prepoffeffed with contrary notions, fhould, whilft it retains its own nature, admit of fuch as do clearly and immediately contradict them. For if these be natural notions, that there is a God, that he must be wife, and juft, and good, and powerful, and ought to be honoured and loved by his creatures; the mind of man cannot poffibly admit of any contrary perfuafions and impreffions for the former perfuafions being natural to us, will always remain while our nature remains, and if any perfuafions contrary to thefe could be wrought upon our minds, they would fignify nothing, but would mutually destroy one another. For if any man that is perfuaded that God is good, (as every man is, that is perfuaded he is at all) could, during the perfuafion, be likewife of a contrary perfuafion, that he is not good; this latter perfuafion would fignify nothing: for he is not perfuaded that God is not good, whilst he retains this perfuafion that he is good.

Thirdly, Suppofing the thing revealed do not contradict the effential notions of our minds, no good and holy man hath reason to doubt of any thing, whether it be a revelation from God or not, of which he hath a clear and vigorous perception, and full fatisfaction in his own mind that it is fuch. For if a man may have reason to doubt of any thing, whereof he hath a clear perception, then no man can be certain of any thing. Now, that there is fuch a thing as certainty, is now fupposed, and not to be proved. I fay, a good and holy man can have no reafon to doubt: for a wicked man, I grant, may, by a finful rejection of, and difobedience to the truth, fo far provoke God, as to give him up to ftrong delufions, to believe lies; and he may be as confident of a lie, as any good man is of the truth.

And as this is not unjust from God, in reference to wicked men, so it is no prejudice to the affurance which good men may have concerning a divine revelation.

Fourthly, A good and holy man reflecting upon this affurance and perfuafion that he hath, may be able to give himself a reasonable account of it, and fatisfy himfelf that it is not a ftubborn belief, and an obstinate conceit of things without any ground or reafon. A good man is fecretly, and within himself, persuaded,

that

that God hath revealed to him fuch a thing: reflecting upon this perfuafion, he finds that it is a foreign impreffion, and doth not spring from his own mind. Now he believing that there is a God, who can, and probably doth communicate and reveal himself to the minds of good men; and being withal fatisfied that his goodness is fuch, that he will not fuffer good men, who do heartily and fincerely defire to know his will, to be under a neceffity of delufion, (which they unavoidably are, if they may then be deceived, when they have the greatest affurance, and clearest fatisfaction that fuch a thing is revealed to them of God;) from hence he reasonably concludes, that he ought not to question the matter any further. I might inftance in the revelation made to Abraham, concerning the facrificing of his fon, which hath the greatest difficulty in it of any cafe I know of: but of that I have elsewhere difcourfed at large. Thus much for the firft.

Secondly, What affurance can other perfons, who have not the revelation immediately made to them, have of a divine revelation? To this I fhall answer by these propofitions.

1. That there are fome means whereby a man may be affured of another's revelation that it is divine. For, (1.) Otherwife it would fignify nothing, but only to the perfon that immediately had it; which would make void the chief end of most revelations, which are fel. dom made to particular perfons for their own fakes only, but for the most part, on purpose that they may be made known to others, which could not effectually be done, unless there be fome means whereby men may be affured of revelations made to another.

(2.) None could be guilty of unbelief but those who had immediate revelation made to them. For no man is guilty of unbelief that is not obliged to believe: but no man can be under an obligation to believe any thing, who hath not fufficient means whereby he may be affured that fuch a thing is true.

2. The private affurance and fatisfaction of another concerning a revelation made to him, can fignify nothing at all to me, to affure me of it. For what fatif

See Sermon 56.

faction

faction is it to me, that another may fay, he hath a revelation, unless I have fome means to be affured that what he fays is true? For if I muft believe every fpirit, that is, every man that fays he is infpired, I lie open to all poffible impoftures and delufions, and must believe every one that either foolishly conceits, or falfely pretends that he hath a revelation: for both the conceited and pretended enthusiast will fay they have revelations, with as much confidence as those who are truly and divinely inspired: and to take every man's word in matters of fuch huge confequence and importance, as revelation from God ought to be prefumed to be, would not be faith, but credulity, that is, an ungrounded perfuafion; which how feverely God punished, you may fee in that famous inftance, 1 Kings xiii. where the Prophet that was fent to Bethel, is upon his return torn in pieces by a lion, because of his credulity and eafy belief of a pretended revelation. I confess this cafe is fomewhat different from theirs who fimply believe a pretended revelation, as being complicated with fome other aggravating circumftances. For he had an immediate revelation from God, not to eat, nor drink at Bethel; nor to return the fame way that he came upon his return, an old Prophet meets him, and tells him that an angel had appeared to him, and had bid him bring him back, and to caufe him to eat and drink; he believes him, and turns in with him. Now, this was the aggravation of his credulity, that when he himself had had an exprefs revelation from God, concerning which he was fatisfied, he hearkened to the pretended revelation of another, concerning which he had no affurance, in contradiction to a divine revelation, which he knew to be fuch. Not but that the command which God had given him was, in its own nature, revokable, and God might have countermanded it by another immediate revelation to him, or by an equivalent, that is, a miracle wrought by the Prophet, who pretended to countermand it from God. Unumquodque diffolvitur eo modo quo ligatur, the obligation which was brought upon him by an immediate revelation, could not be diffolved but by another immediate revelation, or evidence equivalent to it. How

ever, this inftance ferves in the general to my purpose, that a man may be faulty by credulity, as well as by unbelief; and as a man ought not to disbelieve, where there is fufficient evidence; so neither ought he to believe any thing without fufficient grounds of affurance. 3. That miracles wrought for the confirmation of any divine teftimony or revelation made to another, are a fufficient means, whereby those who have not the divine revelation immediately made to them, may be affured that it is divine; I fay, these are fufficient means of affurance in this cafe. I do not fay they are the only means, (for it does not become men to limit the power and wifdom of God;) but I do not know of any other means of affurance, upon which men can fecurely rely; and it is a great prefumption that this is the best and fitteft, if not the only means, because the wisdom of God hath always pitched upon it, and conftantly made use of it, and no other. Under miracles I comprehend the prediction of future events, which God claims as a peculiar prerogative to himself, because fuch things are out of the reach of any created underftanding; and therefore in the Prophet Ifaiah, he challengeth the idols of the Heathens to give this teftimony, or argument of their divinity; Shew us things that are to come, that we may know that ye are gods.

But here we muft diftinguish between doubtful and unquestionable miracles. I call those doubtful miracles, which, though a man cannot tell how they can be done by any natural power, yet do not carry that full conviction with them, as to be univerfally owned and acknowledged for arguments of a divine power. Such were those which the Magicians did by their inchantments. I call thofe unquestionable, which, confidering their quality and number, and the publick manner of doing them, are out of all question. Such were the miracles of Mofes, and our Saviour. Now, a doubtful, and a fingle, and a private wonder, or miracle, as I may call it, can give no confirmation to any thing in opposition to a revelation, or a doctrine confirmed by many, and publick, and unquestionable miracles. Upon this account Mofes forbids the children of Ifrael to hearken to any Prophet that should come to feduce them to ido

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latry; yea, though he should give thee a fign or wonder, and the fign or wonder fhould come to pass, Deut. xiii. 1. 2. 3.4. Now, here lies the ftrength of the reafon, becaufe he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage; that is, becaufe he contradicts the great revelation which God made of himself, and confirmed by fuch a fucceffion of fo many, and fo great miracles; the credit of which revelation ought not in reafon to be called in queftion upon the working of a fingle and a private wonder, which we could not diftinguish from a miracle. Upon the same account, St. Paul, Gal. 1. 8. fays, Though an angel from heaven fhould preach any other doctrine than that which had been preached unto them, he should be accurfed; that is, after fo clear and great confirmation, as was given by the golpel, a contrary doctrine, though it fhould come from an angel, fhould be rejected as execrable.

But you will fay, Suppofe fuch a Prophet as Mofes fpeaks of here, fuch an angel as St. Paul mentions, fhould work as many and as great miracles as Mofes and Chrift wrought, fhould we then believe them?

I anfwer; This is not to be fuppofed for fuppofing 'the providence of God in the world, it cannot be ima gined that an equal atteftation fhould be given to a false doctrine and a true. But that the greatest and most unquestionable miracles are to carry it, is evident; because this is all the reafon why Mofes was to be credited above the Magicians, because he wrought more and greater wonders than they did. But if it could be fuppofed that any one could work as great miracles for the confirmation of idolatry, as were wrought by way of atteftation to the true worship of God, then there would be no difference, but what the reafon of the thing makes; the belief of one God being more reasonable than many; and not to make an image or fenfible reprefentation of a spirit, being more reasonable than to make one. But if this could be fuppofed, the natural iffue and confequence of it would be atheism, a man would believe neither that nor the other, nor that there is any God at all.

But