Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this problem. Their ideas include an argument for the empowerment of private and public interest groups in the regulatory process and a provocative discussion of how the government can support and encourage industry self-regulation.
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מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
actors Administration agency’s analysis antitrust argued Australian behavior benign big gun Braithwaite cartel Chapter citizens companies competitive competitors compliance group consumer contestable Corporate Crime Reporter corruption costs delegation deregulation deterrence dominant firm dominantfirm economic economic rationality effective efficient capture enforced selfregulation enforcement pyramid environmental escalation evolution of cooperation example executives firm’s forms of capture fringe fringefirm intervention Grabosky incentives increase inefficient inspectors institutions John Braithwaite joint defection laissezfaire Law Review lobbying market failure monopsonist monopsony motivated negotiation nursing home oligopoly OPEC partialindustry regulation participation People’s players political prisoner’s dilemma problem production protection public interest punishment rational Reagan regulated firms regulatory agencies regulatory culture regulatory strategies republican responsive regulation reward payoff rules safety sanctions Scholz second sourcing self social responsibility standards sucker payoff temptation payoff tripartism tripartite trust unregulated Yale Law Journal zerosum capture