universal corruption and wickedness, as well as guilt, which he had before largely treated of.”—Vol. ii. p. 512.

Though the word impute is not used with respect to Adam's sin, yet it is said, all have sinned; which respecting infants, can be true only of their sinning by this sin. And it is said, by his disobedience many were made sinners; and judgment came upon all by that sing and that, by this means death (the wages of sin) passed on all men, &c. Which phrases amount to full and precise explanations of the word impute; and therefore do more certainly determine the point really insisted on."-vol. ii. p. 517.

IV. The ground both of the imputation of Adam's first sin, and of the derivation of depravity from him, is, in the judgment of President Edwards, a divinely constituted ONENESS or IDENTITY.

"And I am persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created union or oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects he pleases, may not establish a constitution, whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as ONE with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness and consequent corruption and guilt."-vol. ii. p. 557.

What does the President mean by this divinely constituted oneness?

1. Not the union that subsists between the root of a tree and its branches. He refers to this for illustration; but he knew that Adam was not literally speaking a root, nor his posterity branches. Our Saviour calls himself the true vine, and his disciples branches: but no one ever supposed him to mean that he was, literally speaking, a vine.

2. Not PERSONAL IDENTITY. Until very recently I had no concep tion that any one could charge on Edwards so great an absurdity, as to affirm that he taught, that Adam and his posterity were one natural person. He indeed refers to personal identity to prove the general truth, that all kinds of oneness depend on divine constitution. But he certainly does not teach the absurdity that Adam and his posterity make one person.

"Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as ANY identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God's sovereign constitution. And so it appears, that the objection we are upon, made against a supposed constitution, whereby Adam and his posterity are viewed and treated as ONE, in the manner, and for the purposes supposed, as if it were not consistent with truth, because no constitution can make those to be one which are not one; I say it appears that this objection is built on a false hypothesis, for it appears, that a divine constitution is the thing which makes truth in affairs of this nature."-p. 556.-See the next paragraph.

If Adam and his posterity were one person, then his sin would have been one personal sin, and the act of eating the forbidden fruit would have been one personal act. But Edwards expressly denies this. "It is there observed, as a proof of this doctrine, that death reigned over them which had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression; i. e. by their personal act, and therefore could be exposed to death, only by deriving guilt and pollution from Adam in conse quence of his sin."-p. 510.

Another thing urged against the imputation of Adam's sin, is this:Though in Scripture, sin is said to be imputed, reckoned, accounted to a person, it is no other than his own act and deed.' How does

Edwards answer this objection? Does he affirm the act of Adam to be our own personal act? This he would have done, if he had held the absurd notion, that we were personally one with Adam. Not so. His answer is founded on an admission of the fact that Adam's act was not our personal act, nor his sin our personal sin. See p. 570.

3. Not the NATURAL UNION subsisting between a parent and his children.

"By reason of the established union between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise be tween him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam's race, betwixt whom is no such constituted union; as between children and other ancestors."-p. 559.

What then does the President mean? I take it to be a divinely constituted COVENANT union.

"It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly viewed and treated as sinners, truly guilty and children of wrath on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression; at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the COVENANT which God had established; even as much as if each of mankind had the like COVENANT established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself."

The whole of sect. 3, part 2, chap. 1, pp. 424-438, in which the President proves that Adam was our federal head and representative, might here be quoted.

The editors of the Repertory have, in my opinion, misunderstood the language of Edwards, in one place. It is true he does say, in reference to the sin of the apostacy,

"It is truly and properly ours;" but this declaration is not "the very reverse" of Turretin's affirmation, "non potest esse peccatum nostrum proprium et personale." Let it be observed, that Edwards has elsewhere denied it to be our personal sin, and in this he agrees with Turretin. What then, it may be asked, is meant by the President in the assertion quoted? Let us look at the whole passage, and try to discover his meaning. It reads thus:

"From what has been observed it may appear there is no sure ground to conclude that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the sin of the first apostacy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become their sin; by virtue of a real union between the root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence) established by the Author of the whole system of the universe; to whose establishment is owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full consent of the hearts of Adam's posterity to that first apostacy. And therefore the sin of the apostacy is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground, God imputes it to them." -p. 559.

By the sin of the apostacy, Edwards means that sin by which mankind were ruined; original sin, which includes, according to his statement in the commencement of his discussion, already quoted, both the guilt of Adam's first sin and innate depravity. He does not deny the imputation of this sin; on the contrary, he asserts it in this very paragraph, when he says it "is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them;" and we have shown before how strongly he proves the guilt of Adam's first sin to be imputed to his posterity. He

is stating in what respects the sin of the apostacy is "truly and properly theirs." Two reasons are assigned: the first is, "a real union between" Adam and his offspring; that is, a covenant union established by divine appointment; the second is, "the full consent of the hearts of Adam' posterity to that first apostacy." Now on these two accounts, Edwards thinks that sin to be " truly and properly, but not personally, theirs," and is therefore justly imputed to them."

In the first reason Edwards accords with Boston, who says, "Adam's sin is imputed to us, because it is ours. For God doth not reckon a thing ours, which is not so, Rom. ii. 2-"The judgment of God is according to truth." For God's justice doth not punish men for a sin which is no way theirs. And it is our sin upon the account aforesaid," (that is, "because we are all included in Adam's covenant,"―p. 299.) "Even as Christ's righteousness is ours by virtue of our union to him.”—Vol. i, p. 300. Here Boston assigns our covenant union to Adam as the ground of the imputation of his sin to us. Yet he maintains that it is oURs by imputation, and that imputation of it is antecedent to depravity. In proof of the former part of this assertion, I offer this quotation: "First, original sin consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin. Guilt is an obligation to punishment. For this sin, which is OURS by imputation, we are liable to punishment. This guilt lies on all men by nature, Rom. v. 18. And this guilt of Adam's first sin is original sin imputed."-Vol. i, p. 305. In support of the latter part of the assertion, the following quotation will afford conclusive proof. "This want of original righteousness is a sin, being a want of conformity to the law of God, which requires all moral perfection. It is also a punishment of sin, and so is justly inflicted by God. And though the

want of this righteousness be sin, yet God's depriving man of it, or rather the not giving it him, is a most just act; seeing Adam, having got it for himself and his posterity, threw it away, and God is not obliged to restore it. And it can be no other sin but the first sin, whereof this withholding of original righteousness is the punishment. So true it is, that if the imputation of Adam's first sin be denied, original sin is quite rased; THERE IS NO FOUNDATION LEFT FOR IT."-Vol. i. p. 306.

Boston then teaches, in accordance with Edwards, that the sin of the apostacy is really ours, on account of the covenant union of Adam and his posterity; and that for this reason it is justly imputed to us. But he does not assert that it is our personal sin, or that we did personally commit it. Nor does Edwards advance such an absurd sentiment; he affirms the contrary. It is true he assigns as another reason why this sin is to be considered as the sin of mankind, "the full consent of their hearts;" but this ought not so to be construed as if he believed the sin of the apostacy to be our personal sin, nor as if he supposed it to be imputed to mankind-solely because they consented to it with their hearts; for he states expressly the other reason, in which, it is presumed, Turretin would have united. It is true that Edwards inverts the order of Boston and of standard writers, in regard to imputation and depravity; yet he does teach that both result from the covenant union between Adam and his posterity: "The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself."-P. 544. This speculation, however, cannot with propriety be urged against those full statements which we have

seen he makes in regard to the imputation of Adam's first sin. He certainly does not symbolize with those who boldly affirm we have no more to do with Adam's sin, than we have to do with any other man's sins; and then contradict themselves, by saying that the certainty of all mankind sinning, is the result of Adam's apostacy.

Paul says, [Heb. vii. 9, 10,] "Levi also, who receiveth tythes, payed tythes IN ABRAHAM. For he was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchisedeck met him." The Shorter Catechism says, "The covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his posterity; all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned IN HIM and fell, and fell with him in his first transgression." The words payed and sinned are, let it be observed, both active verbs; both express action. In reading Paul's affirmation, did any man of sense ever suppose the inspired writer intended to teach that Levi did actually and personally pay tithes, before he was born? Surely not. Why then should any man of sense conceive that the framers of the Catechism intended to teach the monstrous absurdity, that mankind actually and personally sinned, before they were born?

A. B.

MEMOIR OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN
WICKES.

(Continued from p. 80.) We shall now lay before our readers the letters of Capt. Wickes, to which he refers in the close of the last quotation we have made from his manuscript, and to which we have adverted, as "indicating the general state of his mind for several years in succession." We have before us many more of his letters, of much the same character; but these were selected and transcribed by himself, as appen

dages to his narrative, accompanied by the remarks which follow them. We think they will be read with much interest, and we hope with some benefit, by those who have had some experience themselves of the trials and conflicts through which he passed. Of every exercised Christian they will doubtless command the sympathy; and certainly they should excite gratitude to God, in those whose pilgrimage has been conducted along a less thorny path. As we shall insert but little in addition to his letters and narrative, descriptive of the state of his mind to the end of life, it may be proper just to mention, that these papers appear to have been written or transcribed, about seventeen years before his death; and that, in general, his last years were of a more tranquil character than those of an earlier periodnot, however, without turns of melancholick depression, even to the last. After the letters, we shall return to trace the leading events of his life; several of which are of considerable interest, and illustrative of his excellent character, and of the high estimation in which he was held by those who knew him best-The following letters were addressed to "The Rev. Joseph Eastburn."

At Sea, Dec. 7th, 1797. My Precious Friend,-I wrote you from Calcutta, I think, by way of New York, and I remember that a part of it might give you reason to hope that I was rejoicing in a covenant God, in Christ Jesus. I vainly hoped then, that I had an interest in him,-now alas, it is otherwise; truly, my friend, I am near distraction, and without speedy relief, from a God of grace and mercy, I shall be lost. The enemy comes in like a flood, so that I have no rest, day nor night: and in place of the precious drawing spirit of Christ, that gives hope, and encourages under darkness, I con