Mr. Milner has so hastily charged Justin with pelagianising.

Precepts of charity would vainly be given to man, unless he possessed Freedom of Will*.

We must, in no wise, suppose Free Will to be taken away, because we read in Scripture: It is God, that worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure †.

God, in Scripture, has plainly revealed to us, that Man possesses Free Will: for the divine precepts would be nugatory, unless man possessed Freedom of Will; so that, by performing the divine precepts, he might attain to the promised rewards+.

We must acknowledge, that we possess Free Will to do both good and evil: but, in doing evil, each person is free from righteousness and is the servant of sin; while, in doing good, no person

* Hæc ergo præcepta charitatis inaniter darentur hominibus, non habentibus liberum arbitrium. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 18. Oper. vol. vii. p. 466.

+ Non enim, quia dixit; Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate: ideo liberum arbitrium abstulisse putandus est. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 9. Oper. vol. vii. p. 463.

Revelavit autem nobis, per Scripturas suas sanctas, esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium :-quia ipsa divina præcepta homini non prodessent, nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quo ea faciens ad promissa præmia perveniret. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 2. Oper. vol. vii. p. 459.

can be free, unless he shall have been freed by him who said, If the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed *.

God created us possessed of Free Will; nor are we, by any Fatal Necessity, drawn either to virtue or to vice: for, where there is Fatal Necessity, there is no crown t.

III. The key to the whole matter, in short, is simply this.

Like many other persons, Mr. Milner has not sufficiently distinguished, between The Free Will of Spontaneous Mental Preference, and The Good Will of freely preferring Virtue to Vice.

By the ancients, on the contrary, who were frequently called upon to oppose the mischievous impiety of Fatalism while yet they stood pledged to maintain the vital doctrine of Divine Grace,

* Liberum itaque arbitrium, et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum, confitendum est nos habere: sed, in malo faciendo, liber est quisque justitiæ servusque peccati; in bono autem, liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab eo qui dixit, Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc verè liberi eritis. August. de Corrept. et Grat. c. 1. Oper. vol. vii. p. 471.

+ Item quod ait a memorato dictum esse presbytero (scil. Hieronymo); Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutem nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin, ubi necessitas, nec corona est: quis non agnoscat? Quis non toto corde suscipiat? Quis aliter conditam humanam neget esse naturam? Sed, in rectè faciendo, ideo nullum est vinculum necessitatis, quia libertas est charitatis. August. de Nat. et Grat. cont. Pelag. c. 65. Oper. vol. vii. p. 289.

this distinction was well known and carefully observed.

The Manichèans so denied Free Will, as to hold a Fatal Necessity of sinning, whether the Choice of the individual did or did not go along with the action *.

The Pelagians so held Free Will, as to deny the Need of Divine Grace to make that Free Will a Good Will t.

By the Catholics, each of these Systems was alike rejected. They held, that Man possesses Free Will: for, otherwise, he could not be an accountable subject of God's moral government. But they also held, that, In consequence of the fall, his Free

* Dicunt illi Manichæi: quia, primi hominis peccato, id est, Adæ, liberum arbitrium perierit; et nemo jam potestatem habeat bene vivendi, sed omnes in peccatum carnis suæ necessitate cogantur. Julian. Pelag. apud August. cont. Duas Epist. Pelag. lib. iv. c. 2. Oper. vol. vii. p. 400.

Οὐκ ἐχρῆν οὖν τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον πρὸς τὸ καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς μέγιστον κακὸν ἔχοντα τὸν λόγον, πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους μέγιστον κακὸν ἀποτείνεσθαι· ἀγνοίας γὰρ τοῦτο σημεῖον, καὶ ἀπορίας ἐλέγχου, καθὰ εἴρηται. Συγχωρεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς πράττειν ἃ ἑκουσίως αἱρούμεθα κακά, οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀλλ ̓ ἵνα τὸ ἡμῶν αὐθαίρετον, καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ μακρόθυμον, δειχθῇ· ὧν χωρὶς, οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωποι, οὔτε αὐτὸς, ἀγαθὸς ἐνεδέχετο εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς παρούσης καταστάσεως. Quæst. et Respons. ad Græc. in Justin. Oper. p. 127.

+ Sunt enim quidam tantum præsumentes de libero humanæ voluntatis arbitrio, ut, ad non peccandum, nec adjuvandos nos divinitus opinentur, semel ipsi naturæ nostræ concesso liberæ voluntatis arbitrio. August. de Peccat. Merit. et Remiss. lib. ii. c. 2. Oper. vol. vii. p. 263.

Will was a Bad Will: whence, with a perfect conscious freedom of Choice or Preference, and without any violence put upon his Inclination, he, perpetually, though quite spontaneously, prefers unholiness to holiness; and thus requires the aid of Divine Grace to make his Bad Will a Good Will.

1. To this purpose, again and again, speaks Augustine and, to this same purpose, Cyril of Jerusalem and Athanasius and Cyprian and Tertullian and Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch had similarly spoken before him.

(1.) Let us hear Augustine.

To live well and to act well, there is in man a freedom of will: but there are also divine testimonies, that, without the Grace of God, we can do no good thing *.

Free Will is always in us: but Good Will is not always in us. For either the will is free from righteousness, when it serves sin and then it is bad. Or it is free from sin, when it serves righteousness and then it is good t.

:

* Sicut superioribus testimoniis Scripturarum probavimus sanctarum, ad bene vivendum et rectè agendum esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium: sic etiam, de gratia Dei, sine qua nihil boni agere possumus, quæ sint divina testimonia, videamus. -Dictum est libero arbitrio; Fili, noli deficere a disciplina Domini: et Dominus dicit; Ego rogavi pro te, Petre, ne deficiat fides tua. Homo, ergo, gratia juvatur; ne, sine causa, voluntati ejus jubeatur. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 4. Oper. vol. vii. p. 460, 461.

+ Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper

We certainly may, if we will, keep God's commandments: but, because the preparation of the will is from the Lord, we must beg of him, that we may will so much as suffices us to do by willing. Assuredly, we will, when we will: but he causes, that we should will what is good*.

The human will is not taken away by the Grace of God; but it is changed from a Bad Will into a Good Will: and, when it has become a Good Will, it is assisted t.

(2.) Let us hear Cyril of Jerusalem.

Our Self-determining Free Will is evil, though it acts by a Free Choice: for, when we sin, it is by a deliberate a deliberate Preference of evil to good. The Creator is holy but the creature,

est bona. Aut enim a justitia libera est, quando servit peccato; et tunc est mala: aut a peccato libera est, quando servit justitiæ; et tunc est bona. Gratia vero Dei semper est bona: et per hanc fit, ut sit homo bonæ voluntatis, qui prius fuit voluntatis malæ. Per hanc etiam fit, ut ipsa bona voluntas, quæ jam esse cœpit, augeatur, et tam magna fiat, ut possit implere divina mandata quæ voluerit, cum valdè perfectèque voluerit. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 15. Oper. vol. vii. p. 464.

* Certum est enim nos mandata servare, si volumus: sed, quia præparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus. Certum est, nos velle cum volumus: sed ille facit, ut velimus bonum. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 16. Oper. vol. vii. p. 465.

+ Gratiam Dei,-qua voluntas humana non tollitur, sed ex mala mutatur in bonam; et, cum bona fuerit, adjuvatur. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 20. Oper. vol. vii. p. 466.