SERM. or servant to his lord, as of a client or dependent to XXXII. his patron, protector, and benefactor, whence correspondent obligations do result; it is just that men should be accountable for the performance, and for the violation or neglect of them; so as accordingly either to receive approbation, or to be obliged to render satisfaction; respectively, as they have done right, and paid respect to God, or as they have offered to wrong and dishonour him; otherwise those relations would seem vain and idle.

4. Seeing also there are natural relations of men to one another, and frequent transactions between them, founding several duties of humanity and just– ice; the which may be observed or transgressed; so that some men shall do, and others suffer much injury, without any possible redress from otherwhere, it is fit that a reference of such cases should be made to the common Patron of right, and that by him they should be so decided, that due amends should be made to one party, and fit correction inflicted on 2 Thess. i. the other; according to that of St. Paul; It is a 6,7. righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you who are troubled rest with us, in the revelation of our Lord Jesus.

5. Whereas also there are many secret good actions, many inward good dispositions, good wishes, and good purposes, unto which here no honour, no profit, no pleasure, no sort of benefit is annexed, or indeed well can be, (they being indiscernible to men ;) there are likewise many bad practices and designs concealed, or disguised, so as necessarily to pass away without any check, any disgrace, any damage or chastisement here; it is most equal that

hereafter both these kinds should be disclosed, and SERM. obtain answerable recompense. XXXII.

6. There are also persons whom, although committing grievous wrong, oppression, and other heinous misdemeanours, offensive to God and man, yet, by reason of the inviolable sacredness of their authority, or because of their uncontrollable power, no justice here can reach, nor punishment can touch; who therefore should be reserved to the impartial and irresistible judgment of God; and fit it is, that (for satisfaction of justice, and distinction of such, from those who contrariwise behave themselves well) a Tophet should be prepared for them.

7. Upon these and the like accounts, equity requireth that a judgment should pass upon the deeds of men; and thereto the common opinions of men and the private dictates of each man's conscience do attest for all men seeing any person to demean himself brutishly and unworthily, committing heinous disorders and outrages, are apt to pronounce it unfit that such an one should escape with impunity; likewise when innocent and good persons (who do no harm, and do what good they can) do suffer, or do enjoy no benefit thence, it is a pity, will any indifferent person be ready to say, that such a man's case should not be considered; that some reparation or some reward should not be allotted to him: the which apprehensions of men are in effect the verdicts of common sense concerning the equity of a judgment to be.

8. Every man also having committed any notable misdemeanour, (repugnant to piety, justice, or sobriety,) doth naturally accuse himself for it, doth in his heart sentence himself to deserve punishment,

Isa. xxx.

33.

SERM. and doth stand possessed with a dread thereof; so, XXXII. even unwillingly, avouching the equity of a judg

ment, and by a forcible instinct presaging it to come. As likewise he that hath performed any virtuous or honest action, doth not only rest satisfied therein, but hath raised in him a strong hope of benefit to come from heaven in recompense thereof; the which apprehensions and hopes do involve an opinion, that it is reasonable a judgment should be. All which considerations (seeing it is manifest that there is not generally or frequently any such exact judgment or dispensation of rewards in this life, nor perhaps, without changing the whole frame of things and course of Providence, can well be) do therefore infer the fitness and equity of a future judgment.

It is further, upon divers accounts, requisite and needful, that men should have an apprehension concerning such a judgment appointed by God, and consequently that such an one should really be. It is requisite toward the good conduct of human affairs here, or to engage men to the practice of virtue; it is necessary to the maintaining any belief concerning religion, or sense of piety: without it therefore no convenient society among men can be well upheld.

1. It is, I say, needful to engage men upon the practice of any virtue, and to restrain them from any vice; for that indeed without it, no consideration of reason, no provision of law here, can be much available to those purposes. He that will consider the nature of men, or observe their common practice, (marking what apprehensions usually steer them, what inclinations sway them, in their elections and pursuits of things,) shall, I suppose, find, that from an invincible principle of self-love, or sen

suality, deriving itself through all their motions of SERM. soul, and into all their actions of life, men generally XXXII. do so strongly propend to the enjoyment of present sensible goods, that nothing but a presumption of some considerable benefit to be obtained by abstinence from them, or of some grievous mischief consequent on the embracing them, can withhold them from pursuing such enjoyment. From hence (seeing fancy, reason, and experience do all prompt men to a foresight of events, and force them to some regard of the consequences of things) it followeth, that hope and fear are the main springs which set on work all the wheels of human action; so that any matter being propounded, if men can hope that it will yield pleasant or profitable (that is, tending to pleasant) fruits, they will undertake it; if they do fear its consequences will be distasteful or hurtful, they will decline it: very rare it is to find, that the love or liking of a thing, as in itself amiable to the mind, or suitable to reason, doth incline men thereto; that honest things, bare of present advantages, and barren of hopeful fruits, are heartily pursued; that any thing otherwise averteth us from itself, than as immediately presenting some mischief, or dangerously threatening it. When goodness therefore doth clash with interest or pleasure, human wisdom (the Rom. viii.6. Opóvnμa τñs σapkòs, natural sense of the flesh, which St. Paul speaketh of as opposite to virtue) will dispose men to take part with these; and, except some higher aid come in to succour goodness, it is odds that ever they will prevail over it. If it do If it do appear, that virtue can pay men well for their pains, they perhaps may be her servants; but they will hardly wait on her in pure courtesy, or work in her service

SERM. for nothing; if she bringeth visibly a good dowry XXXII. with her, she may be courted; but her mere beauty,

or worth, will draw few suitors to her: who will forego sensible pleasures, or wave substantial profit ; who will reject the overtures of power, or honour, for her sake? And if vice, how ill soever it look or lear, do offer fairly, how many persons will be so nice or squeamish, as merely out of fancy, or in despite to her, to refuse or renounce her? In short, as men are baited with pleasure or bribed with profit, so they pursue, as they are stung with pain or curbed with fear, so they eschew things; it is a gift (or a specious appearance of some good offered) which perpetually moveth the greatest part, which often Deut. xvi. blindeth the eyes and perverteth the heart of the Exod. xxiii. Wisest sort of men.

19.

8.

It is further to common sense very obvious, that this life cannot promise or afford to virtue any rewards apparently so considerable, as in the common judgment of men to overpoise the pains and difficulties required to the procurement and maintenance thereof, (the pains and difficulties to be overgone in mastering stubborn inclinations, in moderating greedy appetites, in restraining violent passions, in encountering frequent and strong temptations, in abstracting our minds and affections from sensible. things, in assiduous watching over our thoughts, words, and actions,) together with the manifold inconveniences, crosses, and troubles, which do attend the strict practice of virtue; that likewise here there are not ordinarily any such discouragements affixed to vice, which do much weigh down the pleasures with which it is tempered, and the advantages waiting on it.