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And fancy's fond illusions beam
All brightly on thy blissful dream,
Thy snowy bosom's gentle swell
Their happy influence shall tell,
The smile upon thy rosy cheek
The sweetness of thy visions speak.
Then with a more than mortal care,
I'll watch thee as a treasure rare,
And bending o'er thy lovely form,
Gaze silently on every charm;

Then view thee when thy slumber flies,
In renovated beauty rise,

And feel that of a realm so fair

Thou should'st alone the sceptre wear.

Then haste thee, ere the dawn be past,
We'll meet Aurora in the east,
Who comes the gloomy night to chase,
And fold the earth in her embrace.
See where awaits our magic car,
To waft us thro' the cloudless air,
Until we reach our lov'd retreat,
For sinless spirits only meet :
There, my Titania shall alight,
With the first blush of morning bright,
And springing to the charmed ground
With sylphlike and elastic bound,
Buds shall beneath thy footsteps spring,
And birds thy joyous welcome sing,
While all within the lovely scene,

Shall greet with smiles the Fairy Queen.

FOLIA SIBYLLINA.

"Since earth is but a desert shore, and life a weary dream."

A weary dream indeed is life,
A scene of never-ending strife,
Beset with bitterest woes :
The Pilgrim, with its pains opprest,
Hails as his last unbroken rest,
The sepulchre's repose.

The pangs of love rejected ne'er
Disturb his peaceful slumbers there
He never wakes to weep.

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The faithless heart and wily tongue
Mock not the bosom which they stung,
In death's enduring sleep.

Too fondly and too well he lov'd,
Too deeply was that feeling prov'd,
Then thrown unheeded by.
"Twas his to sympathise and feel
With others' woe, for others weal,
And then neglected die.

Oh! if his lot deserve a tear,
Then shed the sacred tribute here,

And ere you turn to tread

The stormy paths of life again,
Where griefs are real, pleasures vain,

Think, think upon the dead.

APPLICATION OF METAPHYSICS TO SCRIPTURE.

NO. I.

"But Christ's lore and his Apostles twelve
"He taught."-CHAUCER.

The great object of human existence should be the regeneration of the heart. The principle by which this is to be effected, must be one which will supply new motives of action, flowing either from general laws or generated by particular impulses, as well as eradicate those vicious propensities inherent in our nature. Whether in his unaided strength, an individual submits to the imperious dictation of passion, or regulates his conduct by a rule of mere rationality, he will find that the flash of the one or the ray of the other, can never light him far on his road through life. The works of Providence form a system; every part of which has some relation to, and will be affected by, the movements and condition of other portions; and as it is necessary to have a knowledge of the consequences of any action upon a system, before we can determine how far that action is likely to be beneficial or detrimental, it follows that the clearer man's views, the more extended his knowledge of creation, and of the Creator's dealings with mankind, the more competent is he to estimate the qualites of actions. Pas sion only dwells on the immediate consequences; reason and conscience can only determine the proximate results, and revelation alone declares the ultimate effects of human conduct. But revelation goes further; it supplies the machinery by which the human heart is to be remodelled, and the principle by which man's conduct is to be directed, a principle which not only carries within it a general and immutable law, but supplies to the particular affections of our nature an object for their beneficial gratification, while it places a restraint upon their pernicious indulgence. A moral code could not so operate upon the moral constitution of man; give it the ordinary sanction

of rewards and punishments, still it will leave the subjects of its government in every case, open to the accidental results of contending passions, or the imperfect check of reason. As in the natural world we find the dusky twilight of evening lingering on till it gradually melts into the dark gloom of night, while the grey glimmering of morning springs into the risen light, so the influence of gospel grace, by pouring the light of eternal truth into the recesses of the human heart, vigorously expels all its clouded corruptions and gloomy passions, while over the obscure and dismal sanctions of the law, those corruptions float in buoyant and dubious suspension. At this eventful period of the history of man, when those who feel that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation, are clinging to its consolations; when, with one arm resting in faith and humility upon the altar, they are called upon to raise the other, in defence of those blessed truths which reason demonstrates and revelation declares to be the only principles for the guidance of man as an immortal being, the analysis of the operations of those principles of divine grace and omnipotent love must be a subject of surpassing interest. The savage will trace omnipotence in the thunder; he will tremble at the howlings of the storm, while he marks the avenging voice of the author of nature: but the Christian's prerogative is to trace the operations of divine love in the still small voice that whispers

"Peace on earth; good will towards man." If, therefore, scriptural truth be a pearl of priceless value, and if the seat of its operation be the human heart, and its principal communications be made through the medium of language from the word of revelation, it cannot be denied that the cultivation of metaphysi

cal and moral science may be rendered powerfully subservient to the great end of inculcating the lessons of divine knowledge. In society there appear to be three classes of individuals. The first are those who believe that the gospel was sent to man as glad tidings of great joy. The second (amongst whom are to be reckoned the supporters of the gospel of the government) are those who profess to believe that a revelation was given, but that "the glad tidings" are not to go to but from man to his fellow men. The third are atheists, who deny the Creator as revealed in his Son. Upon the principle already established, that a more perfect knowledge, which can alone be had from a more extensive intimacy with revelation, leads to a sounder rule of life, it can at once be proved that the second and third classes are courting the darkness of error. The third is more consistent in its blindness than the second. For while the latter cannot deny the necessity of divine assistance, and thereby acknowledge the paramount importance of revelation, they with a singular fatuity close up the fountains of that living water which alone (as they dare not deny) can quench the burning thirst of the weary pilgrim. They would control man's licentiousness by a code of decent morality, but not awaken his affections by a system of grace and reconciliation. Again, be it remembered that their system, like every system of human contrivance, fails in supplying a proper object for the affections of our nature, although perhaps its sanctions may, in particular cases, prevent the indulgence of a passion in reference to a pernicious object. So that at most such virthe can only be negative; the offspring of fear; the toilsome duty of the galley slave; no labour of love, no positive holiness, no cheerful subservience to the divine will. They would read the great commandment, as if it were written, “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God," &c., and even then they would fear man rather than God; for he who would compromise the integrity of scripture, rather than offend the prejudices of a fellow sinner, betrays a fear of the creature without the love or fear of the Creator. Like Saul's companions, such see the light, but hear not the voice that speaks. Upon the principles then of metaphysical and

moral science, it appears that the full revelation of God's will, and the manifestation of his character in our Redeemer, is the only safe guide for a wandering sinner. In order to shew with what advantage these sciences may be called in aid, in a clear analysis of the holy symmetry, the regenerating influences and the internal evidences of the divine character of the Christian's creed, it may be important to give a few examples of the application of such principles of these sciences as may be considered more peculiarly adapted to the purposes of such an analysis.

The operations of matter upon mind, and the degree in which the latter is affected by the former, appears to constitute the distinction between man and man, and man and the inferior animals; and this in reference to the principle already stated, that the competence of an individual to determine the quality of an action, depends upon the extent of his acquaintance with that vast system of which he forms an atom. Thus many of the inferior animals can perceive and remember; but on examination it will be found, that whatever in them appears to partake of rationality is simply subservient to their temporal wants, and thus circumscribed by the influence of matter. They have particular appetites or affections which are at once directed by instinct to the objects of their gratification. Man in his natural state, has these particular affections, together with a principle by which he may, at his discretion, control their gratification: but in this natural state, (that is independent of revelation) he has not, and cannot have the knowledge requisite to enable him to exercise a safe and sound discretion; and furthermore, this discretion is mainly exercised in prohibition and not in the proper developement of those affections to promote the Creator's glory, by positive acts of obedience and holiness. There is no advancement in moral excellence. When Saint Paul speaks of the natural law of the Gentiles, it is not that that law is sufficient for spiritual guidance, but only as a branch of that great proposition which he demonstrates, and which is the foundation of all religion, that in every condition of man, he has light enough afforded him to convince him that he is an offender against that light, and

that his own efforts to save himself must necessarily be fruitless and unavailing. Let us now examine the process of the human mind in generalization. The inherent power of the infant mind, is but a capacity to receive impressions through the medium of the senses. It must primarily be affected by individual objects, and hence the sensations produced, must be single and unconnected. The mind thus acquires materials, which appear to be only its particular states or affections created by qualities of matter. The mind exercising itself on these, acquires a new train of ideas. An idea may be properly defined to be that particular condition or affection of the mind, when engaged in contemplating the qualities of external, material objects, or the sensations which they produce. Being at one period affected in a certain manner by a definite object, or a definite sensation, and being at another period affected in a similar manner by a certain other object or sensation, the mind from a feeling of partial resemblance considers these two affections under one head, and thus begins to classify and arrange; and so proceeds to the formation of an abstract or general idea. It is material to observe how ever that the process is from particulars to generals, as will be of much importance when we come to examine the idea of God. The only idea we can have of a substance is, that the mind is affected in a certain way by a number of qualities; and by abstraction, we may consider the isolated effect of any number of these qualities independently of those which remain unnoticed. By this process we can reduce substances to a general class, by considering those qualities which are similar, and omitting to consider those in which the substances differ. On this position the Socinian error is founded; and the fallacy is obvious, because Christ is only therein considered with reference to a portion of his nature, and as contrasted with mankind. The positive nature of a Saviour cannot be determined by that which is founded upon comparison and abstraction; and, consequently, to determine the true nature of that Saviour, we are not to omit any of the Divine attributes of his character. So with our notion of God. So far as we render it comparative or abstract, it must be erroneous. The true notion

of God, therefore, cannot be obtained by the ordinary process of the human mind; and, therefore, without the manifestation of God in Christ, and the communication of the Divine Spirit, it is clear as demonstration that man cannot know God. If he cannot, without these aids, know Him, he cannot know His dealings; and, consequently, cannot, without these aids, determine on any sound general law of action, or safely act upon the impulses of passion or appetite, or propose any proper object for the developement of his affections. By the very nature of man, time and space are laws of his mind; he cannot, therefore, understand the peace of God; he cannot conceive the joys of Christian blessedness; he cannot, unquestionably, on the same priuciple, rectify his condition to prepare for an eternal dwelling in the world to come, because his thoughts and actions are limited by time and space. Now, as many errors flow from the discussion of questions wherein general terms are used, and to which different individuals affix different meanings, according to the extent of the abstraction followed out by each, so the greatest variety of fallacies spring from an inattention to this leading truth, that time and space are laws of the human mind. Thus as to the Scripture doctrine of Divine omniscience and election. A common argument is drawn from what is called God's fore-knowledge, as creating a necessity, and, therefore, extinguishing human responsibility. God's knowledge is not qualified; it is not subject to the limitation of time. All events are at once apprehended by God's omniscience, and consequently no argument can be drawn from FORE-knowledge as contradistinguished to the knowledge of past events; or, in other words, there must be error in applying to the eternal and omniscient Creator, a conclusion drawn from a quality of knowledge, growing out of the limitations or laws of a fallen and imperfect creature. again, there must be boundless error when God is not beheld in Christ. There we have all his attributes reduced to the comprehension of human capacity, and subject to the original laws of human sympathy. Close the pages of Divine Revelation, and in vain you search for Divine sympathy for human frailty. Where is there such a God as the God of the Bible, manifested in the

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flesh? Our fellow-sufferer; our continual intercessor.

The instrument by which the mind of man is supplied with the thoughts of others, is called language, the very nature of which implies that the thoughts which its symbols represent, must have an existence previous to those symbols; and, consequently, general or abstract ideas must have had an existence before general terms. The feeling of partial resemblances causes the formation of the general idea; conventional arrangement or arbitrary formation creates the general term; and, as has been already remarked, great fallacy arises from the impracticability of having the precise meaning of such terms clearly settled, so much is left to individual caprice. This would solve many apparent paradoxes and moral enigmas in the writings of learned and eminent men. But a different view of the origin of general terms has been taken by Smith, and approved of by Dugald Stewart. According to this view, a savage, seeing a particular object, which he designates a tree, on seeing another object, possessing a resemblance to the former, applies to it the same name or appellation, and so on; and thus the name, which was before a particular denomination, becomes a general term. Now, in the instance adduced, the word tree is the sign, and is used by the savage to designate a particular object; that is, to express the feeling or affection of his mind, produced by the contemplation of that object, or rather by the various qualities of that particular object to which the name is primarily applied. That name, therefore, cannot be applied to express the affection of his mind produced by any but the same qualities in another object: as a sign can only represent the one thing signified, that is the one affection or condition of the mind. A symbol and a sign are very different; the one being merely an arbitrary character; the other being a chosen representative. If Smith's principle be correct, then, in the very first application of the term tree, the abstract general idea of a tree is formed; and, consequently, we might have an abstract idea of a class of objects or sensations, by only having seen one object or experienced a single sensation. This subject was handled with considerable acuteness by the late ArchVOL. I.

bishop Magee, One apparent error, however, in his views, deserves to be noticed, namely, that resemblance is not the origin of generalization. He analyzes the case of a child, designating several persons by the name of father. He says "The child, it is true, may give the name of father to an individual like to the person it has been taught to call by that name; but this is from mistake, not from design; from a confusion of the two as the same person, and not from a perception of resemblance between them whilst known to be different." It would appear, however, that, by the term father, a child expresses the idea produced by seeing an individual who has been in the habit of caressing or fondling it; whose actions have thus produced a certain feeling upon its mind, and, therefore, it naturally and correctly applies the term father, to every person whose actions produce these sensations. But if, in maturer years, it discovers that in the received use of the term, other qualities are comprehended besides those which it supposed the term to include, and which additional qualities limit the applicability of the term, it then accommodates its application of the term to, and corrects it by, the received meaning attached to the term. The errors of both Smith and Magee appear to result from their assuming the preexistence of the sign, and hence the fallacy, because the thing signified must be formed before the symbol can be applied as a sign to express that thing so signified. The term is the sign, the idea the thing so signified. And as in the process of abstraction, the particular idea, designated by a particular term, becomes changed, the term must also be changed. But it is a manifest fallacy to suppose and assume the term as formed, when we analyze the theory of its formation; in doing so, the reasoning must be in a circle. In Smith's theory, the general idea is to be obtained from a single sensation, which it manifestly is not; or it is to be obtained by comparison. In the latter case, the appellation by which the savage designates the first tree, and which includes all its qualities which affect the mind, would be erroneously applied to designate another object not possessing all those qualities; and, therefore, would not be the same sign, though it might be the same symbol. A learned

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