shewn to one wholly destitute of the power of conducting or fol lowing an argument; and who concerning those things which lie beneath his notice, manifests an entire disregard to the first prin ciples of sound reasoning.

You say, p. 24. " Finding IT under some peculiar states, you do not object to calling IT the sole Being." This it relates to the word matter, a little above. ፡ ካር

Now, by this matter, do you mean any thing more that you find, than" your sensations and your ideas" of solidity, extension, figure, colour, &c. You say, yes. I ask where do you? For the three first qualities, you will not deny that you FEEL, and the last that you SEE ; where then is there any thing besides feeling and sight, the perception of touch and vision? You are aware of the force of this objection to finding matter in any state different from an" idea of sensation," and your say that you overcome it by perceiving that though our knowledge of matter is ideal, there could have been no idea without the previous existence of the matter to form it.". Here is your bad logic; pray, if matter be ideal, how could it at the same time exist antecedently to its idea," in order to cause it? Your knowledge of matter," that is, I suppose, your knowledge of its qualities, is ideal, then those qua lities previous to their ideality, cannot exist as the causes of their ideality: this sort of rebutting of the power of a strong positioni is a poor kind of victory over it. When you know better, where you find matter that sole, Being, and when you can better frame an argument than permit it to involve a contradiction, it will be time enough to say something of any other, which ignorant people conceive may possibly exist, and which they think they find as easily as you do your MATTER. Again, you say, “that you conclude that matter is the necessary foundation of the idea; but your conclusion is not supported by any premises whatever. And bask, if you can fight a battle in a dream, how do you know, that res sistance and motion, at any time, are more than ideas? Where are the proofs of it? Certain it is, that if you believe the exists ence of any thing but your own ideas, you condescend to believe in things as invisible and as intangible as Deity can be, for touch and vision are sensations, and you cannot touch or see any thing that is not touch or sight, it is a contradiction in terms.

The next bit of infamous logic is, " Imagination cannot exist until ideas, or mind, has been once formed by observations on matter." Now, how can there be observation previous to ideas? The sentence contains so obvious a circle, a child might defeat the fallacy.

P. 29. What is intelligence DISTINCT from the life of an ani mal." I ask you, is it in an animal when dead? No, say you! Is it in life separated from an animal? No, you will say again. Then if it be in neither, how can it be in both? Nothing can come

R. C.

I know nothing of life separated from an animal, except it be vegetable life.

of nothing. "Speak again." I do not say that your question cannot be answered, but I doubt much if you can answer mine like a philosopher.

You say: "Is your God an animal?" I ask, was your father an animal? If you say yes you speak irreverently, but it will not prevent his being a conscious being, and perhaps wiser than yourself. What, and if the arranged matter of the whole universe, being under a constant and regular motion, forms the intelligence of so great a being, that yours can as little conceive of it, as your powers of touch and sight can find its state of uneircumscribed extension, or its immeasureable distance from your short sighted optics? Take heed, lest there might be such an animal," for if he be not so kind as his best friends make him, he might, being angry, answer your profane question, convince you of his existence, by acting on your "ideas," and your “sensa tions" in a manner even less agreeable than by the being crushed in a storm.

P. 31. Mind is the common property of animal sensations." I do not believe that you know the meaning of this sentence yourself. How can any noun substantive be the quality, the accident, the adjective of another set of nouns substantive? You might as well say the house is the property of the stones, wood, and mortar used in the building of it, or that the cart you put before the horse is the property of the horse. If mind be the property of sensations, I ask, of what are sensations the property? If you say of a body a matter; I shall humbly propose an amendment of terms; for that of which sensations are the property 1 would rather call mind than body. Yet, if this term be objected to, I would call it by an Algebraic sign a, rather than by body; ab. perhaps all solid extension feels, I chuse to call the immediate reason for the different capacity by the term, a, a mind; for I may call perfectly different capacities by different nouns substantive if I chuse, it being a privilege generally used in most, languages so to do.

P. 26. We have no dispute about objects, that are tangible." Have you not read then, Hume, Stewart, Keid, &c., where there are constant disputes about them-but especially, if tangible extension be an idea, or not an idea; whether smoothness and roughness, heat and cold are in the mind or out of it; what signifies all experimental philosophy, unless you know without dis pule to what object qualities belong? Do you know so well of this, as to answer these authors and settle their disputes? Can you answer them also, why you expect the experiment of yesterday, or to-day will bear the same result to-morrow? Can you tell them, what are the laws of nature and how you know they are invariable? Can you acquaint them in what way you can detect, by any experiment, the presence of like compound aggregates, so as to be sure you have only like objects present? Surely these questions belong to the tangible objects of physics. Yet I doubt

if you can answer them or settle their disputes. I dare say you might appeal, in a summary way, to your experience, but I must take so far the fact of those authors as to conceive that your experience of the past is not their knowledge of the future. As well might I suppose that the little round of your ideas were the all of which nature was full; that there were no sea, because some one had travelled on land without arriving in his experience at water: that there were no sun, because he had never stirred from the chimney-corner, or from the light of a taper in a dungeon: or, if there were, its warmth and brilliancy must be kindled by human artifice and be its property.

Then, of motion, what absurd shifts do you condescend to make about it! How can the essential property of any subject be equal to rest and motion too? If matter held an inward principle of motion, then a principle of rest must be extraneous to it; for rest and motion cannot go on both together without a variety in their cause, and tread the circle which your syllogism concerning it does!

But if matter can be at rest, all matter (to any one who can abstract) is essentially at rest; and if it be found in motion the whole impulse equal to it is extraneous to it, both as to its beginning and direction. Nevertheless, the beginner and director of motion and matter shall not be called God, unless, like us, it could be proved, that it intentionally directed it to such ends, which I am not prepared to admit, seeing I walk becanse I have feet; and that I see because I have eyes; and that feet and eyes came probably by a chance direction of motion in those quarters!

I shall permit myself but one question more.. If in metaphysics all is dogma; all is error, why do you use them? I suspect you cannot know the meaning of the word, or would be aware, that without the metaphysical doctrine of cause, there could be no result on which to depend, either in experimental or mathematical philosophy; and that to argue against Deity requires a shrewder mind than to argue for him, a logical mode of reasoning, and an acumen, which depends upon their rules and pro-perties, and in a higher degree than you possess, in order to establish a conviction of his non-existence to any but yourself.

If you think proper, you may place these observations in the title-page to your next edition of your pamphlet.-I am, &c. A.

THE KING'S SPEECH.

THE following is the KING'S SPEECH to the NEW PARLIAMENT of old faces, and we have the confession of Mr. Canning, that omissions constitute its grace and wisdom, that it is so framed as to express nothing on which a debate could be raised! Might not the King as well have kept at home by his fire-side at Windsor as to have made a pompous procession to the House of Lords to read such a written paper? From all professions made to this time, there appears to be no intention on the part of the Ministers, to take any steps that shall effectually relieve the distresses of the people. Finding so barren a speech from the throne, I have published for twopence a super royal specch ́ upon half-a-sheet of fool's cap. R. G.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

I have called you together at this time for the special purpose of communicating to you the measure, which I judged it neces sary to take in the month of September, for the admission into the ports of the United Kingdom of certain sorts of Grain not then admissible by law.

I have directed a copy of the Order in Council issued on that occasion to be laid before you: and confidently trust, that you will see sufficient reason for giving your sanction to the provisions of that Order, and for carrying them into effectual execution. I have the greatest satisfaction in being able to inform you that the hopes entertained at the termination of the last Session of Parliament, respecting the final close of the Burmese war, have been fulfilled, and that a peace, highly honourable to the British arms and Councils of the British Government in India, has been concluded in that quarter.

I continue to receive, from all the Foreign Powers, assurances of their earnest desire to cultivate the relations of Peace with each other, and a friendly understanding with this nation.

I have exerted myself with unremitting anxiety, in conjunction with my Allies, to arrest the progress of the existing hostilities, and to prevent the interruption of peace throughout the world.

GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

I have directed the estimates, for the ensuing year, to be made out, and in due time they shall be laid before you. I assure fou, they are framed with the strictest attention to economy, which the exigencies of the public service will permit.

The distress which has prevailed throughout the commercial and manufacturing districts of my subjects, during the last twelve months, has affected some important branches of the revenue, yet I have great satisfaction in informing you, that no such diminution of the internal consumption of the country has taken place, as can possibly create any apprehension that the great sources of the wealth and prosperity of the country will be impaired.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

I most deeply sympathise with the distresses of the manufactnring districts, and I contemplate with feelings of the sincerest satisfaction, the patience with which those sufferings have been

borne.

The depression under which the trade and manufactures of the country have been labouring has abated more slowly than I had thought myself warranted in anticipating; but I retain a firm expectation that the abatement will be progressive, and that the time is not distant, when under the blessing of Divine Providence, the commerce and industry of the United Kingdom will have resumed their wonted activity.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER,

Accompanying the following Subscription from Leeds for Messrs. PERRY, CLARKE, and CAMPION, in Giltspur-street Compter.

le your friends in this town had half the boldness in asking rehef for the victims of oppression, as the Bible distributors have impudence in collecting cash for the double purpose of filling. their own pockets, and of perplexing the minds of the poor Hindoos with the mysteries of the "word of life," we should not have to ask your acceptance of so small a sum as £2 2s. Who, except a saint, can ask a 'man to relieve the distresses of others when it is known that his children are neither so well fed, nor so well clothed as convicted felons? We know that the inmates of gaols have at least one meal a day, and enough of clothing to shelter them from the "pelting of the pitiless storm;" which is more than can be said of many of our day-labourers and industrious artisans, who are seen prawling about the streets like so many living skeletons. Our mites are small, but they will serve to shew that you live in our remembrance, and that amidst the general tumult of distress, we can think of those whose wants are less seen. and less heard of.

Printed and Published by R. CARLILE, 62, Fleet Street.-All Correspondences for "The Republican, to be left at the place of publication.