quarters of a mile through the woods, to the road that I ought to go in. I told them they must put me in the road, or let me and my horse tarry with them. I saw a boy there, not so large as I was, and I told him I would give him what pence I had, which I think were seven, if he would go and put me in the road. About this time, also, the moon arose; and though it rained, yet it was so light that we could see to travel. The boy consented to go, and after being put in the road, I had no more difficulty in finding the way, and I got safe to my mother's house a little after the middle of the night.

I tarried about ten days with my friends and acquaintances at Killingly. I often thought of my solemn promise in the woods, and did not directly seek an opportunity to commit the sin. But every day I was less and less affected with a sense of my being lost in the woods, and the promise I had made: and the day before I was to set out on my journey to Malden, I was led into temptation. A number of circumstances concurred to bring me to the trial, and I endeavoured not at all to keep out of the way of temptation: and when an opportunity offered, I made a free and voluntary attempt to commit the sin, but was unexpectedly prevented and disappointed. After some hours I repeatedly endeavoured it again, but was still prevented, as to the outward action; but in me it was the same as if I had done it: for I did what I could; my will was certainly in the thing; and in the very time of my endeavouring it, my conscience put me in mind of my promise, and checked me: but I hearkened not, stifled conscience, and resolutely complied with temptation, so far as I could: so that in the sight of God I was guilty, and that against light and conscience. The next day I set out on my journey, and returned home to Malden -careless, stupid, and insensible of

my guilt. After my return home, I recollected my promise in the woods, and that one part of it was "that within a week after I returned, I would begin to pray in secret;" but I thought with myself that I had broke one part of the promise, by endeavouring to commit the sin, and the promise being broken, it would be much the same if I neglected to pray; and so concluded that I would not observe that part which respected praying. The truth was, I had no inclination or heart to pray, but felt amazingly stupid and careless. This was my condition till the last night of the week after I returned; that is, the night before the morning, when, according to my promise, I was to begin to pray-On which night I had a remarkable dream.

(To be continued.)

MENTAL SCIENCE.

Phenomena of Feeling.

In examining our mental exercises, we find a class which we denominate feelings, or emotions. Much speculation has been excited among philosophers concerning these exercises; some refusing them the distinctive appellation of a class, and denying a generick difference between them and intellectual operations. But apprehensions are so manifestly different from emotions, that we think it unnecessary to state and refute those speculations which assume their identity, or similarity. It is quite sufficient to refer every thinking man to the evidence of his own consciousness. The difference is generick, and therefore properly denotes a distinct class, in which are to be included all mental exercises, which are of the nature of emotion or feeling. However numerous their com binations, and various their modifications, a proper analysis will discover their character and relation.

The truth is, they are not as variously modified as the operations of intellect.

Mental feeling is the generick indication; pleasure and pain are the two modes of this class. Every mental affection, desire, or passion, will be found to possess the generick distinction, and one or the other of the modal characters; or, as is sometimes the fact, a combination of both. We shall not attempt to follow, establish, or refute the theories of Reid, Stewart, Brown, or Payne, but simply mention a few of the most important phenomena of this class, and give some brief specimens of illustration, as we apprehend the facts. We have mentioned affection, desire, and passion, as names of operations belonging to this class. But these are general terms, which denote the degrees of feeling, and not the kind, mode, or relation of the exercise. The same is true of emotions. In their general, or abstract meaning, we cannot define them, because they are only other names for feelings, and they need no other description than to call them degrees of feeling; and refer every thinking man to his own consciousness for the recognition. Affection, without any qualifying term, may indicate any kind, mode, or degree of feeling, in relation to any object. Desire is used to express any feeling of anxiety, more or less strong: it follows the simple emotion of pleasure or pain, and may be considered generally as exciting volition. Passion denotes a stronger degree of feeling, and in common usage means a sudden, highly excited emotion. The most important distinction to be observed in the use of these general terms, is that between affection and passion. Those emotions or feelings, which gradually increase and abide, are called affections; and those which are suddenly excited, are strong and vivid, and which soon subside, are called passions. But in all this

the difference is circumstantial only; the principal difference is in degree.

Love is an affection which includes pleasure and desire. It presupposes several things: an object corresponding in its nature and tendency with some propensity, or character of the faculty which feels; and an apprehension of the object, and the quality or character suited to awaken the emotion, are necessarily presupposed. Except what is included in this statement, no reason can be given why we love any object. The pleasure excited may be greater or less in degree; and in proportion to its strength will be the desire to enjoy the object, or promote its good, if it be capable of enjoyment. The specific character of this affection is distinguished by the object, or by its intensity. When the object denominates its character it is easily understood, as self-love, benevolence, friendship, patriotism, complacence, paternal, filial and conjugal love. So, where it is distinguished by the degrees of its intensity, we use various terms, as respect, esteem, attachment and veneration. There is no other method of analysing this affection. It has no ingredients except pleasure and desire; and all its modifications are by its objects, degrees, or some circumstantial relation. Its moral estimate is another matter, hereafter to be considered.

Hatred is an emotion directly opposite to that of love. It consists of pain, and desire to avoid or remove the object which awakens the feeling. The analysis is conducted in the same manner as with love, its opposite affection; and is modified by the object, its degree, or circumstantial relation. It is selfabhorrence, and misanthropy, or it is disregard, disesteem and contempt.

The modifications of pleasure are numerous; sometimes with strong, and oftentimes with very

slight shades of difference. Take for an example of the former, gladness, joy, delight, and compare them with cheerfulness, contentment, satisfaction, and the difference is readily perceived. But compare satisfaction with contentment, or gladness with joy, the shade of difference is very slight. They are all modifications of the simple emotion of pleasure, connected with less or more strength of desire.

The same method will show the modifications of pain to be various in different degrees. The terms grief, regret and melancholy, indicate emotions of pain differently modified in slight shades; while anger, remorse, disgust and revenge, differ widely, in their modifications and relations, from the preceding and from each other. Take any affection or passion, and analyze it by observing its objects, relations, and degree of intensity, then all that will be left will be an emotion of pleasure or pain, and its attendant desire. Let pride and remorse be the examples for illustration.

Pride is considered essentially an inordinate self-esteem; it is a high degree of pleasure in one's real or supposed superior excellence, with a desire to make it manifest. Now these ingredients suppose some other exercises of mind beside feeling, but they belong not to its proper description. Intellectual exercises are always presupposed in pride: there is always a high estimate by the mind of its state, qualifications, attainments, or of whatever excites the emotion. This estimate may be just, and yet awaken the emotion properly called pride. But it does not follow that every man who highly estimates his own qualities, attainments or possessions is necessarily, or in fact, influenced by pride. We make these remarks to show that the intellectual process does not belong to pride. Now separate, in the analysis, what belongs to the man

ner and circumstances of its manifestation, and what belongs to the kindred feelings of haughtiness and overbearing contempt of inferiors, and the definition above will be applicable to all cases.

Remorse is a painful feeling which arises from self-accusation, on a retrospection of one's own guilt. It presupposes a perception of the standard by which the character is estimated, and a consciousness of criminality; but the consequent painful feeling is the remorse. There is one emotion presupposed in all cases of remorse: it is an approbation of the rule or standard by which the estimate is made. The desire which belongs to remorse varies with the nature, relations and circumstances of the crime and the criminal. Sometimes it may be for restitution, sometimes self-destruction, sometimes to 'drown sensibility, and sometimes to seek forgiveness.

The foregoing brief analysis of some phenomena belonging to the class of feeling, is sufficient for the purpose of furnishing a specimen of ascertaining both the nature and the modification of this class. Recurring, now, to a prin-ciple already established, that all mental exercises, of the same nature, belong to the same faculty, we propose to make some remarks on the name given to this faculty in the scriptures; and on its uses. This will render the present article both scriptural and practical.

The term which is used in the holy scriptures to designate the faculty of feeling is heart. The meaning of this term is an important subject of inquiry. It is used in connexions where it is very necessary to be understood, because great importance is attached to the heart and its operations. Although the term is used in different senses in different passages of the Bible, sometimes figuratively, more or less extended or limited, yet it has an appropriate distinctive meaning,

when applied to the source of moral exercises. We intend not to examine all the different senses in which the term heart is used in the Bible, or in common language; a few only will be sufficient. Its literal and common meaning is, to denote the muscular organ which gives circulation to the blood; one of the primary organs of animal life. It is scarcely necessary to say that we have no reference to this vital organ in our present discussion: as physiologists we might have something to say of the material organ, but as mental philosophers nothing. The term is also used to denote the vital part, and sometimes the inner or hidden part of any thing: with these meanings we have at present no concern. Our only object now is, to remark on some of the meanings of this term as applied to mind. It is here proper to say, that by far the greatest number of the terms applied to mind are borrowed from material things, or have their original and literal application to the properties of matter. But while in this view words are taken from their original and literal meaning, and may be said to be figuratively employed, common usage has so familiarized them to the ear and thoughts, that we scarcely think of any other than the figurative import.

Heart is one of the terms, though figurative in the above sense, as applied to mind, which has, from its use, a proper meaning; and when it is applied to the seat or source of affections it is used properly. Thus we read of a good heart, an evil heart, of sorrowful, joyous, hard, proud, tender, faint, and pure hearts. By these and many like uses of the term heart, are meant plainly, the seat of mental feeling; but it would be manifestly improper to substitute the name of any other faculty in the places where heart is thus properly used. We never speak of a sorrowful, or joyous understanding, nor of a hard

or tender will. By a metonymy, heart is used for an affection or passion in many instances, which will readily occur to the reflecting reader as he peruses his Bible. By a different form of the figure, heart is sometimes used for the soul, or mind, with all its faculties, which instances are easily distinguished by the careful reader. These suggestions will be sufficient to show what we think is the true meaning of the term heart in the scriptures, and in mental philosophy. We repeat it, that it may not be misunderstood or forgotten-heart is the faculty of feeling, or seat of affections and passions, in distinction from the faculties of knowledge and volition.

The heart is a moral faculty, ag is evident from the scriptures, and from the nature of the case. Jesus Christ, who proved his divinity by that perfection of the true God, searching the heart, declared that from the heart proceeds every evil. (Matt. xv. 18, 19.) The question, what belongs to man of a moral nature, and why is it moral? deserves more full and particular consideration than we shall attempt to give it in this place. In some future article we intend to give the result of a careful examination of this important question. For the present it is enough to say, that the heart is a moral faculty, because it is the seat of praise or blame, good or evil, sin or holiness in man. shall not deny the depravity or perversion of the other faculties, or their sanctification in the saint, but we mean to say, that the scriptures do represent the heart as the seat of that which is morally good or evil in man. (Matt. xii. 34, 35.) The affections are, therefore, more directly expressive of all moral qualities than perception or volition.

We

The heart is the governing faculty of the mind, and its character determines the character of the man. Men perceive objects of a

physical and moral character, but the mere perception does not produce any action, nor discover character, except the mere fact that they are intellectual beings. Good men and bad men may perceive the same objects-they may see the same evidences of God's power, wisdom and goodness, in his works and providence, but they feel very differently affected in view of the same truths. We can have no doubt that holy angels and fallen spirits feel very differently in view of the same developments of God's plan. The temper of the heart, therefore, gives character to men and angels. It is the feeling that governs the conduct. Holy angels act very differently from wicked angels; and wicked men act differently from good men, in their moral relations, and that because they feel differently from each other. The reason is entirely obvious, therefore, why the revelation of God contains such special injunctions to keep the heart, and to direct its exercises towards God and holiness. Its governing influence, and being the source of character, account for the fervent appeals made to men's hearts, in the scriptures of truth.

The uses of this faculty have been already, in part, intimated; but we are desirous to add a few thoughts on this suggestion, in the close of this article.

In addition to the intimations already made, we say that one important use of the faculty is to render men responsible agents. It is the heart alone, which feels a sense of responsibleness; and without a faculty to feel a sense of obligation, no obligation could bind man: he could not be a subject of praise or blame. Here it may, perhaps, be said by some, that men perceive their relations to law, and to God the Lawgiver, that without understanding, man could not be morally bound, and that understanding is, therefore, the faculty connecting

There

with obligation. But to make this matter plain, let it be observed that all the faculties of understanding, heart and will, are necessary to constitute man a moral, accountable agent. No man can be a responsible subject of moral government unless he has a faculty of knowing his relations, a faculty of feeling the influence of inducement, and a faculty of action-that is, he must be a perceptive, sensitive, voluntary agent. But after all, some one of these faculties must be more immediately connected with the idea of obligation than the other, and this we think must be the heart. Take another view of the facts in the case. It is moral agency alone that can fit a man for obligation. must be an internal principle of action, which is itself a moral principle. Man has such a principle of action, and that is the heart, which alone can feel. Without this capability of feeling in man, there could be no action. No motive would influence him, nothing could induce him to seek one object or avoid another. The heart is the spring of action, consequently that on which obligation ultimately rests. Take one more view of the subject. That, which distinguishes good beings from bad, must be of a moral character, belong to the moral faculty, and correspond with, or violate responsibility. That faculty which renders man virtuous or vicious, renders him capable of moral obligation; and the exercise of that principle might be under moral responsibility.

There is another use of this faculty which will show that man's moral obligation connects primarily with the heart-it is to render him capable of happiness or misery, susceptible of reward or punishment. A responsible man must be liable to punishment if he violate his obligation, otherwise to reward. But no reward or punishment can be appreciated in prospect, or felt when present, without