question but that for a long time the people of the United States and the people of Japan did not understand the term 'open door' in the same sense. Do they now? Have the American and the Japanese governments achieved a meeting of the minds as to the connotation of the term 'special interests'? In case of disagreement as to whether a given measure does or does not infringe China's independence or the principle of equal opportunity, who is to decide? . . . In 1915 the Japanese Government insisted that its demands upon China did not infringe treaty rights; China insisted that they did. When China, under pressure of an ultimatum, agreed to some fifteen of the things demanded, the United States, without committing itself as to whether they did or did not do so, merely went on record to the effect that it would not recognize any agreement impairing the rights of the United States, the integrity of China, or the principle of the open door.'"

Some of the less well-informed Chinese viewed the agreement as a sign of America's tacit approval of Japan's recent action in China. The general attitude seemed to be one of anxiety as to the eventual meaning and implications of the agreement.

Concerning Japan's pledge not to allow any attack upon Chinese territorial integrity, or independence, the

China Press, as quoted in Millard's Review of Oct. 6th, said:

"Baron Ishii announces that Japan is 'prepared to defend the independence of China against any aggression.' This is all to the good. There is only one nation that threatens China, and if Japan will defend China against the aggression of that nation, China will survive. If Japan, to put it plainly, will defend China against Japanese aggressions, all will be well."

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A final comment was that no two powers could guarantee between themselves a a continuation of China's independence as a sovereign state, or could make certain a preservation of its national territorial integrity. The only way in which these aims could be accomplished seemed to be in a growth of power on China's own part, which would enable it to defend its domains from any aggressions by a foreign power." 1

The Japanese, although there were some who criticized the agreement because it did not seem definite enough as to their desired powers in China, were generally satisfied with the agreement. The best indication of their approval was the immediate selection of Viscount Ishii as Ambassador to America. They believed that the way was open for their recognized

1 In the Lansing-Ishii Agreement quoted above.

leadership in the Orient. One of their publicists, writing in an American magazine, said: "The new understanding between the United States and Japan will be held in Japan as the greatest piece of constructive achievement of the diplomatic history of the Far East for many a generation. To Japan it is a double triumph. Japan has been the ally of the British Empire for years. That the greatest power in the two Americas now recognizes her leadership of the Far Eastern states must mean a good deal ... to my countrymen. Besides laying a pretty solid foundation stone of the future peace of Japan, the achievement of the Ishii Mission crowns high the cup of Japan's political aspirations.'

The view of the treaty taken in the United States, followed a middle course, as compared with these two estimates. The chief criticism was along the lines already indicated, but America was hopeful that it had solved a difficult situation with satisfaction to both China and Japan. This attitude was expressed in a statement by Secretary Lansing, accompanying the publication of the treaty. He said: "By openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special 1 Adachi Kinnosuke, in Asia, December, 1917.

relations to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of suspicion. The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two governments in relation to China. This understanding is formally set forth in the notes exchanged, and now made public. The statements in the notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the 'open door' policy, but introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation, also, of Pan-Americanism, as interpreted by this government."

True friends of China and Japan warmly hope that this estimate of the outcome of the agreement will be borne out by future events.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHINESE-JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT

OF 1918

THE situation in Russia following the abdication of the Czar in March, 1917, was of special concern to the Allies. It was of vital importance to the two neighbouring oriental supporters of the Allies, Japan and China. The northern boundaries of the Chinese Republic are contiguous for hundreds of miles with the boundaries of Siberia; any German penetration there would be felt at once in China. Japanese shipping, which included practically all of the vessels on the Pacific, would be menaced at once if the Germans should gain control of Vladivostok. Further, in its larger aspect of German control of Russia's resources and territory, presaging the establishment of a vast empire stretching from the North Sea to the Pacific, the Japanese saw a grave menace. The military danger of the German forces in Siberia seems to have been exaggerated, but there was every probability of economic control and domination. Japan could not take military measures to meet this situation unless it had