imagine themselves to be such paragons of perfection both in mind and person, were to inspect these matters, and observe the starry heavens, and ask themselves the question, how much they know about them, methinks it would abase their loftiness, and bring their thoughts into captivity, and produce in them a more humble and amiable spirit.-Extracted from Dr. Dick's Treatise on the Sidereal Heavens.

A DISSERTATION

ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE CREATION AS TAUGHT BY

MODERN CHRISTIANS, PRIESTS, AND THEIR ABETTORS. (Concluded from p. 216.)

T has been proved in the preceding papers, that the doctrine of absolute creation was believed by a large majority of the nations of the earth, and consequently that, in relation to it, the Christian priesthood, or the Jewish priesthood can claim no merit on the score of originality. The question then naturally arises, Did Moses borrow his notion of creation from the traditionary opinions of other nations, or did other nations derive their notions of creation from the writings of the Hebrew legislator? This is a question which, like all other questions respecting the antiquities of nations, is involved in much uncertainty: for whatever may be the number and force of the arguments adduced in favour of the one hypothesis, arguments equally as numerous and powerful may be adduced in favour of the other. The style of a few of the first chapters of Genesis evidently shows them to have been derived from different documents, and afford presumptive evidence of the fact that the book is a compilation of stories which were afloat in the minds of different tribes of men. The impossibility of educing something which is tangible, which has a positive existence, and which is possessed of positive properties, out of absolute nothingness-out of a pure negation, has struck many minds, and affords de

monstrative evidence of the absurdity of the doctrine we are discussing. The notion of creation then, we have every reason to suppose, was first generated in the human mind by observing the productive powers of nature. These, to ignorant men, appeared so truly wonderful and inexplicable, that they were referred to some unknown cause; and as men and the world they inhabit were supposed to have had a beginning, and as the causes which produced them were unknown, the notion of a great and immense being would very naturally arise. An order of priests would soon follow who, seizing on the popular idea, would soon turn it to the advancement of their own interests. Thus the Egyptian priests had their Isis and Osiris, the Greeks and Romans their Jupiter and a nameless herd of divinities, the Brahmans their Buddha and Bramha, and the Jews their Jah.

The advocates of the doctrine of creation endeavour with all their might to overturn the eternity of matter, knowing well that, if that can be done-if it can be proved that matter has not existed from eternity, the existence of a cause distinct from matter in point of its nature and properties follows as a consequence. Some in their eagerness to attack (query) what has been called atheism, have even went so far as to deny the existence of matter considered apart from mind; arguing that, though what we called matter exists, it exists solely in relation to mind; so that, if all minds were to be destroyed, there would be no such thing as matter in existence. This was the doctrine taught by Berkeley, which has been considered by some philosophers as absolutely irrefutable. Whether it be true or false matters not to our argument. If matter exists solely in relation to mind, if it be merely an idea or conception of mind, then it must ever have existed. For if mind, especially an infinite mind, always existed, the idea of matter always existed in that mind. For if we suppose that there ever was a time when the idea did not exist, we must also suppose the mind or the thinking agent to be ignorant of something at one period of his duration which he knew at another, which is at once denying his infinity; because an infinite intellect must know all things, else it cannot be infinite in point of wisdom. Now it follows from all

this, on the hypothesis of Berkeley, that there never could have been such a thing as the absolute creation of matter, except in relation to finite minds; which would prove too much, and is therefore useless. In this last view of the matter, there must have been a new creation for every mind that has any conception of the doctrine. Supposing, then, that the doctrine of creation has been known to twenty billions of human beings, there must have been twenty billions of absolute creations; which appears to my heretical judgment rather too many.

The advocates of the doctrine of absolute creation endeavour to show metaphysically, that there must have been a time when no finite being or thing existed, and that, consequently, there must have been from all eternity an uncreated substance or being, unlimited in wisdom and power. The argument which they employ for this purpose may be stated as follows:

All beings must either have existed from eternity in their present form, or there must have been an infinite succession of beings, if matter be eternal. That all beings existed from eternity in their present form is contradicted by the fact, that our own bodies are undergoing perpetual changes; and is, in short, too absurd to be credited. On the supposition, then, that there was no creation, there must have been an eternal succession of beings of a finite character. Now there must have been a time when each of these beings was not; therefore there must have been a time when it was future. The direct consequence of this argument is, that as there must have been a time when each of them was future, there must have been a time when the whole were future. But if there ever was a time when the whole of them were not, then there must have been some cause able to bring them into being, inasmuch as they now exist. This cause must have had power to produce, and skill or wisdom to arrange and diversify the things produced. This skilful and powerful being we call God, or the Creator; and the act of producing all things we denominate creation.

Without objecting to the existence of an infinite, wise, and powerful agent, we contend that the argument before mentioned is unsound. The fallacy lies in

the improper application of the word whole: this word necessarily implying finity in the thing to which it is applied. For example: we divide time into years, months, days, hours, minutes, and seconds. Now, I might argue thus: there was a time when each of these separate portions of time was not; therefore, there was a time when each of them was future; consequently, there was a time when the whole were future; ergo, there was a time when there was no time, a duration when there was no duration—which is a flat and palpable contradiction, and cannot therefore be true. The same argument might be applied to space, and the same conclusions would be arrived at. To apply the word whole to an infinite succession of beings is virtually an absurdity. If we say the whole of the links belonging to a supposed infinite chain, we at once limit it, and, consequently, destroy the supposition of its infinity. When we say the whole of these things are in their proper places, we mean that all of them are placed in their proper positions. Here the word whole implies a limit; namely, that there are no more. The word whole ought to be applied only to those cases wherein finity is expressed or implied. For the instant that we apply it to an infinite succession, or to any thing else implying infinity, we contradict ourselves. If we suppose in the first place an infinite succession of beings, and then say the whole of these beings were once future, we manifestly destroy the former supposition by the latter. If we can imagine the whole of a finite succession of beings, we at once preclude the possibility of that succession being infinite. The argument then so frequently adduced by the priests and by the advocates of the doctrine under consideration, amounts to no more than a miserable fallacy, and is a manifest proof of the weakness of the cause it is brought forward to support.

It is most illogical on the part of bishops and clergymen to reason in this manner. Yet, forsooth, if we believe themselves, they are the only reasonable menthe only men who have truth on their side, and who defend it in a reasonable manner. But what can be more unreasonable than to admit for the sake of argument the supposition of an infinite succession of beings,

and then, in order to prove the fallacy of the supposition, apply to it the idea of a finite or limited succession, and, because there is a discordance between the ideas condemn the supposition?

In these remarks I am not contending for the eternity of the human race, or of any other race of beings, but simply for the eternity of the material of which they are composed. This may have undergone a million or more changes-may have entered into innumerable combinations, and may yet enter into more. It is for the absolute impossibility of creating this material I am contending, and not for the eternity of any one of the combinations into which it may have entered. The fact of a creation having occurred some five or six thousand years ago is not sufficiently attested. Neither mathematical demonstration, nor ocular proof, nor any sort of evidence, except that arising from positive credulity, can be offered in favour of the doctrine. It is true the priesthood have said it happened; but then this order of men have been so much accustomed to the practice of telling untruths, that philosophers in these degenerate days declare they will not believe them. It has been said that geology furnishes proof of the short existence of man on the surface of this globe, and that this, at least, renders the creation of man not only possible but certain. But it should be observed, that to make a compound out of previously existing materials, and to educe those materials out of absolute nothingness, are widely different questions: the former may be true, the latter false. Man may have been made by an intelligent deity, without the matter which enters into the composition of his frame being created. Now we know too little of the agency of matter, of the peculiar affinities, forces, or energies which it may possess under peculiar circumstances, to be able to state positively that there is no possibility of nature being able to generate animals and men. A modest scepticism therefore becomes us amidst so much uncertainty. Future discoveries will perhaps reveal the secret. To create however is to act; to act is to apply force; to apply force, and to apply it to nothing, appears an absurdity. We can form no idea of creation without at