The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1969-73: From Violence to Power-sharingUS Institute of Peace Press, 2011 - 437 עמודים Focusing on four case studies, author William Beattie Smith traces the evolution of British policy from 1969-73 and depicts how easily a conflict over national identity can turn into bloodshed, grief, and horror; and how difficult it is once a serious fight has started to restore peace.In each of the case studies, Smith highlights a discrete policy followed by the British government in tackling political disorder in Northern Ireland, and examines why the policy was chosen or pursued. He outlines three broad strategic options reform, coercion, and powersharing and identifies factors influencing which of the three will be selected in practice. Focusing on policy outcomes rather than the details of the negotiating process, the author evaluates the relative importance of rational calculation, patterns of understanding, party politics, diplomatic pressures, organizational structure, and official doctrine in shaping policies and initiating radical changes. While rooted in policy analysis, the book ventures into the territory of political history and conflict studies. The author addresses issues such as the legitimacy of state authority, the vulnerability of democratic institutions to the opposition of disaffected minorities, and the tensions that exist between public order and individual rights. His conclusion derives strategic lessons from the British experience in Northern Ireland and provides guidance for policymakers confronting challenges arising from comparable cases." |
תוכן
Introduction | 1 |
Explaining Policy Choices | 7 |
Learning and Adaptation | 21 |
Preconditions for the Conflict 1968 | 27 |
Reform 1969 | 59 |
Coercion and Internment 1971 | 113 |
Imposing Direct Rule 1972 | 165 |
Negotiating Power Sharing 1973 | 249 |
Evaluation | 347 |
11 | 351 |
27 | 358 |
46 | 364 |
67 | 371 |
Lessons? | 395 |
List of Abbreviations | 415 |
7 | 317 |
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
accepted administration agreed agreement argued army commanders assembly August backbenchers Belfast Bloody Sunday bombs Britain British cabinet Callaghan campaign Carrington Catholic Chichester-Clark civil coalition concessions conflict Conservative constitutional cooperation Craig devolved direct rule Dublin elected representatives electoral Faulkner February Fianna Fáil Gerry Fitt hard-liners Heath Home Office Ian Paisley internment Irish dimension Irish government Irish unification issues January July Labour Party leaders London loyalist Lynch March Maudling meeting Memoirs ment military minority moderate Nationalist Nationalist Ireland negotiations NILP Northern Ireland officials Operation Banner operations options Paisley paramilitary percent policymakers political initiative power sharing PREM pressure problem proposals Protestant Provisionals reform republican responsibility SDLP secretary security forces senior settlement Sinn Féin soldiers solution Stormont strategy Sunningdale taoiseach tion UK ministers UKREP Ulster unification union Unionist government Unionist Party united Ireland violence vote Westminster white paper Whitehall Whitelaw Wilson