The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, כרך 1Nicolai J. Foss Taylor & Francis, 2000 - 1589 עמודים Firms have for a long time been part of the explanatory set-up of economics. However, it is only recently that economists have felt the need for an economic theory addressing: why firms are different; why firms exist; what determines their boundaries relative to "the market"; and what determines their internal organization. This collection documents the rise of the modern theory of the firm during the last two to three decades. It reprints classic writings from a diversity of perspectives, including not only contractual theories of the firm, but also knowledge-based theories and theories of the firm as an information processor. In addition, the collection features perspectives from business strategy and business history as well as methodological and doctrinal historical perspectives. |
תוכן
M | xi |
Transactioncost economics in real time 1992 167 | xiii |
Formal and real authority in organizations 1997 210 | xvi |
The firm as an information processor | xxiii |
Common knowledge and the coordination of economic | xlv |
Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm 1982 217 | xlvii |
The firm as a communication network 1994 294 | lvi |
The function of authority in transaction cost economics 1987 399 | lvii |
The theory of the firm revisited 1993 102 | 82 |
The history of the theory of the firm from Marshall to Robinson | 101 |
past present and future 1988 | 115 |
knowledge versus | 123 |
Vertical integration appropriable rents and the competitive | 128 |
An economists perspective on the theory of the firm 1989 | 130 |
the Fisher | 143 |
The theory of the firm 1989 | 148 |
Organisational capabilities and interfirm relations 1994 288 | lix |
The theory of the firm in the last ten years 1942 | 3 |
Some basic problems in the theory of the firm 1952 | 14 |
The organisation of industry 1972 | 15 |
Why do firms differ and how does it matter? 1991 39 | 39 |
marginalist behavioral managerial 1967 | 49 |
how do they | 59 |
theory and evidence 1994 | 74 |
the role | 81 |
Corporate culture and economic theory 1990 168 | 215 |
Production information costs and economic organization 1972 | 223 |
managerial behavior agency costs | 248 |
Agency problems and the theory of the firm 1980 | 307 |
The contractual nature of the firm 1983 | 325 |
Agency problems and residual claims 1983 | 345 |
The old firm and the new organization 1997 | 367 |
Specific and general knowledge and organizational structure 1992 | 387 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management <span dir=ltr>Nicolai J Foss</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2000 |
The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management <span dir=ltr>Nicolai J. Foss</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2000 |
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
action activities agency costs agents Alchian and Demsetz allocation American Economic Review analysis argue assets assumption authority behavior bounded rationality capital Coase Coase's competition concept contributions corporation debt decision Econ economic organization Economic Theory economists effects efficient employee enterprise entrepreneur equilibrium firm equity ex post example expected explain factor financing firm's Fisher function Harold Demsetz Hart Holmström implies important incomplete contracts increase indifference curves individual industry influence inputs interest investment issues Jean Tirole Jensen Journal of Economics labor managerial marginal product Milgrom monitoring moral hazard neoclassical nexus of contracts oligopoly optimal organizational output owners ownership paper peak coordinator perfect competition performance profit maximization property rights relationship representative firm residual claimants residual claims risk role specific stockholders strategy structure tion transaction cost economics transaction costs value premises wage wealth Williamson workers