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MENTAL SCIENCE.

or country seat, are unrelished, if metropolis. Thus, after three days not unknown, in France. The

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of hard labour, by sun and stars, sant, like the citizen in Paris, must we arrived safely from Strasburg; have the bustle and the amuse and I am now once more comfort. ments of society. :

ably lodged in my old apartments, We stopped a short time at in the Hotel de l'Interieur, Rue Chalons, situated on the dull banks Mont Martre. of the river Marne. This is a mi

(To be continued.) serable looking town, and is so old, that nobody can tell when it was founded. “In the time of the Emperor Aurelian it was considered

Intellectual Phenomena. one of the principal towns of Belgick Gaul. Two remarkable bat

In applying the principle of clastles were fought near it—that in sification to mental phenomena, it which Tetricus was defeated by will be our aim to describe the proAurelian, his competitor for the cess of examination, pursue some empire, and that in which Attila examples of analysis, and state a and his allies were vanquished and few important results. dispersed by the Romans, Burgun

Understanding, has been long dians, and Goths, in 451." Here,

used as the name of a mental faculif it had not been for the horrors ty, and should not be discontinued of the Diligence, one might have without good reasons.

It means been excited to some enthusiasm the mind's aptitude to know or apby reflecting on “by-gone” days; prehend. To avoid circumlocuthough scenes of battle and blood, tion, we shall use this term as the either in ancient or modern times, name of a faculty to which one class are no agreeable topicks of cons of mental operations belongs, altemplation.

though we are aware it is sometimes Between Chalons and Paris, we

used as the name of a mental opepassed through a portion of the ration itself. district of Champagne; and the

It is now convenient to begin Diligence stopped at an inn, where our examination with simple apwe obtained some of the exquisite prehension. We mention this as and famous wine, for which this indicating the essential character, country is celebrated. The cham or nature, of all those exercises pagne wine does not seem to be which form one class, and belong to produced from any species of grape one faculty. This term is preferred peculiar to this part of France, for reasons which will be obvious, but it derives its superiority in our analysis of intellectual phefrom the manner in which the nomena. Several other terms are vineyards are cultivated, and the used to designate the same operaskill exercised in expressing and tion; as knowing, understanding, refining the juice. The nature of cognizance, and some others less the soil, no doubt,contributes much appropriate. We are certainly to the perfect growth of the grapes. conscious of a mental operation The conductor of the Diligence we called apprehension. It is a simnoticed purchasing a number of ple, uncompounded and indivisible bottles of capital champagne, exercise, which admits of no anawhich he stowed away in some of Jysis. We can give no philological the inscrutable holes of his moving definition of the term, because it castle; and he succeeded in eluding suggests a simple idea; all that the custom house officers stationed can be done towards a description of at the barriers of Paris, and who the operation intended, is to use its searched us before we entered the appropriate name, point out its re

sense.

lations, and refer men to their own the mind; but its meaning indicates consciousness for the true know. no more than a mental act with its ledge of its meaning. If we use a peculiar relation; for if it were a technical description, it is the tak. distinct faculty, then the principle, ing hold of any thing, or thought, by which it is so denominated, without comparing, judging or rea- would make every modification of soning-one simple mental act. By thought or intellection, to denote a whatever name it may be called, we distinct faculty. Such a principle use it to indicate the character of a of classification, would introduce whole class. All the mental exer confusion into the science, and concises of this class are distinguished tradict the testimony of common by this character, whatever may be

All attempts at classificatheir relations, objects, modes, or tion on such a principle would be combinations. Operations of this useless. character may vary in all these re Others have told us that conspects, and be so connected as to sciousness is a general term, exform a process of thought, to which pressing the whole variety of our a distinct name is given. We give feelings. But this is more indefidifferent names to mental exercises nite still, and farther from the truth. of the same nature—from the objects Consciousness is neither a variety to which they are directed, the re- of feelings, a mode of feeling, nor lations involved, and the results any feeling at all. It has no such obtained. But they are all capable character, but is a knowledge of of analysis, and reducible to simple feelings, as well as other mental apprehension. All this will be acts. If it were merely feeling, or evident from the illustrations here. if it consisted of multiplied feelings after to be given.

combined, it could not be our Some of the operations of the un- guide in the investigation of menderstanding, are consciousness, con tal exercises. And those philosoception, perception, memory, judg- phers, who give it this description, ment, reason, and imagination. All resort to a supposed faculty of disthese belong to one class, because covering resemblances, by which they possess a common character, the mind is able to class its own although in different relations: they operations. What is this but an belong to one faculty, because they inappropriate description of condevelop but one capability, or ap- sciousness? It is the apprehendtitude of the mind.' These differ. ing faculty, or understanding, ement operations vary in their objects, ployed with mental acts as its obstrength, clearness, and other cir- jects. Why suppose a distinct facumstances, but not in their na

culty to account for a mental pheture.

nomenon, so obviously the same exWhat is consciousness? Its tech- ercise properly denominated connical, or philological import, is the sciousnessThe truth on this submind's knowledge of its own ope- ject recognises an agent or mind, a rations—the mind knowing in, of, capacity, and a description of its with, or by itself. It is a single appropriate exercises relating to simple operation; knowing, or ap- different objects. A different mode, prehending, is its character. It and different objects of the same admits of no analysis or more ap kind of exercises, do not indipropriate definition, and the best cate different faculties; but differdescription is simple apprehension, ence in the nature of the exercises having for its object the internal necessarily implies a different camental phenomena. Sume have pacity. We have already intimated told us that consciousness is a fa that correct philology corresponds culty, power, or susceptibility of with correct mental philosophy. In VOL. IX.-Ch. Adv.

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this case, the philological meaning The technical meaning, (con and of consciousness, expresses correcto capio,) as applied to mental acts, is ly the distinct mental operation to to take or apprehend with, in, or by which it is applied. It should be the mind itself. But it has an acapplied no otherwise, than to de. quired import from the usus lonote the exercises of the mind tak- quendi, and so indicates the invening cognizance of its own acts. tion, arrangement, combination, or

What is conception? Like all abstraction of thoughts; it is thereother mental acts, it has been the fore a process of simple apprehensubject of many puzzling specula- siods. When the whole process is tions, and given rise to many ab- carefully examined and analysed, surd theories. By some it has been it will be found to consist excluconsidered a faculty of making sively of simple apprehensions conthings absent, objects of thought. nected together, and so related to By others it has been considered a their appropriate objects, as to form modification of memory; by some the result. This result is often others a modification of imagina- called the conception, but more tion; and by another class of philo- properly it denotes the process of sophers, it is considered as belong- mind by which the result is attained. ing to a supposed faculty of sug What is perception? In answer gestion. We cannot here enume to this question we are constrained rate all the hypotheses on this sub- again to differ from many respectaject, much less attempt to describe ble pneumatologists, who describe and expose their fallacy in order. perception as a distinct faculty.

Conception is applied either to We consider it a very important one or more mental acts, and never operation of the understanding, properly to denote a faculty of perhaps, next to consciousness, the mind. "It is sometimes used to de. most important. Some have connote a single idea, which the mind sidered it the characteristick opeforms of an absent object; but it ration of the faculty; and such it more properly denotes the mental would be, from its prominence and process of combinations and abstrac- use, but for the fact that it is not a tions of thought, in which the mind simple operation, or its description forms ideas of things not present, does not suggest a simple idea. It or things never seen. We hear or includes necessarily, or by its use, a read the description of an animal, fixed and indissoluble relation to plan, or thing which we have not the senses. Its technical import seen; conception denotes the pro- is its true and appropriate meancess of thought in combining or ab- ing; (per capio) always denotes to stracting qualities and circum- take through the senses. But abstances to form an idea of the ani- stract its expressed relation to the mal, plan, or thing which may, or medium and external objects, and may not, correspond with the fact; what is there left, except simple apand therefore it differs from per- prehension? Apprehending or knowception, and from recollection of ing is its character. It differs not the facts. Such is our meaning in its nature from the exercises alwhen we say we conceive of things, ready described, but relates to exevents, or relations; for it matters ternal objects of thought, apprenot as to the nature of the exer- hended through the senses of sight, cise, what the objects or relations hearing, touch, taste, or smell. Thus may be. All the descriptions of we perceive light, sound, hardness, past, absent, and future things and sweetness, scent. Terms are often events, are materials from which used, which are derived from the the mind forms its conceptions, or senses, to denote the mind's cogniwith which they are connected. zance through their medium; but

there is no need of confusion from former only by including a volunthat source. The mind's appre- tary exertion, to recal former aphension through the senses is what prehensions: but beside this, there we call perception. This coin- is nothing in the whole mental pletes the analysis.

process except a combination of We enter not into a discussion simple apprehensions; to this every of the question whether sensation mental act in memory is reducible. is in the organ, in some interme- Beyond this, they cannot be sepadiate link between it and the mind, rated. or in the mind itself. This ques We are well apprized that metion would involve physiological mory has been called a distinct principles which we bave not room faculty of the mind; also that some to discuss; and it is not necessary have attempted to resolve the pheto our purpose. We only express nomena into a law of suggestion; our full and deliberate conviction, others have called it a power of that a careful and thorough induc- association ; and it has been de-tive inquiry will establish incontro- scribed as a particular mode of vertibly the facts, that all sensation operation belonging to a supposed is in the mind and not in the organ, faculty of suggestion. But all and that there is no intermediate these are mere hypotheses, and not link between them. Our purpose the result of inductive examination will be accomplished by describing and analysis. The stubborn fact, the operation itself.

which no thinking man can avoid, What is memory? It is a process is, that the whole process of memore complex than perception, but mory has no other generic charit as certainly belongs to the intel- acter than simple apprehension. lectual class, consequently to the · Every man, who adopts the only understanding. The term can principle of classification which never be properly used as the can be defended, will refer it to name of a distinct faculty, because the same generic class with perit denotes a complex process of ception and apprehension; consethought. The analysis is simple quently it cannot be a distinct and easy. To make the matter faculty. plain we may use a tautological With respect to the faculty of explanation. It is the apprehen- suggestion, which some very resion of an object, or thought, to- spectable philosophers have supgether with the apprehension of posed to exist in the mind, and to having apprehended it before. This which belong, as appropriate exermay be either with or without the cises, conception, memory, imagiprecise time or place associated. nation and habit, we have room Take any process of memory, and only to state that it is a fanciful this is its whole analysis; and now theory, tending more to perplex thing else belongs to the mental than to simplify the subject. The operations. If, however, we use terms are indefinite, and seeni to the term ia a sense a little more us, calculated to cover ignorance extended, as may be entirely pro- under general names, without any per, to include recollection, there proper attempt to analyze the will often be a longer process of mental process. The doctrines of analysis. The circumstances of relations, resemblances, contrast, time, place, similar things, rela- and contiguity, which are made so tions and connexions of facts, may conspicuous in the scheme, and asbe so associated as to awaken all sociated with mental operations, the apprehensions, and furnish the seem to have misled the advocates process of memory and recollec- of the system. They seem to have tion. The latter differs from the forgotten that the relations of ob

jects and the mental recognitions relations are obvious and the proof them, are distinct things to be cess short; but in reasoning they examined. States of the mind, and are not immediately obvious, some suggestions of the mind to itself, other connecting things, having reor of relations founded on resem lations to both, are interposed and blance, contrast and contiguity, as compared to discover the relations their laws, suggesting the succes- sought. This is reasoning. Now sion of one mental state after an the whole intellectual process, be other, all seem to us much like it long or short, is nothing more talking very wisely without any than a concatenation of simple apdefinite meaning; or more proper- prehensions. The whole complexly, it is confusion confounded. ity arises from the number and The truth, as it seems to us, is al- arrangement of simple operations, together in opposition to this the- having the saine nature.' What is ory. A careful inductive analysis that intellectual operation in which would have set it aside, and shown the mind discovers one relation or its authors and advocates that they quality? It is apprehension. The were contemplating different com same, by which two, three, or more binations of simple apprehension, are known, when the exercises are operations of the understanding. arranged in a certain order, consti

What is judgment? It is an stitutes reason. It is not, therefore, operation of the understanding, re- a distinct faculty of the mind, but cognizing some relation between only a process of thought, of the two or more objects. It respects same character with judgment, relations only, and is an appre- whose nature is simple apprehenhension of their character. It is sion. We need not lumber this perfect or imperfect, clear or in- discussion with examples to illusdistinct, according to the character trate a process so familiar to every of the apprehensions in the case. mind. All appropriate arguments, A man recognises the difference short or long, and on any subject to between a stone and bread, be- which argumentation can apply, will tween a circle and a triangle, and furnish examples for analysis. And between a plain matter of fact and every analysis inductively made, an obvious falsehood. But in each will but investigate the same proof these cases the process is an ex cess of apprehension. ercise called judgment, easily re What is imagination? The duced to simple apprehensions of phenomena of imagination are mothe things and their relations. The dified conceptions. We combine correctness of the judgment, in- and abstract our apprehensions of volves the distinctness and cer- facts, qualities, and relations, not tainty of the apprehensions in the only as things exist, but in forms process.

anal connexions never actually What is reason? In this ques- found. This is a process of imagition we refer not to any syllogism, nation. We also arrange and comor form of words in which reason bine apprehensions of resemblances, ing is expressed—this consists in and relations for the illustration a series of related and connected and embellishment of subjects, propositions. We mean that pro- which is also called imagination. cess of intellection by which the Perhaps the only difference bemind reaches its conclusions. It tween conception and imagination, corresponds with the description consists in a more extended comof judgment in having relations for bination of apprehensions, or givits objects; and it differs only in ing, as a whole, liveliness and the number and combination of the strength to the latter, which do not apprehensions. In judgment the necessarily belong to the former.

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