trivance the advocates of this scheme have aimed to give validity to their hypothesis. Hence this supposed justice is considered as acting a part distinct from the Deity himself. The latter is described as intimating a disposition of mercy to forgive the offender, while the former, as personified, is represented as imposing its claims, and demanding its rights, before favour should be shewn. Mercy is then set forth as devising a plan which obviates its complaints, and answers all its requisitions, in the proposal of a substitute in one of the persons of the Godhead. In such a manner as this have I repeatedly known it stated. But it might be asked, how inflexibility of character could be predicated of this justice, while it could accommodate and bend itself to the terms of mercy? The very act of treaty or compromise on terms suggested by clemency argues its pliability, not its inflexible rigour; just as much as a bent piece of metal proves that it was not unbendable. Again, if a substitute was necessarily required in order to satisfy justice, of whom is it natural to expect this substitute should be demanded? Of the offender or offended?-the debtor or the creditor? And lastly, what sort of justice could that be which, instead of inflicting its penalties on the really guilty, should enforce them on one who had never incurred them? If the grand distinction between justice and injustice does not consist in punishing the offender in proportion to his crimes, and rewarding the innocent with honours and favours deserved, then I am at

a loss to know wherein it does consist.

The

notion of a person in the Deity being the voluntary undertaker of this work of substitution, I consider too palpably absurd to need a word in refutation.

The fact is, after all this parade of fanciful theology, the Deity himself must be considered as the offended or injured party; and therefore his justice is not to be detached from himself, any more than his merey or benevolence; and indeed it may be said, as God is just, that justice which is supposed to be acting the part of a stern interposer, must be, if a reality, only a certain modification of his own character. Now, on the supposition that God, as the offended party, required a satisfaction as the indispensable condition of shewing mercy, of whom could he justly require this satisfaction but of the party offending? Did he require it of himself? Certainly not; for this would be justice requiring satisfaction of justice, which is a complete solecism. And yet such is the ridiculous mode of argument which is in reality adopted to support a favourite notion: for the prominent feature of the scheme is, that the Deity himself, though he is the party offended, provides for this supposed satisfaction without the least interference from the offender! That is, in other words, the creditor, while he professes the most unbounded regard for the debtor, insists on the payment of his claims without the least abatement; but in order to give this clashing view of things the appearance of consistency, he

condescends to furnish the means of payment himself, and in point of fact pays to himself, by his own property, what the debtor is represented to have paid by the provided supply, under the name of a surety! To call this a most palpable absurdity is to say the least of it: it is an absolute libel on the character of God, and carries with it its own refutation. It represents the Judge of all the earth, the God whom John declares to be "light, and in whom is no darkness (or deception) at all," as acting the part of duplicity, as an evasive contriver!-as affecting a strenuous and rigid adherence to the rights of his justice, while, by a circuitous and costly expedient, he in reality relinquishes or nullifies those rights! O, ye who call yourselves orthodox, by holding such a notion, only consider what a God-dishonouring creed you hold, the best part of which charges the Deity with a line of conduct which would reflect the greatest discredit on yourselves, as counterfeiting what you are not, were you to act in like manner!

Having thus endeavoured to shew by argument that the notion of God's being an inexorable Lawgiver and Judge, in requiring satisfaction for sin, is founded in false conceptions of his character, I will now proceed to inquire whether it receives any countenance from the language of the Scriptures. Where do prophets or apostles speak of such rigour on the part of Him "whose tender mercies are over all his works, and who maketh his sun to shine on the evil and the good"? Do

they ever tell us of the demands of a broken law -of the inflexible requirements of Divine justice? Do they ever tell us respecting the sinner, that "Die he or justice must; unless for him Some other able, and as willing, pay

The rigid satisfaction, death for death"?

No. Yet it appears the above language of Milton's, with many, has more weight than that of the inspired poets, and it is often quoted as genuine gospel. So far from this doctrine deriving any support from scripture, abundance of texts may be adduced to contradict it: in fact, as I before observed, every declaration which expresses mercy and forgiveness to sinners is opposed to it. But I shall confine myself to a few of these which appear more expressly to teach an opposite sentiment.

In Psalm cxxx. 3, it is asked, "If thou, Jehovah, shouldst mark (Heb. watch, note, observe strictly) iniquity, O Lord, who shall stand?” Why, none, of course. But, says the advocate for inexorable justice," he does mark it; if not against the sinner, yet against his substitute." The remaining part of the verse, however, declares, in reply to the solemn question, “There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared." By this language a direct and unequivocal intimation is given, that he does not mark iniquity where he forgives it: for if he did, how could it be said there is forgiveness with him? And if the latter clause is not to be understood as negativing the first, I am at a loss to make it

intelligible. The two clauses The two clauses may be taken, therefore, as one of those striking antitheses with which the Hebrew writers abound; and I am astonished I should have read the verse so many times without observing the force and beauty of it.

In speaking of the kindness of God towards sinners, the Scriptures are exuberant in metaphors, and, amongst others, the ardour of his affection is not unfrequently conveyed to us under the endearing representation of paternal love, accompanied with the strongest figures to give us the most solemn assurances of its reality. Hence, Psalm ciii. 8, 10, 13, it is affirmed, "He hath not dealt with us after our sins, nor rewarded us according to our iniquities. The Lord is slow to anger, and of great kindness. Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him: for he knoweth our frame, he remembereth that we are dust." Is such language applicable to an inexorable judge, who is bent on enforcing the full penalty of disobedience? What should we think of the paternal regard of an earthly parent who should affect to shew kindness and forgiveness to his children who had erred and disobeyed him, by inflicting the chastisement they merited on one of his sons who had not offended him? Would not such a case be revolting to human nature? Yet this is the picture which orthodoxy draws of the Father of mercies and God of all comfort. In connexion with the above texts of scripture in which this