unaccountably strange. Since that time, however, we have become so familiar with similar misrepresentations, made in the face of notorious facts, that we can no longer denominate them strange-they at present neither surprise nor move us much. The Editor of the Christian Advocate, from the earliest period of his ministerial life to the present hour, has been the decided and earnest friend of revivals of religion in conversation, in preaching, and in most of the publications which he has given to the world: and he has the pleasure to say, that among all the brethren with whom he harmoniously acts in ecclesiastical courts, or in the common service of the sanctuary, he knows not an individual who is not, as far as can be known by speech and action, a real friend to religious revivals. Yet the whole of the Old School Presbyterians have been represented as hostile to these glorious displays of divine power and mercy. The design is evident-the destruction of their character and influence among the friends of vital piety.

It is indeed true, that many of the Old School Presbyterians, and the writer among the number, are deliberately, and we believe irreconcilably opposed, to certain new measures, as they have sometimes been called, for getting up, promoting, and conducting revivals. But this opposition is wholly directed against the unscriptural extravagances which were pointedly condemned by Edwards and Dickenson, in the great and general revival which took place in their day; and more recently condemned, and more pointedly too, in a very able paper, of which Dr. Beecher of Boston was the reputed author, and which was directed against some of the new measures of Mr. Finney, Dr. Beeman, and their associates. It was exceedingly well shown in that paper, that the wild doings condemned, were so far from being friendly to

genuine revivals of religion, that they were calculated to injure, arrest, and bring them altogether into disrepute. We have been greatly gratified in seeing this subject treated with ability and just discrimination, in the last number of the Biblical Repertory, which we earnestly recommend to the careful and candid perusal of all our readers.

In closing this long paper, we shall remark for a moment on an idea thrown out in the last General Assembly, which we then imputed to excitement, but which we have since found is cherished, by some at least of the New School party. It is, that the present Board of Missions is not the Board of the General Assembly, because the Assembly continued it as a matter of compromise. What is a compromise? Johnson says it is "a compact or bargain, in which some concessions are made on each side." And is not a compact or bargain binding, both in law and conscience, when, in forming it, concessions are made on each side? We should suppose that no man, who wished to preserve his character for understanding, would say no. Yet this is in effect said, by those who hold the language on which we remark. A better description could scarcely be given of what was done in the Assembly in relation to the Board of Missions, than is given by Johnson in his definition of a compromise. Shortly after the Assembly rose, we asked a member of a state legislature, a good deal versed in law making, whether laws were not sometimes made by compromise? He replied, that a great part of them were made in that, and in no other way. And every American citizen, who knows the history of the Federal Constitution under which he lives, knows that it was formed by compromise, and never could have been formed but on such a principle; and that this was distinctly intimated in the circular letter of President Washington, in

which a copy of the instrument was transmitted to the executive of the several states. Yet the Board of Missions is not the Board of the Assembly, because it was continued by compromise! It is surely not necessary farther to expose this monstrous absurdity.

MENTAL SCIENCE.

Doctrine of Freedom.

There are few facts more certainly ascertained than man's free agency, and yet few things have been subject to greater diversity of speculation. We have not time now, nor will the limits of the pages allotted to this discussion permit us, to review the speculations and theories of man's freedom, which have occupied the schoolmen, and perplexed philosophers. Nor is it necessary to our present purpose, that we should encumber our discussion with the statement and refutation of errors, which serve only to perplex the subject. A simple exposition and plain illustration of the true doctrine, will be entirely sufficient for our purpose.

Let the question first be answered, what is freedom? The abstract notion of liberty is, the absence of all restraint from action, external, or internal. But the thought is modified by the relations, or subjects, to which it is applied. Political freedom does not imply the absence of law and government, which are intended to operate as a salutary restraint. The absence of all the restraints of law and government would be political licentiousness, undesirable and disastrous to man's best interests and happiness. With this liberty we have no concern at present, any further than to distinguish it from the subject of present discussion. Nor do we intend to discuss the franchises, immunities, or privileges of

political, social, or religious freedom. What we have in view, is personal liberty, which belongs to every rational man, in all his external actions, and in all the volitions of his mind.

Every man, having the faculties of understanding, heart and will, underanged, possesses two kinds of liberty or freedom. One relates to external action, the other to the mind alone.

External liberty, when examined inductively, will be found to consist in an unbroken connexion between choice and external action. We have already seen that one important use of the will, is to move and direct bodily action. Whenever those actions are unrestrained and so directed, they are free, because there is a connexion between the choice and the action. This kind of liberty may be partially or wholJy obstructed. The slave has this connexion often broken by force. It is true that many of his actions are free-entirely the result of choice, but others are the result of constraint. The violence done to the freedom of external action in the case of the slave, rather respects some privileges and immunities, than the connexion between the actions which he does perform, and the choice of his mind. The child also has his external liberty interrupted by force. He chooses to do many things, and to obtain many things, which the watchful parent prevents in various ways. Men often have this external liberty obstructed-sickness, palsy, a broken limb, and external force, may break the connexion between volition and choice. But it is of less importance to discuss this kind of liberty, than that which belongs to the mind. There is no difficulty in understanding, and accurately defining, external freedom. Every man of common observation can tell what it is; and although he may not be able to give the shortest or most technical definition of it, he

will make out an intelligent description of its exercise, and point you to that in which it consists. Every man can tell when it is obstructed, and it would be strange if he could give no account of that which suffers obstruction.

Mental liberty, or as it is sometimes called, moral freedom, is more difficult to define, and vastly more important to be described. It requires a careful examination of mental exercises, their connexion, relations and laws, in order to understand definitely and clearly what mental freedom is. Without lingering here to write the process of discovery, which is inductive, we state the result in brief and plain terms.

Mental, or moral freedom, consists in a connexion between the pleasure of the heart and the choice of the will. Or if any person should object to the distinction of faculties implied in this statement, we say the mind chooses just as is most agreeable to itself, which in our view implies the same thing-a connexion between pleasure and choice. This is freedom, and noth ing else can be mental liberty. It is the highest kind of freedom conceivable, and the only kind of freedom desirable for the mind. Indeed the whole is implied in the single term choice. The mind always chooses just as is most agree able, and in no other way-nothing else is choice. If it were conceived that men had liberty to choose for the sake of pain, they never would use it, nor is such a supposition possible; it is not choice, nor freedom. It is however true, that men sometimes choose objects which are disagreeable, and even painful; but always do this for the sake of something which is agreeable: so that in all those cases the connexion subsists between the pleasure and the choice. This statement involves the doctrine of ultimate and subordinate objects of choice, which we have discussed in a former ar

ticle. In the same article, we think the doctrine of motive, there settled, shows conclusively that pleasure always governs the choice.

It has been supposed by some, that moral freedom includes an independence of the will, and a control over the temper, or disposition of the heart. The doctrine of selfdetermination belonging to the will, was once a popular doctrine, and it bids fair to become so again, although it has been so often and so ably refuted. Its refutation is exceedingly simple, plain and conclusive.

The operations of mind, in a connected order, may be thus briefly stated; perception, feeling, choice. The first operation, is perceiving the object, the next is feeling pleased or displeased with it, and the result is choice, or refusal of the object. This is substantially the analysis of mental process in choice. We appeal to every man, who can hold his mind fixed to the examination of his own mental process, for the correctness of this statement. Now if this be so, where is the self-determination of the will? It is out of the question altogether; it is not possible that moral freedom should involve such an independence of will. But if there be no such selfdetermination of the will, it can exercise no control over the temper of the heart.

It has been denied by some, that men are free moral agents, and there has been much philosophical speculation on the subject. But one single argument sets aside all the philosophy which has denied, and mocks at the speculations, which would deprive man of his mental freedom. It is an argument founded upon consciousness. Every man is conscious of choosing as he pleases, or in other words, is conscious that his mind is free, whether he choose right or wrong. All arguments against a man's consciousness are useless, because its testimony is paramount to all other.

We may perplex a man on the subject, but to convince him that his mind is not free, is impossible; it is the same thing as to convince him that he does not choose at all. Consciousness furnishes incontrovertible evidence of choice to every man. If it were necessary to confirm the decision of consciousness, we could do it by the evidence furnished from the actions of man, many of which would be inexplicable on any other ground; and we could do it from the word of God, which every where describes man as a free, responsible moral agent. But we think it altogether unnecessary in this place, to give any details of this confirmation. The whole administration of God, under which we live, is confirmation strong and conclusive.

There is a question, here, that has perplexed many a theologian, as well as the plain unlearned Christian, which we ought to consider. Is moral freedom consistent with dependence on God? We answer in the affirmative, without the least hesitation. There is one very short method of making out this consistency, which must be perfectly satisfactory to every mind. It is as simple as it is short, because inductive. All men are conscious of this freedom-all men who reason at all, are convinced that they are dependant on God for all that they have-and their experience has always shown their agreement. Thus, men have the testimony of consciousness that they are freethe testimony of reason that they are dependant-and the testimony of constant experience that they are consistent. No man has ever known them to come in collision, through the whole course of his life. Each of these is also confirmed by the testimony of scripture.

There are other methods of illustrating this consistency, equally satisfactory. One method is, to obtain a distinct apprehension of each, and then compare them together.

A plain definition of moral freedom is, as above stated, a connexion between pleasure and choice. Of dependance there are several definitions and theories, some of which are absurd. But it is not necessary now to examine theories. Facts are all that we need. Take the following illustration of dependance: God gives and sustains our life and our faculties, preserves their connexions and relations, gives vigour and activity to them all. In the language of inspired philosophy, "we live, move and have our being in God." So that this dependance on God is entire. Take, now, the two thoughts and compare them together. Their consistency is obvious. Here are faculties sustained by God's power, acting in dependance on him, always in a certain relation and connexion, which constitutes the essence of freedom. Is there any inconsistency in this? So far as the present question is concerned, we care not with what notion of dependance this definition of moral freedom is compared. Only admit the fact as it is, a connexion always between pleasure and choice, and the more absolute or entire the dependance, the more certain and permanent the freedom. Any change wrought in the temper of the heart, or the entire dependance on sovereign grace to effect it, can never affect the principle of mental liberty. The temper of a man's heart is pleased with sin, and he therefore chooses it-God changes that temper, and then his heart is pleased with holiness; he now chooses holiness for the same reason that he before chose sin-because it pleases him. His moral freedom is not at all affected. The character of his feelings and choice are widely different, but his freedom is the same.

A still more perplexing question is often asked:-Are free moral agency and God's decrees consistent with each other? A common

form of pressing this inquiry is the following: If God has irreversibly decreed a man's actions, he cannot do otherwise, and if he cannot do otherwise, then he cannot be free. This form of the statement involves both kinds of liberty, external and moral. Let us compare them both with the divine decrees. Suppose God has irreversibly decreed that a man shall act just as he chooses to act in accomplishing a given purpose, or in all his life; does this destroy the connexion between his external action and his choice, which is external freedom? Certainly not. But suppose God has decreed that a man shall not, in a given case, accomplish what he chooses to do; then there may, or there may not be, an obstruction of his external freedom. If it relate to an ultimate object or action, there is no abridgment of liberty, so far as subordinate actions are concerned. Take, for illustration, the case of the lyers in wait for Paul's life. God decreed that they should not do the ultimate thing they chose, but all the subordinate actions, banding together, providing their weapons, selecting their stations, abstinence from eating, and lying in wait, were done, and freely done. Take another illustration; men choose to obtain riches, but God disappoints them by his Providence; yet all their efforts are directed to the object as the result of choice. But a man chooses to walk, and God has decreed that his limbs should be paralyzed. In such case his external liberty is obstructed; he is not free in this case. In all cases when God's decree cuts off the connexion between the choice, and the direct object of choice, this kind of liberty is destroyed, but never otherwise.

Let us now examine the consistency of moral freedom with divine predestination. Here it is important to be remembered that God has decreed this connexion between pleasure and choice, in every ra

tional mind, and nothing can ever obstruct it. The more irreversible we may suppose this decree, the more secure the freedom. We need not enter into an argument to prove that the human mind is so constituted as always to choose as is most agreeable. The fact, as already shown, is proved by consciousness, and no rational mind can doubt it. Without undertaking in this place an exposition or defence of the doctrine of God's irreversible decrees, which, in its appropriate place, might be profitably and triumphantly done, it is sufficient now to say, that they never do, and they never can, interfere with moral liberty. Suppose God has ordained every choice of the mind, and the mind invariably chooses just as it pleases, or in other words that the connexion between pleasure and choice is never broken-then this kind of freedom is not interrupted. Let the supposition be varied as often as will suit any caviller, only retain this connexion, and there cannot possibly be any infringement of liberty. Suppose God has decreed the temper of the heart, the object of its pleasure and the choice: the mind remains as truly free as is possible. Now compare this definition of moral freedom with the doctrine of special grace, or the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit, and their consistency will be just as obvious. In all the operations of the Holy Spirit on the minds of men, this connexion is never broken. have already seen that in renewing the heart, there is a preparation to be pleased with holiness, and that holy objects are then freely chosen. In all Christian graces, which are called fruits of the Spirit, because produced under his influence, this freedom is never interrupted. We refer the reader to the descriptions which are given of the Spirit's influence in the holy scriptures, and request him to compare our definition of liberty with these descrip

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