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the fum due, with a juftice of the peace, who fhould give notice of it in the public papers; and if the creditor did not appear and receive the money within fix months from the firft notice, his debt fhould be forfeited. This act aftonifhed all honeft men; and even the promoters of paper-moneymaking in other ftates, and on other principles, reprobated this act of Rhode-Ifland, as wicked and oppreffive. But the ftate was governed by faction. During the cry for paper money, a number of boisterous ignorant men were elected into the legislature, from the smaller towns in the ftate. Finding themselves united with a majority in opinion, they formed and executed any plan their inclination fuggefted; they oppofed every measure that was agreeable to the mercantile intereft; they not only made bad laws to fuit their own wicked purposes, but appointed their own corrupt creatures to fill the judicial and executive departments: Their money depreciated fufficiently to answer all their vile purposes in the difcharge of debts-business almost totally ceased, all confidence was loft, the ftate was thrown into confufion at home, and was execrated abroad.

Maffachusetts Bay had the good fortune, amidst her political calamities, to prevent an emiffion of bills of credit. New Hampshire made no paper; but in the diftreffes which followed her lofs of bufinefs after the war, the legislature made horses, lumber, and moft articles of produce a legal tender in the fulfilment of contracts. It is doubtlefs unjust to oblige a creditor to receive any thing for his debt, which he had not in contemplation at the time of the contract. But as the commodities which were to be a tender by the law of New Hampshire, were of an intrinsic value, bearing fome proportion to the amount of the debt, the injuftice of the law was lefs flagrant, than that which enforced the tender of paper in Rhode-Ifland. Indeed a fimilar law prevailed for fome time in Maffachusetts; and in Connecticut it is a ftanding law that a creditor fhall take land on an execution, at a price to be fixed by three indifferent freeholders; provided other means of payment fhall appear to fatisfy the demand. In a ftate that has but little foreign commerce, and but little money in circulation, fuch a law may not only be tolerable; but, if people are fatisfied with it, may produce good effects. It must not however be omitted, that while the most flourishing commercial states introduced a paper medium, to the great injury of honeft men, a bill for an emiffion of paper in Connecticut, where there is very little specie, could never command more than one-eighth of the votes of the legislature. The movers of the bill have hardly escaped ridicule; fo generally is the meafure reprobated as a fource of frauds and public mifchief.

The legislature of New-York, a ftate that had the leaft neceffity and apology for making paper money, as her commercial advantages always furnish her with fpecie fufficient for a medium, iffued a large fum in bills of credit, which support their value better than the currency of any other ftate. Still the paper has raised the value of fpecie, which is always in demand for exportation, and this difference of exchange between paper and fpecie, exposes commerce to most of the inconveniences refulting from a depreciated medium.

Such is the hiftory of paper money thus far; a miferable substitute for real coin, in a country where the reins of government are too weak to

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compel the fulfilment of public engagements; and where all confidence in public faith is totally deftroyed.

While the ftates were thus endeavouring to repair the lofs of fpecie by empty promifes, and to fupport their bufinefs by fhadows, rather than by reality, the British miniftry formed fome commercial regulations that deprived them of the profits of their trade to the Weft-Indies and to GreatBritain. Heavy duties were laid upon fuch articles as were remitted to the London merchants for their goods, and fuch were the duties upon American bottoms, that the states were almost wholly deprived of the carrying trade. A prohibition, as has been mentioned, was laid upon the produce of the United States, shipped to the English West India Islands in American built veffels, and in those manned by American feamen. These reftrictions fell heavy upon the eastern states, which depended much upon shipbuilding for the fupport of their trade; and they materially injured the bufinefs of the other ftates.

Without a union that was able to form and execute a general fyftem of commercial regulations, fome of the states attempted to impose restraints upon the British trade that should indemnify the merchant for the loffes he had fuffered, or induce the British miniftry to enter into a commercial treaty and relax the rigor of their navigation laws. These measures however produced nothing but mifchief. The ftates did not act in concert, and the restraints faid on the trade of one ftate operated to throw the business into the hands of its neighbour. Maffachusetts, in her zeal to counteract the effect of the English navigation laws, laid enormons duties upon British goods imported into that flate; but the other ftates did not adopt a fimilar measure; and the lofs of business foon obliged that ftate to repeal or fufpend the law. Thus when Pennsylvania laid heavy duties on British goods, Delaware and New-Jersey made a number of free ports to encourage the landing of goods within the limits of those states; and the duties in Pennfylvania ferved no purpose, but to create smuggling.

Thus divided, the ftates began to feel their weaknefs. Moft of the legislatures had neglected to comply with the requifitions of Congrefs for furnishing the federal of treasury; the refolves of Congrefs were difregarded; the propofition for a general impoft to be laid and collected by Congrefs was negatived firft by Rhode-Ifland, and afterwards by New-York. The British troops continued, under pretence of a breach of treaty on the part of America, to hold poffeffion of the forts on the frontiers of the itates, and thus commanded the fur-trade. Many of the ftates individually were infefted with popular commotions or iniquitous tender laws, while they were oppreffed with public debts; the certificates or public notes had loft most of their value, and circulated merely as the objects of fpeculation; Congrefs loft their refpectability, and the United States their credit and importance.

In the midst of thefe calamities, a propofition was made in 1785, in the houfe of delegates in Virginia, to appoint commiffioners, to meet such as might be appointed in the other states, who fhould form a system of commercial regulations for the United States, and recommend it to the feveral legiflatures for adoption. Commiffioners were accordingly appointed, and a requeft was made to the legislatures of the other states to accede to the propofition. Accordingly feveral of the states appointed commiffioners who met at Annapolis in the fummer of 1786, to confult what mea

fures

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fures fhould be taken to unite the states in fome general and efficient commercial fyftem. But as the ftates were not all represented, and the of the commiffioners were, in their opinion, too limited to propose a system of regulations adequate to the purposes of government, they agreed to recommend a general convention to be held at Philadelphia the next year, with powers to frame a general plan of government for the United States. This measure appeared to the commiffioners abfolutely neceffary. The old confederation was effentially defective. It was deftitute of almost every principle neceffary to give effect to legislation.

It was defective in the article of legislating over ftates, instead of individuals. All history teftifies that recommendations will not operate as laws, and compulfion cannot be exercised over ftates, without violence, war, and anarchy. The confederation was also deftitute of a fanction to its laws. When refolutions were paffed in Congrefs, there was no power to compel obedience by fine, by fufpenfion of privileges, or other means. It was also deftitute of a guarantee for the state governments. Had one ftate been invaded by its neighbour, the union was not conftitutionally bound to affift in repelling the invafion, and fupporting the conftitution of the invaded state. The confederation was further deficient in the principle of apportioning the quotas of money to be furnished by each flate; in a want of power to form commercial laws, and to raife troops for the defence and fecurity of the union; in the equal fuffrage of the ftates, which placed Rhode-Ifland on a footing in Congrefs with Virginia; and to crown all the defects, we may add the want of a judiciary power, to define the laws of the union, and to reconcile the contradictory decifions of a number of independent judicatories.

Thefe and many inferior defects were obvious to the commiffioners, and therefore they urged a general convention, with powers to form and offer to the confideration of the ftates, a fyftem of general government that should be lefs exceptionable. Accordingly in May, 1787, delegates from all the states, except Rhode-Ifland, affembled at Philadelphia; and chofe General Washington for their prefident. After four months deliberation, in which the clashing interefts of several states appeared in all their full force, the convention agreed to recommend the plan of federal government which we have already recited.

As foon as the plan of the federal constitution was fubmitted to the legiflatures of the feveral states, they proceeded to take measures for collecting the fenfe of the people upon the propriety of adopting it. In the fmall ftate of Delaware, a convention was called in November, which after a few days deliberation, ratified the conftitution, without a diffenting voice.

In the convention of Pennsylvania, held the fame month, there was a fpirited oppofition to the new form of government. The debates were long and interesting. Great abilities and firmness were displayed on both fides; but, on the 13th of December, the conftitution was received by two-thirds of the members. The minority were diffatisfied, and with an obftinacy that ill became the reprefentatives of a free people, published their reasons of diffent, which were calculated to inflame a party already violent, and which, in fact, produced fome disturbances in the western parts of the ftate. But the oppofition has fince gradually fubfided.

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In New-Jersey, the convention which met in December were unanimous in adopting the conftitution; as was likewise that of Georgia.

In Connecticut there was fome oppofition; but the conftitution was, on the 9th of January, 1788, ratified by three-fourths of the votes in convention, and the minority peaceably acquiefced in the decision.

In Massachusetts, the oppofition was large and respectable. The con vention, confifting of more than three hundred delegates, were assembled in January, and continued their debates, with great candor and liberality, about five weeks. At length the question was carried for the conftitution by a small majority, and the minority, with that manly condefcenfion which becomes great minds, fubmitted to the measure, and united to support the government.

In New-Hampshire, the federal cause was, for fome time, doubtful. The greatest number of the delegates in convention were at first on the fide of the oppofition; and some, who might have had their objections removed by the difcuffion of the subject, inftructed to reject the conftitution. Although the inftructions of constituents cannot, on the true principles of reprefentation, be binding upon a deputy, in any legislative affembly, because his constituents are but a part of the ftate, and have not heard the arguments and objections of the whole, whereas his act is to affect the whole state, and therefore is to be directed by the sense or wisdom of the whole, collected in the legislative assembly; yet the delegates in the New-Hampshire convention conceived, very erroneously, that the sense of the freemen in the towns, those little districts where no act of legislation can be performed, impofed a restraint upon their own wills*. An adjournment was therefore moved and carried. This gave the people an opportunity to gain a farther knowledge of the merits of the conftitution, and at the fecond meeting of the convention, it was ratified by a respectable majority.

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In Maryland, several men of abilities appeared in the oppofition, and were unremitted in their endeavours to perfuade the people, that the pofed plan of government was artfully calculated to deprive them of their deareft rights; yet in convention it appeared that five-fixths of the voices were in favour of it.

In South-Carolina, the oppofition was refpectable; but two-thirds of the convention appeared to advocate and vote for the conftitution.

In Virginia, many of the principal characters opposed the ratification of the conftitution with great abilities and industry. But after a full difcuffion of the subject, a small majority, of a numerous convention, appeared for its adoption.

In New-York, two-thirds of the delegates in convention were, at their first meeting, determined to reject the conftitution. Here therefore the debates were the most interesting, and the event extremely doubtful. The argument was managed with uncommon addrefs and abilities on both fides of the queftion. But during the feffion, the ninth and tenth states had acceded to the propofed plan, fo that by the conftitution, Congress were empowered to iffue an ordinance for organizing the new government. This event placed the oppofition on new ground; and the expediency of

* This pernicious opinion has prevailed in all the ftates, and done infinite mifchief.

uniting

uniting with the other ftates-the generous motives of conciliating all differences, and the danger of a rejection, influenced a refpectable number, who were originally oppofed to the conftitution, to join the federal interest. The conftitution was accordingly ratified by a small majority; but the ratification was accompanied here, as in Virginia, with a bill of rights, declaratory of the fenfe of the convention, as to certain great principles, and with a catalogue of amendments, which were to be recommended to the confideration of the new congress, and the several state legislatures.

North Carolina met in convention in July, to deliberate on the new conftitution. After a fhort feffion they rejected it, by a majority of one hundred and feventy-fix against seventy-fix. This is the firft ftate that has, in a formal manner, rejected the conftitution. Upon what principle they did it, it is difficult to tell, and delicate to conjecture. The miseries that will probably arise from their feparation from the union, and their internal divifions, may eventually occafion a reconfideration. It is certain that their rejection of the new plan of government, will have no effect in impeding its organization and establishment between the ratifying ftates.

Rhode-Island was doomed to be the sport of a blind and fingular policy. The legislature, in confiftency with the measures which had been before purfued, did not call a convention, to collect the sense of the state upon the propofed conftitution; but in an unconftitutional and abfurd manner, fubmitted the plan of government to the confideration of the people. Accordingly it was brought before town-meetings, and in moft of them rejected. In fome of the large towns, particularly in Newport and Providence, the people collected and refolved, with great propriety, that they could not take up the subject; and that the propofition for embracing or rejecting the federal conftitution, could come before no tribunal but that of the State in convention or legislature.

It is hoped that the very refpectable minority, who have ever ftrenuously oppofed the proceedings of the infatuated majority, will, by their prudent and persevering exertions, effect the falvation of the state. NewYork rejected the proceedings of the firft Congrefs, and Georgia refused to fend delegates; yet in two years after they were both among the foremoft in fupporting our independence. In two years North-Carolina and Rhode-Ifland may be as warmly engaged in fupporting, as they are now in oppofing the conftitution. If we may judge from their prefent fituations, they have more need of an efficient government than any ftate in the union.

From the moment the proceedings of the general convention at Philadelphia tranfpired, the public mind was exceedingly agitated, and fufpended between hope and fear, until nine ftates had ratified their plan of a federal government. Indeed the anxiety continued until Virginia and New-York had acceded to the fyftem. But this did not prevent the demonftrations of their joy, on the acceffion of each state.

On the ratification in Maffachusetts, the citizens of Boston, in the elevation of their joy, formed a proceffion in honour of the happy event, which was novel, fplendid and magnificent. This example was afterwards followed, and in fome inftances improved upon, in Baltimore. Charleston,

Philadelphia,

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