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of the essence of mind, we are from this doctrine, as it seems to us, profoundly ignorant, and so we must be, that there is only one intelmust remain, while our spirits are ligent agent in the universe. Others so intimately connected with their say that action is the essence of material habitations. How it may mind, and that those evanescent, be when our minds are disembo- ever varying phenomena, called died, must remain hidden from our thoughts, feelings and volitions, view, while we dwell on earth. constitute the mind. We can speculate concerning it, It is worthy of remark, that the but knowledge we have none. latter speculation has been applied There are, however, some things in all its principles to matter. Thus concerning the mind which we can one class of philosophers has atcertainly know,-others, satisfac- tempted to deprive us of mind, anotorily: and there are some others ther has attempted the same with of which we may have probable matter, and both have been equally knowledge. Take the following successful and rational. As well specimen for illustration. The might a man undertake to prove mind's existence is certainly, be- that he has no existence, as that he cause intuitively known,-its ope- has no permanent subject of the rations, because of them we are constantly diversified intellectual conscious,-its immateriality, be phenomena; that is, has no mind cause the pature of all its known distinct from exercises. We know properties differs from those of not how to guide any man's mental matter,-its immortality, because process to convince himself that he its moral relations, and revealed exists, or that he has a mind, if he destiny require it, according to denies or doubts the facts. A man that gospel which brings life and who will not trust his conscious. immortality to light.
and his intuition, should The mind's moral character may rather seek relief from medicine be satisfactorily known, because than philosophy. its feelings may be compared with We think it sound pneumatoa perfect moral rule, capable of logy, and unassailable truth, to asbeing examined. The expansion sert that we have intuitive knowof its capacities, when it shall be ledge of both existence and mind. separated from the body, is proba- We should think it quite as philoble, because this is according to its sophical to talk of motion without known history in its present frail ta- any thing being moved, as of menbernacle, and in harmony with some tal exercises without a mind-anteintimations of God's revelation. cedent to, and distinct from, the
We are aware that it has been exercises themselves. said, mind is only exercise; and What is mind? We cannot anbecause we are conscious of no swer essentially, but we can answer thing antecedent, therefore nothing the question relatively: and that else of mental character exists. with rational satisfaction. It is a This sentiment has been variously spiritual substance, which thinks, modified. By some it has been feels and wills. It is the permamade the ground of materialism; nent subject of those numerous and and great efforts have been made diversified phenomena, of which to prove that matter, peculiarly or we are conscious, and which differ ganized, is capable of thought, feel in their nature and laws from all ing and volition. By others it has that pertains to matter. This is been contended, that all those ex- inind-simple, uncompounded, not ercises commonly styled mental, consisting of parts or organs, but are produced immediately by the indivisible and unique. Its capaauthor of our being. The conclusion cities we shall attempt to describe, Vol. IX.- Ch. Adv.
but not its essence. It is proper class them, use them as arguments, here to state, there is a mental point out their relations, and show process, in the form of an argument, their dependence one upon another. approximating certainty, for the But a man, who has so employed immateriality of mind. The pro- his philosophy as to produce a cess is similar to that by which we doubt or denial of his own intui. prove the existence of matter. By tion, consciousness, senses and exour senses we take cognizance of perience, must be left to the enjoy. certain properties, which must be- ment of his blank scepticism. long to something beyond human Our next inquiry is the principle cognizance. This something, we of classification, by which we discall matter--not because we know tribute and arrange the phenomena its essence, but can judge of its of mind. We introduce this inproperties. The material sub- quiry in this connexion, for reasons stance, in all its masses, atoms and which will be obvious from its use; forms, is unintelligent. We take and because many different classithis
upon the authority of our fications have been made by metasenses; and their testimony is cor. physicians. The latter reason roborated by the history of its crea seems to render it important that tion and government, in the word we should carefully examine and of God's revelation to man. Those settle this principle, before we exproperties of matter-each, and all amiue the capacities and their together, unintelligent--must be phenomena. long to something in its nature un. Classification is the disposition intelligent. Now by consciousness or distribution of our mental exerwe know certain properties and cises, according to some principle, phenomena, entirely different in or character, cognizable by contheir uature from all the pheno. sciousness. Some have made two mena and properties of matter. classes, some three, some six, some This character is intelligence; nine, twelve, and some many more. hence, the substance to which they in some systems, a preconceived belong must be entirely different theory of faculties forms the basis from matter: we call iť mind, in- of classification, which saves much telligent spirit. If there be any time and accurate painful investi. truth in philosophy, the results of gation of facts, but lacks truth and this process are truths. But after utility. Others have adopted the reall, this is not the process by which lationsof mental phenomenatointerthe mind originally arrives at these nal and external objects of thought, results. Every intelligent man and thus have multiplied the fatakes the knowledge of his own culties of mind to a great number. existence, and the nature of mind, We shall not stop to examine those as far as he knows any thing of its theories and principles; although nature, upon the authority of his they have had, and it is likely they own intuition; his knowledge of the will yet have, their advocates. It phenomena of mind, upon the au- will be sufficient for our purpose, to thority of his consciousness; and his define what we consider the true knowledge of external objects, upon principle of classification. the authority of his senses. We The resemblance, or difference, in must take these things upon such the nature of exercises, is the prinauthority, supported by the intima- ciple. To state it more fully-All tions of revelation, without philoso- mental exercises which are of the phical proof; but if any man can- same nature, however they may be not do this, we should think his modified and combined,' we put best remedy would be a mad-house. together, and distribute them into When facts are known, we may as many classes as we find pheno
mena essentially different. For mean by faculty; and the distincexample, we know, let all the ex tion to which we have already ercises whose nature is knowledge, alluded is obvious, that the capabiform one class-we feel, let all the lity of knowing is not identically phenomena of feeling constitute the capability of feeling, or of willanother class—and we will, let all ing. They all belong to one agent, those exercises whose nature is but differ as much as the essential choosing or refusing, that is will- character of the phenomena which ing, be disposed in another dis- they exhibit. Without supposing tinct class. This is the general, any analogy in the things themand we think only correct, princi- selves, the illustration is approple of classification; except there priate which we take from the promay be sub-classes, disposed ac cess of thought, in associating and cording to the relations, combina- dissociating the properties of mat. tions, or circumstance of pheno- ter. The process is similar. Take mena, having the same nature. But the following example. Gold has in this sub-classification, the whole colour, weight, malleability, &c.; pomenclature might be exhausted but we ascribe not the phenomena to name the classes. We trust it belonging to one property, to any will be evident, that the general other, yet we ascribe them all to principle of classification is suffi. the one mass, and to its every parcient for our guidance in mental ticle. So we ascribe to that one analysis; although we may some. indivisible essence, which we call times have occasion to make a mind, all mental phenomena, but secondary class, the principle and to each faculty its appropriate reason of which will hereafter be character and exercise, and not the explained.
same to another faculty, or to all According to the general prin indiscriminately. ciple of classification, we denomi Faculty is an inherent and insenate the faculties of the mind. Let parable property of the human us be understood in our use of the mind, which has its own peculiar term faculty. We mean what is character, and all the faculties besometimes called capacity, proper- long to the mind. We ascertain ty, preparedness, or adaptedness; the character of each faculty by its something antecedent to the exer- appropriate phenomena. The facise which developes its character. culties are the real basis of classiThe faculties of the mind are the fication in all mental phenomena, simple elements of mental science, because each faculty exhibits its and somewhat difficult logically to own peculiar character, in its own define. We may use other terms exercises. But we must pursue to express the same simple ideas; the inductive method,-learn first but that will not furnish logical the character of the phenomena, definitions. We may also guard then by them the character of the our meaning, by dissociating such faculty to which they belong. things as others might be liable to When, therefore, all the phenosuppose belonged to our intention. mena are classed, and the characThe latter may be important. We ter of each faculty ascertained, their do not mean by faculty, a distinct whole estimate indicates the charagent, as if the mind were a habita- acter of the mind. Thus it will be tion of different agents; nor do we perceived there are three stages in mean parts of the mind, as if it the process of this examinationwere divisible like matter. The the first is the character and clasmind is one indivisible agent, ca sification of the phenomena-sepable of knowing, feeling and will- cond, the character of each faculty, ing. This capability is what we third, the character of mind.
Now if we were conscious of that tions, thoughts and volitions, or of spiritual essence itself, and could the faculties, as to speak of the take cognizance directly of its state of mind: in all we might character and properties, this pro- speak truth. If the phraseology cess would be unnecessary. We be intended merely as a caution should then know, with certainty, against considering mental phenoall the mind's properties and prin- mena material, it is very well, ciples of action, and precisely how nothing is lost by the word state; it would act in all supposable cir- but if it mean any thing more, it cumstances. This would be know. may not be so harmless. It adds ing the mind in some measure as nothing to the definiteness of God knows it. Possibly this may thought or expression. The mind be one thing included in the apos. in action, is just as definite as mind tle's assurance of knowledge, when in a state of action-the mind feelthat which is in part shall be done ing, as in a state of feeling-the away~" then shall I know even mind willing, as in a state of voli. as I am known.” But such know- tion. Still we admit that the state ledge, and such method of acquire of the mind is ascertained by the ing knowledge, are denied to us in phenomena, but they are not the our present state. We must now same; and we have an objection to examine facts as they come under use a term differently from its proour cognizance, and by slow de- per significance, and without gaingrees learn their character and re- ing any thing in the definiteness lations, to acquire a useful and prac- sought, especially when the term is tical knowledge, even of ourselves. intended to denote any important
It has been said that faculties distinction. and exercises of mind are only dif In order to be the better underferent states, in which the mind ex- stood, we state here the result of ists. This may be true or it may our general classification, so far as be false, just as it is understood. the names of the faculties are conThe term state is so indefinite as to cerned, before we give the process furnish a cover for almost any con- and application of the principle in ceivable associations of thought; detail. The general faculties are and yet the acute metaphysician, three, understanding, or faculty of Payne, who uses the phraseology, knowing; heart, or faculty of feelmay have had an entirely correct ing; will, or faculty of volition. view of the facts. The term may Having disposed of three inquimean condition, modification, rela- ries, namely, concerning the mind tion, quality, or character. It is itself, the meaning of faculty, and true that qualities belong to sub- the principle of classing mental stances, and have not a separate phenomena, it will be convenient to existence; so actions are evanes close this article with some general cent, and cannot exist without au remarks, on the application of our agent; but the agent and action principle in distinguishing mental are not the same thing. Connect- operations. We call it our princied with mind, action has existence, ple, not because we claim to have quality, mode, relation and charac- discovered it, but because we adopt ter, not independently, but as ex and use it. Indeed we affect no pressive of mind. As objects of originality in these discussions ; consciousness, therefore, mental and our main object is to simplify actions, thoughts and emotions, the application and use of known have real existence, and are not principles. mind, nor its condition, but indices In applying the principle of clasof its character. We may as well sification, it is obviously the first speak of the state of mental affec- step to examine carefully the sha
racter of the phenomena. To do lations and circumstances may this successfully, we must examine furnish reasons for sub-classificaeach exercise distinctly, and com- tions, or the distribution of genera pare it with others, that we may into species, but never can be a rule avoid mistaking the character, and by which to discover generick difshun confusion in the arrangement. ferences, or to form general classes After all, it must be confessed, there of mental phenomena. It may is a difficulty in the process. It is sometimes be convenient, as has aldifficult to apply the principle to ready been intimated, to employ thoughts which are evanesceni, feel these secondary, or specifick clasings which are transient, and voli. sifications, in our mental investigations which are momentary. We tions, but it will make great contu. cannot lay them by in some repo- sion to dispense with generick sitory, and examine them at our classes. leisure, as we analyze material We do not expect in these essubstances in the laboratory of the says, to examine all the phenomena chemist. We must take cogni- of mind, or all of any one class of zance of them as they pass in in- exercises, but to furnish sufficient stantaneous succession, and if we specimens to illustrate and settle continue the examination, recollec- both the principle and the process tion must furnish the subject. of classification. In our next, we
But there is less difficulty in ap- propose to apply the principle to plying this principle of classifica- several phenomena, and examine tion, than any other which we have their connexion with the mind's caseen, or of which we can form any pabilities.
F. conception. If relations and circumstances are to form the rule of classification, we cannot reduce
PRACTICAL METHODISM. them to form, or complete the work of distribution. If we take the ob
(Continued from p. 25.) jects of thought, feeling, and voli. To the Editor of the Christian Advocate. tion, as the basis of classing mental Rev. and dear Sir, phenomena, there will be as little In the present paper, I shall conprospect of relief and success. On fine myself to some general rethis principle, our classification marks on the effects of Methodism must be confused, and our labour on the church, and on the world. interminable. It is not at all won By way of preliminary, I would derful that philosophers, who have state,that I am very far from depreciattempted classification on the prin- ating the good the Methodists are acciple of relations, or of objects, have complishing all around us. I do, yea, uniformly failed of success, both in and will rejoice, that through their distinctness and completion. All zeal and activity, the lamp of the variety in circumstance, complexity, gospel is carried to many sitting in or objects, would, in such a case, the regions of darkness. In the indicate a different state of mind. wild wastes, and new settlements What, therefore, becomes of the of our country, as well as in foreign principle of distribution? It be- lands, they are accomplishing much, comes a mere arbitrary name of re which without them, would probasemblance, or else there will be no bly remain undone. But yet, in limit to the number of classes. But several respects, I think the effects if resemblance, or difference, in the of their influence are very much to nature of exercises, be the principle be deplored. And of classification, we have some pros 1. As it regards the church. pect of cognizable distinction, and Here the first obvious effect of their the completion of our labour. Re- influence, is in lowering the stand