preserved the true text, the Israelites are forbidden there to swear As the Lord liveth!' This prohibition, however, is very unlikely. W. R. Harper (Amos and Hosea (ICC), Edinburgh, 1905, p. 263 f.) is probably right in conjecturing (with Wellhausen, Nowack, and G. A. Smith) that in Beersheba' has fallen out. Read And swear not in Beersheba, "As Jahweh liveth!"* This oath was permitted (Jer 42 3816), and at a later date was even commanded (Dt 613 1020).

2 The use of this oath may be taken perhaps to imply phallic worship as its origin. Or it may be due to the kind of tradition

that makes certain persons the offspring of a divine father. The stories of the opening of Leah's womb (Gn 2931) and of the visit of the angel of Jahweh to Samson's mother (Jg 133) have been referred to in this connexion (see R. C. Thompson, Semitic Magic, p. 78).

3 It has been suggested that we-hê derek should be read we-he dōdeka, dōd, literally darling,' being used here in the sense of patron-god. Thus C. F. Kent (Student's OT, Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses,' iv., London, 1910, p. 79) translates, And as liveth thy patron, O Beersheba!' A. B. Ehrlich (Randglossen, v. (Leipzig, 1912] 252) even conjectures that there is no oath

to Mecca is of such importance that it is natural to find this and other oaths associated with it. Thus the sanctity of him who instituted it, or of him in whose honour it is made, is, of course, a sanctity by which to swear. In Hariri's Maqamah of Alexandria (as rendered by T. Preston, Makamat of Al Hariri of Basra, London, 1850) occur the

nes:

'Lo! here I swear by Mecca's Lord divine,

Whose pilgrims, sped by camels, seek his shrine' (p. 108).

Preston compares a similar asseveration in the poem of Nabegra: 'By the eternity of Him to whom I have gone on pilgrimage of the Hadj!' In the Maqamah of Koufa we have (Preston, p. 218): By the sanctity of the Shaikh (Abraham) who ordained the hospitable meal and founded the place to which the hadj is made (the Kaaba) in the mother of towns.'

The Essenes refrained altogether from swearing (Jos. BJ II. viii. 6). It has been thought that even in Ec 92 the taking of an oath is regarded as objec tionable. In any case the Jews came to regard the taking of an oath as a very serious matter. The general principle is, 'Let thy yea be yea and thy nay be nay' (Bābhā Meși a, 49a); for he who utters an untruth is excluded from the divine presence( Sotah, 42a). There are many passages in Rabbinic literature which express abhorrence of false or vain oaths. Such falsehood is one of the

seven capital sins which provoke God's severest judgment on the world (Abhoth, v.). A false oath, even if made unconsciously, involves a man in sin, and is punished as such (Gittin, 35a). The oath or vow which a man was charged to make by a Jewish court of justice could be absolved by no Rabbi or Rabbinical tribunal. Oaths uttered over the Scroll of the Law were particularly sacred. In the age of the Geônîm no dissolution of business contracts made on oath was permitted (cf. E. Landau, Responsen, Prague, 1776, 21810-11, p. 123). 2

LITERATURE.-HDB; EB; Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopadies; JE ix. 865; DI; J. D. Michaelis, Das mosaische Recht (ed. J. L. Saalschütz), Berlin, 1846-48; W. Nowack, Lehrbuch der hebräische Archäologie, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1894; S. A. B. Mercer, The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature,

Paris, 1912; J. L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, London, 1831; J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums2, Berlin, 1897; W. Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites2, London, 1894, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, new ed., do. 1903; C. M. Doughty, Wanderings in Arabia, 2 vols., do. 1908; C. H. W. Johns, The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples (Schweich Lectures, 1912), do. 1914. Some other works have been referred to in the course of the article.

MAURICE A. CANNEY. OBEDIENCE.-In the sphere of ethics the term 'obedience' signifies the practical submission to an authority regarded as universally valid or to an authority of a concrete or provisional character. In the former case it stands opposed to disobedience; in the latter to self-determination, culminating in complete personal autonomy, which, however, must be distinguished from romantic caprice.

1. Obedience as an ethico-religious principle.— Unconditional obedience is demanded in certain stages of religion-in those, namely, which are characterized by the enunciation of positive laws. The laws in question may be grounded on ancient custom, priestly enactment, or the ordinances of sacred books. The motives for obedience, too, may be of the most varied kind, such as convention, fear, hope of reward, and even belief in the real excellence of the law, and trust in the authority here at all. For he he would read in both clauses ', and, for we-hé derek, we-'é bōrëk: 'And they shall say, Where is thy God, Dan? and Where is thy Spring, Beersheba?'