we intend to examine and illustrate hereafter; that is, freedom. But that will be more intelligently explained, after the topics placed at the head of this article are discussed. All that we now assume, in reference to the subject, is that the human mind acts without any foreign violence or constraint. By action we now mean choice, operation of the will. There cannot be choice and nothing chosen, nor can there be choice without a motive. The doctrine of motive, as it exists in fact, is very simply and easily described; but there is complexity and difficulty attending the subject, because it is confounded with ultimate object. In common style, the motive and excitement are the same. The principal object, or that which excites to a series of actions, is called motive. This is a substitution of terms, which in popular discussions, leads to no erroneous result, because motive and ultimate object are inseparably connected. The error is therefore common and venial; and scarcely any other substitution of terms would lead to less error in reasoning. Motive, properly speaking, is never an object of pursuit, but the feeling, or expected feeling of the heart. Pleasure is the motive with all men, whether they be good or bad. There can be no other motive with a rational mind than its own pleasure, and that is always future. Present pleasure cannot be a motive to action, because no action is performed without an object, and that once gained, cannot become an excitement to future exertion. The history of the case is this: the ultimate object excites the feeling, and the feeling moves the will; but in order to be a motive to choice, the object must be future, and the enjoyment future. If it were otherwise, there would be no criterion by which to judge of character; actions would be no index of the feelings. Good and bad men have the same motives, not in character, but in name. The truth is, the pleasure is derived from totally different objects, consequently its nature and character are as different as its excitements or objects. What is said, therefore, of good and bad motives, must apply to the objects, or to the character of the motive, or pleasure, which always corresponds with the character of the objects. To this doctrine of motive it has been objected, that it represents all men as supremely selfish. If every man's pleasure is his only motive to action, then, it is said, all his actions proceed from a principle of selfishness. This is the strongest form in which we have heard the objection stated: and if it were a just inference, it would annihilate all benevolence, and we must talk of good and bad selfishness. In the view of those, who consider selfishness the essence of sin, it would certainly seem very singular. But the objection is only an inference from other premises, and unjustly assigned to this doctrine. We admit the justness of urging the absurdity of legitimate inferences, from any doctrine against its truth. But in this case, we deny the legitimacy of the inference. It is a non sequitur. What is selfishness? It is seeking one's own interest exclusively, without regard to the good of others, and often in opposition to it. But what is the selfish man's motive?-Undoubtedly it is pleasure from the promotion of his own exclusive interest; no matter whether that interest be treasure, power, or fame. What is benevolence?-It is doing good to others, for the sake of their best interest. But what is the benevolent man's motive in promoting publick good? According to our view of the fact, it is pleasure from the promotion of publick happiness or interest; and this proves him to possess a benevolent heart. He takes pleasure in benevolent objects. But suppose he derives no pleasure from doing good to others, or in benevolent objects, what is his motive? Will it be said that duty, or a sense of obligation to God, is the motive; then we ask, is it pleasant or painful, to honour God? If pleasant, then we say, the glory of God is the object, and pleasure the motive. If it be painful, or indifferent to him, whether he honours God, we ask for his motive: and moreover, we ask for the character of that heart, which has no pleasure in benevolent objects, or in the glory of God? Whatever may be considered the doctrine of motive, few will contend that such a heart is good. We repeat, that the common substitution of an object of choice for motive does not so far mislead as materially to weaken the force of argument or illustration, provided always that subordinate objects are never so used. But we think, the more distinctly and uniformly our language corresponds with fact, the better for science, truth, and argument. One important use of this distinction between motive and object, is to learn the true character of the heart. This fact, always understood, that pleasure is the motive, if we can ascertain the objects which are chosen for their own sake, and know the character of those objects, we shall be certain what is the ruling propensity of the heart. This is the principle upon which all investigations of character proceed in social relations, in judicial process, and in self-examination. Contravene this doctrine of motive, and we lose the link that binds the action to the heart. We have no method of ascertaining the character. Men may be sometimes successful in concealing what are really their ultimate objects, but when they are known, their character is ascertained. The doctrine of ultimate and sub ordinate objects should be well understood, for several reasons which will appear in the sequel. The objects of choice are indefinitely multiplied; and they sustain a great variety of relations to each other in themselves, and in the voluntary disposition of them by the human mind. It is not our intention to examine any except ultimate and subordinate relations. It may be sometimes necesssary to show their relations to feelings, and speak of their character, as suited to produce happiness or misery. The terms, ultimate and subordinate, express the relation of superiority and inferiority in order, time, plan, value, nature, dignity, importance, or whatever else to which they are applied. The ground of this distinction, so far as we propose now to consider it, is in the fact, that ultimate objects are chosen for their own sake, and subordinate for the sake of those which are ultimate. There can be no choice without an ultimate object to furnish the motive. According to the laws of volition, the will is always governed by the affections of the heart: and all objects of volition are chosen either because they are in themselves agreeable, or because they are connected with those which are agreeable. Ultimate objects must be loved for their own character, subordinate may be, in themselves, agreeable or disagreeable. Objects may be ultimate in relation to certain others which are subordinate; yet they may be subordinate when considered in relation to some others. To illustrate this fact, take the case of a merchant who trades for gain. All his plans, toil and means, are employed with reference to that object; he provides his building, goods, and assistance; he buys, sells, and barters, calculates his expenditures and income, with reference to the increase of his wealth. But beyond this, it must be asked, to what use does he appropriate his gains? If it be to do good to others, gain is subordinate; if it be to hoard it up and gratify a miserly disposition, it is ultimate. Suppose he employs it to promote the cause of Christ, and glorify God; then however any one object in the series may be ultimate with reference to certain departments of operation, it is subordinate to the glory of God. The distinction is very plain, and needs no further definition or illustration. The use and importance of this distinction deserve particular consideration. It is important in judging of our own character. Suppose a inan sets himself to examine his own moral estimate, the character of his heart; what must be the process? The character of the heart must be developed by the affections; and these are to be known by their objects-We speak of their nature, not of their degrees of strength or feebleness. Let him ask himself what objects please him for their own sake, and he may form some correct estimate of his heart. But understanding the doctrine of motive, and the distinction under consideration, he may come more directly and more satisfactorily to the result. Let him ask himself what objects he chooses, because they please him, and for no other reason? He will find, connected and intermingled, objects of choice, painful and agreeable, subordinate one to another, and all to some higher object; and at length he will come to that most dear to his heart, that to which all others are subordinate. The ultimate object, once clearly ascertained, furnishes the key to his heart's character. But the use and importance of this distinction appear more conspicuously in judging of others' characters than in our own case. We can better judge of our own feelings than of others', in some other important respects, such as the readiness and strength with which they rise in view of certain objects. Of others, our rule of estimate is the character of their ultimate objects. This is always safe. There may be some difficulty in ascertaining the ultimate objects of men, though we may be very familiarly acquainted with their general conduct. They may sometimes conceal the grand object which most excites their feelings, and in this sense, governs all their conduct. That object may be so distant, requiring so many subordinate movements, and be so artfully concealed by contrary professions, that we may be deceived. Besides, this relation is not fixed; the disposition of subordinate objects is according to the mind's own decision; and sometimes it may not be possible to make a subserviency where it is intended, or to detect it when it really exists. But after all the difficulties in ascertaining character, the ultimate object is the only key by which it can be certainly ascertained. Another use of this distinction, is to develope character. If we have a knowledge of what ought to be the ultimate objects of conduct, by a proper representation of those objects, the feelings will be excited, and the conduct regulated according to them. There is no doubt that the glory of God should be the ultimate object of all men. When, therefore, the appropriate illustration of God's glory is presented before the mind, one of three things must be the effect; either the affections will kindle with delight, and so the conduct will show a subordination in its promotion; or emotions of disgust will be discovered, which tell the iniquity of the heart; or else a cold indifference will show a callousness of feeling, characteristick of a hard impenitent heart. Other illustrations might be given, but this is probably sufficient. The distinction is useful in explaining the principles of action, and in applications of truth to the judgment and conscience. Its applications to the principles of human action have already been intimated; but one or two illustrations may be here appropriate. Men can and really do choose subordinate objects, which are in themselves disagreeable, but never those which are ultimately painful. No man can ever choose objects which are painful for the sake of the pain. But let them be connected with objects which are agreeable and necessary for their attainment, and they will be as really chosen as those which are agreeable, but for a very different reason. The sick man chooses nauseous medicines for the sake of health. The convinced sinner will as really choose the fear and service of God, and even the change of his own heart, as the sick man does the medicine, and in the same manner, that is subordinately. Such a sinner, apprehending that a change of his own heart is indispensable to his salvation from ceaseless misery, will choose it, and seek it with great anxiety. We doubtless state a familiar fact, when we say that we have known many unrenewed sinners, who have been deeply anxious for weeks and months; and in this subordinate manner, chosen from day to day the change of their hearts, and to love God; but the effect has not followed. To show the truth and sincerity of their choice, they have not only said that such was their choice, but have used the external means of grace with great diligence, and tried every possible measure to bring their hearts under the control of their wills, without success. At length they have despaired utterly of accomplishing the object of their choice, and have relied on the agency of the Holy Spirit, to change their heart, and excite the affection of love to God, and then they have speedily rejoiced in a gospel hope. We have referred to this common case of subordinate choice, because VOL. IX.-Ch. Adv. 585 it serves to illustrate the principles of voluntary actions, and confirms the importance of the distinction in apprehending many declarations and facts found in the scriptures. In the application of truth to the judgment and conscience, this distinction is important. An appropriate example of this is found in our Saviour's instruction to the young ruler. This young man, in many respects, amiable, thought he had kept all the commandments, and had no suspicion that there was any deficiency in his obedience. Christ brought him to the test, by directing him to subordinate all his wealth to the direction and cause of him whom he had just addressed as his Master. The ultimate object of his choice and delight was his possessions. These he could not relinquish for the sake of heaven, because that would have been to relinquish an ultimate for a subordinate object; no free and rational mind can do this. It would be violating the laws of human action. Without this distinction it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince men that they deserve condemnation for their feelings, when their conduct is fair in the world's estimation. Men, who think little, and feel less on religious subjects, must be led to distinguish between their ultimate and subordinate objects, if we seek to convince them of sin. Good men and bad men may do the same things, as subordinate objects of choice and desire, with ultimate objects as widely different in their nature as right and wrong. If the things done, irrespective of this distinction, were to be taken as the indexes of character, conscience would never accuse men for wrong feelings in the performance of duty. But admit this distinction, and men may feel guilty when they choose and act right, with a wrong end in view. This fact has often been used by the Spirit of God to con4 E vince men of the depravity of their hearts. There is one inquiry more of importance, to be answered on this subject-What are the ultimate objects of good and of bad beings? The answer to this question has been in part anticipated already, but it deserves a little more particular consideration. The ultimate objects of all men are few, and depend, both as to number and character, on the governing propensity of the heart. They must be few in a strict technical sense, because the term implies the last in the series, and because the highest and strongest affection cannot rest on many objects. God has told us what is his ultimate object, in all his works of creation, providence and grace. It is his glory. To manifest his own perfections is the highest object of his delight, and he has told us that our highest happiness should be derived from the same object. Of the good man, therefore, the glory of God is his ultimate object. With reference to his whole life, he can have no other. In all things whatever he does, he must do all to the glory of God. But according to the statement above made, there may be objects pursued with reference to this, which are ultimate in relation to a series of actions. So, in this sense, a good man may have more than one ultimate object. But every ultimate object must possess the character of holiness. It may be safely said, that holiness is the ultimate object of all good men. Every thing should be subordinate to this; and if all the objects of pursuit were entirely subordinated to that high aim, the character would be perfect. The reasons why good men do not always furnish such a character, are two. One is ignorance. Men cannot always perceive distinctly the real tendency aud relations of things, and consequently make some mistakes. But the principal reason is found in the remaining corrupt propensities in the hearts of good men. While good men are sanctified only in part, there remain some propensities to evil, which, under circumstances calculated to excite them to action, bring the men into captivity to the evil propensity. The ultimate objects of bad men are more numerous, but in one respect, they have a general character; that is, sin, in opposition to holiness. Thus, according to this principle, we class bad men by their ultimate objects. The ambitious man, whose ultimate object is fame; the tyrant, the miser, and the voluptuary, have their appellations from the governing propensity of the heart, developed by their ultimate objects of choice. It is not necessary here, to give an extended illustration of this doctrine. What has been stated may be sufficient to furnish data for its appropriate applications, in all the investigations of human conduct and character. The way is now prepared to examine the doctrine of freedom and of power, one or both of which will be examined in our next article. F. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, No. V. Among the first minutes of the last General Assembly of our church, and before the choice of a Moderator, the following record appears"The Assembly proceeded to consider the case of the person denominated standing committee' in the commission; and after considerable discussion, it was resolved that the member be received, and enrolled among the list of members." Against this resolution a protest with 67 signatures was entered; and a committee was appointed on the part of the Assembly, to answer the protest. |