fore, resolved by a conference, to endeavour to come to some composition for mutual benefit. The body of the aristocratical party still refused all confidence to their opponents: but some, both of those who had, and of those who had not, taken refuge in the temples, less fearful, consented to serve in the fleet; and thirty triremes were manned with mixed crews, those of the aristocratical party being distributed so as best to obviate danger from their disaffection. Alcidas however attempted no attack: about noon he reembarked his ravaging troops, and returned to his harbour of Sybota, where, in the evening, he received intelligence by fire-signals that a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of war was approaching. Immediately he got under way; and hastening his course close under shore as far as Leucadia, would not double the cape of that peninsula, but dragged his galleys across the isthmus, and so passed undiscovered to Peloponnesus. No sooner were the Corcyræan people assured of the approach of the Athenian fleet and the flight of the Peloponnesian, than every dark passion mixed itself with the joy which instantly superseded their fears; and measures were deliberately taken for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. The Messenians, hitherto encamped without, to oppose the foreign enemy, were now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then directed to pass from the town port to the Hyllaïc port. In the way all of the aristocratical party among the crews were thrown overboard, and in the same instant massacre began in the city. The suppliants in the temple of Juno only remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evils from the vengeance of the gods for affronts to themselves, while no apprehension was entertained for the grossest violation of every moral duty. The fear of starving, nevertheless, induced about fifty of them, on the persuasion of their opponents, to quit their situation and submit to a trial. They were all summarily condemned and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair: some killed one another within the temple; some hanged themselves on the trees of the adjoining sacred grove; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their wretchedness. In the city and through the island the scene of murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days the democratical party continued hunting out their opponents, and massacring wherever they could find them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of Bacchus. Superstitious fear prevented any direct violence there, but a wall was built around the temple, and they were starved to death. Nor was difference of political principles and political connexions the only criterion of capital offence. The opportunities opened by the tumult for private revenge, or private avarice, were in many instances used. Debtors cancelled their debts by the murder of their creditors; the nearest relations fell by each other's hands; audaciousness in crime went so far that some were forced from the temples to be murdered, and some even murdered in them; and every enormity usual in seditions was practised, says the his torian, and even more. The Athenian admiral, Eurymedon son of Thucles, lay in the harbour with his powerful fleet, the quiet and apparently approving spectator of these disgraceful transactions: and not till the democratical Corcyræans had carried revenge to the utmost sailed away. The impolicy of his conduct seems to have been equal to the inhumanity of it. Nicostratus interfering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The licence which Eurymedon gave to massacre all who were supposed adverse to the Athenian interest had a very different effect. About five hundred had escaped, some aboard the triremes which had deserted to the Peloponnesians, some on other occasions. They took possession of some forts and lands which had belonged to the Corcyræan people, on the continent opposite to their island; and thence, with all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst of plunder, and the desire of recovering their ancient possessions, united could excite, they carried on hostilities against Corcyra; seizing ships, making descents on the coasts, living by depredation, and wasting whatever they could not carry off. After this experience of the weakness of their adversaries, they determined to attempt the recovery of the island; and having in vain solicited assistance from the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, who would no more risk their fleet against the naval force of Athens, with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number only six hundred, they debarked on Corcyra. The conduct of these undoubtedly brave but apparently illjudging men, misled by passion, remarkably supports an observation which Strabo, who lived in an age to see and to advert at leisure to the consequences, has made upon the conduct and character of his fellow 2 Thucydides, in his manner of marking the different characters and different merits of the two Athenian commanders, offers an admirable model for writers of cotemporary history. Without any offensive remark, merely stating facts in the simplest manner, he gives the reader fully to discover which deserved the highest praise, and which disgraced himself and his country. Nicostratus, arriving in the very height of the sedition, with only a small force, with which he had soon to cope with a very superior enemy, interfered as a generous mediator, and so efficaciously as to prevent all outrage. Eurymedon came commanding a fleet of sixty ships of war, a force that deterred opposition; he stayed seven days, during which all the enormities were committed, and he went away: this is absolutely all that the historian says of Eurymedon: but that so short a tale, with so few circumstances marked, might not escape the reader's notice, with a slight variation of words he repeats it. countrymen. The warmth of temper which perpetually engaged their whole souls in party disputes and petty quarrels, disabled them for great objects; insomuch that they were continually employing, for mutual destruction, abilities and courage, which, with more political union, might have enabled them to defend their independency for ever against Rome and against the world. The aristocratical Corcyræans, had they directed their views to their establishment on the soil where they had found refuge, might probably have raised a powerful city there. But passion, to an extraordinary degree, still directed their measures. Immediately on landing in Corcyra, determined to maintain themselves or to die there, they burnt those vessels by which they had hitherto been successful and even powerful. They then occupied and fortified mount Istonë, which was certainly a prudent step; and, from that commanding post issuing as opportunity offered, they compelled their adversaries to confinement within their walls, and themselves commanded the country. The calamities which followed, being connected with Athenian history, we shall see hereafter. SECTION IX. An Athenian Squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. End of the Pestilence at Athens. Sixth Year of the War: Operations of the Athenians, under Nicias on the Eastern Side of Greece, and under Demosthenes in the West: Defeat of Demosthenes near Ægitium: A Peloponesian Army sent into the Western Provinces; Ozolian Locris acquired to the Peloponnesian Confederacy: Demosthenes elected General of the Acarnanians; Battle of Olpæ; Battle of Idomenë: Important Successes of Demosthenes: Peace between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots. THE Sicilian Greeks, mostly well disposed to the Peloponnesians, and engaged in alliance with them, B. C. 427. P. W. 5. but distracted by a variety of political interests within their island, had given no assistance in operation. War had now broken out among themselves; and toward the end of summer, after the return of Eurymedon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a squadron of twenty ships, under Laches son of Melanopus, to assist the Leontines, an Ionian people, against the Syracusans, who were of Dorian race. The consequences did not become immediately very important; and it may be most convenient to defer all farther account of Sicilian affairs till the period when Sicily became the principal scene of military operation. In the beginning of the ensuing winter, the pestilence again broke out in Athens. It had never yet entirely ceased, though after the two first years there had been a remission: but in the renewal of its fury it seems to have worn itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole course it carried off not less than four thousand four hundred of those Athenians in the prime of life who were enrolled among the heavy-armed, and three hundred men of the higher rank who served in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons who perished by it, no means existed for ascertaining the number. Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive the friend of his youth, whom in old age he was destined to oppose in arms, the illustrious citizen, who with more than regal sway had directed the affairs of the Athenian democracy. Pericles died about the beginning of the third campaign of the war. Archidamus commanded the invasion of Attica in the spring of the fourth year; and it is the last occasion upon which the cotemporary historian mentions him. The invasion in the fifth year was commanded by Cleomenes, regent for the minor |