The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life
Oxford University Press, 3 בינו׳ 2002 - 560 עמודים
This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual killed is uncertain. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.
מה אומרים אנשים - כתיבת ביקורת
לא מצאנו ביקורות במקומות הרגילים
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
accept Account of Egoistic Alzheimer’s disease anencephalic animals argument badness of death become a person begin to exist believe biological brain death brainstem capacity for consciousness cause ceases to exist cerebral deficits cerebral hemispheres child chimpanzee claim cognitive comparable continuing to live dementia deprogramming developed fetus dicephalus earlier egoistic concern euthanasia evaluation example fetus’s function future harm human organism hylomorphic impersonal implies individual individual’s infanticide Innocent interest in continuing intrinsic potential intuitions involving loss matter maximum life span misfortune moral significance moral status Nonresponsible Threat Norm Account normal one’s Parfit Patient permissible person’s personal identity plausible possible potential to become pregnant woman Progeria prudential unity relations Psychological Account psychological capacities psychological connections psychological continuity rational relevant respect response sanctity seems self-defense sense severely retarded human soul species suffering suicide suppose things being equal Time-Relative Interest Account transplantation victim well-being worse worth living wrongness of killing zygote
עמוד 10 - For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and shape are excluded.