Thirdly, A fteady purpofe and fixed refolution to be religious. The difficulty attending this path, all will admit, whilft the fojourner only, is fully convinced, that godliness with contentment is great gain.

Probably the most valuable and most general purpose of governing influence of the greatest importance, is a fixed purpose and growing refolution to examine our inclinations universally, by the best rules and maxims of wifdom we have at hand, and with an eye fteadily fixed on evidence, to establish or refcind our dependent purposes accordingly. This resolution should never be impeded in any inftance, as periods arrive, from ripening into volition, and becoming a real ability to forfake the foolish and live, and to go in the way of understanding: Whilft its happy poffeffor is fecure of the approbation of God, of angels, and of the pious and virtuous in all generations.St. Paul uses this phrase, "He that standeth stedfast in his heart, having no neceffity, but hath power over his own will, and hath fo decreed in his heart." 1 Cor. vii. 37. Now what does all this import, but refolution which governs volitions? I conceive ability in the refolution, capacity in the volitions, and an occafion or opportunity-It seems to imply, that fome other men are not in this ftate, have not dominion over their own will, that is, have not a governing purpofe in the respect affigned.

U 2

Purpofes

Purposes of governing influence, are generally affected by the prevailing taste, and fuch is the depraved state of humanity, that the purposes of most men seem affected by prevalent sensuality, or pride, and oftentimes by both in the fame person. Happy, fuperlatively happy, the pious few, who raised in a good degree from the ignorance which is at the root of pride, are frequently indulging reflections on their univerfal, entire, and unlimited dependence on God, respecting the exiftence, properties, and efficiency of valuable purposes. Ignorance is the parent of self-sufficient purposes and proud refolutions, as inconfiftent with our mutual dependence as they are atheistical: But knowledge of our mutual dependence on each other, and primarily and ultimately, dependence on God, generates humility, the immediate parent of pious intentions and godly refolutions, which persevered in, ennoble humanity, and glorify God: Divine ftrength being made perfect in our weakness, and divine fufficiency in creature infufficiency.

SECTION

THINKING, when the mind endeavours to

begin, or continue any propofed action, or its forbearance, fuppofed within its dominion, and of a nature, without the intervention of any medium, to be produced by its influence, takes the name willing or volition.

That particular thought, whereby the mind knowingly exerts that dominion, it either primarily or habitually supposes itself to have over any part of the man, in concurring to the existence or continuation of a proposed action or its forbearance, takes the name will or a volition.

This fimple modified act of mind, by other arrangements of its circumftances, may be further defined.

Volition or will, is that inclination which immediately follows a confcious want of fome fuppofed attainable good, and which immediately precedes, endeavour to attain the said good.

Volition or will, is that thought by which the mind knowingly exerciseth that dominion, it primarily or habitually fupposeth itself to have, over fome other property of its subject.—The

following feems the most logical definition, as the next or nearest genus is used.

Volition is that inclination in which the mind knowingly exerts that dominion it apprehendeth itself to have, over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, fome immediate action. The ability in the mind to or der, or as it were, to command the doing or refraining any particular action is what I call the will, conceived in abftract.

It is impoffible by discourse, to lead a man into a conception of volition, unless he has reflected, or will reflect, on his own cogitation or thinking, when merely by a thought, he gives exiftence to motion of his body, or pursues a train of thinking by inclination; or, on the other hand, oppofes fuch motion or thoughts, when proposed in idea to the mind. Every reflecting man has abundant opportunity for observing that he has ability sometimes joined with fuitable circumstances, to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of his mind and motions of his body, barely by a thought, or inclination of mind. That I be not too tedious, I fhall only add, That this inclination of mind, which co-exifts with apprehended liberty thus to order the confideration of an idea, or the forbearing to confider it: to effect the motion of any part of the body, or its ceffation, if in motion, in any particular inftance, is that which I call will or volition. Thinking, thus circumftan

ced,

ced, or under this modification, takes the name willing.

A volition agrees with a wish and a purpose, in that it is an inclination of mind: But difagrees with wifh, in that its object is immediate acting or refraining what is conceived poffible; whereas,' the object of wifh is an impoffible, improbable, or uncertain event, paft, prefent, or to come. And volition differs from purpofe in that its objects are always immediate, and either action or refraining; whereas, the object of purpofe is always future, and may be not only action or refraining, but enjoyment or fuffering, and alfo changes in things.

If the foregoing descriptions of volition are juft, it is fully evident, that understanding and emotion are effentially requifite to the existence of volition. Let us attend them in their order.

First, Understanding. That fpecies of underanding which we call apprehenfion, is chiefly concerned here, as respecting inclination under other modifications. This apprehenfion is refpecting the object of volition-the nature of the acting or forbearing proposed-the dominion of the mind—and its present liberty.

1. In regard of the apprehended or conceived object, whether it is immediate action or immediate ceffation, we may remark, that, without apprehenfion of it, we could never be voluntary agents; but if actors at all, fhould merely act as

vegetables